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ABSTRACT

The inability to gather, analyze and share various aspects of an attack has made it
difficult to effectively counter real-world information system attacks. The lack of a
formally defined vocabulary which can express an “attacker‟s-perspective” makes
collaboration of academic research difficult. These problems lead to significant confusion
by security managers and decision makers who are constantly bombarded by the media and
security vendors attempting to describe or prevent the latest attack (Hoglund & McGraw,
2004).
The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration Classification (CAPEC) Release 1
Dictionary defines attack patterns as a formalized representation of a computer attacker‟s
tools, methodologies, and perspective (capec.mitre.org, 2007). CAPEC provides a formal
definition of each attack by providing descriptive textual fields. These fields, defined as
elements, provide explicit details for each identified attack pattern. The current CAPEC
release includes a list of 101 specific information system attacks. Each attack pattern may
include up to 30 elements to describe attack details.
While CAPEC has addressed the need to create a standard for representing and
defining attacks from an attacker‟s perspective, issues pertaining to usability and
consistency exist. The goal of this research is to further refine and extend the CAPEC
framework in order to provide usability and consistency. Issues of usability arise when
CAPEC adopters attempt to leverage the Release 1 dictionary because of the sheer amount
of information presented (Engebretson, Pauli, & Streff, 2008). Furthermore, while the

vii
details of each attack pattern are extremely valuable, CAPEC does not provide a consistent
level of documentation for each element among the 101 attack patterns.
Our approach includes three distinct processes to take the vast repository of CAPEC
information and create a usable and consistent model for leveraging attack pattern details in
system security configurations.
Process one creates a framework for general parent mitigations for each attack
pattern. Parent mitigations are abstracted directly from the “solutions and mitigation”
element in CAPEC and adds the appropriate National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) based Parent Mitigation element (Engebretson et al., 2008). These
solutions and mitigations improve the resistance of the target software and reduce the
likelihood of the attack‟s success. They also improve the resilience of the target software
and reduce the impact of the attack if it is successful.
Process two re-includes a Parent level Threat as an attack pattern element. The
Parent Threat element places all 101 of the attack patterns into context without having to
manually interact with both the full Release 1 dictionary and the CAPEC Classification
Tree, thus ridding our approach of this manual research. We also use the Parent Threat
element to provide structure in our hierarchy-based graphical models. Textual attack
descriptions for viewing attack patterns are created to provide additional details about each
attack pattern in a consistent manner.
Process three creates two security metrics, Knock-Out Effect (KOE) and Parent
Mitigation Power (PMP), to provide usability to CAPEC. The addition of security metrics
to our approach allows adopters to quickly and accurately leverage the vast amount of
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information provided by the CAPEC standard from both the individual attack pattern and
parent mitigation perspectives.
The result of this dissertation is an approach for increasing the usability and
consistency of the CAPEC standard. The use of a taxonomy for cataloging and organizing
attacks can increase awareness and communication about attacks as well as provide a
framework for collecting consistent data about each attack (Hansman & Hunt, 2005).
Process one abstracts nearly 400 unique mitigation strategies into one of 17
commonly accepted, Parent Mitigations. Process two re-includes the “Parent Threat”
element into the dictionary to provide consistency and context to each attack pattern. The
creation of graphical hierarchies and textual attack descriptions are used to provide CAPEC
with visual and textual representations for each attack without becoming overwhelming to
the user. The introduction of a defined hierarchy between descriptive elements assists with
learning and processing attack patterns. The significance of this process is a much clearer
and less convoluted picture of the attack, resulting in a more usable and appropriate
element set.
Process three creates security metrics derived from defined mitigation strategies,
which creates a measurable numeric value which can allow security personnel to make
more informed security decisions, play "what-if" security scenarios, and quickly analyze
the cost-benefit for mitigation strategies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
In the United States and around the globe, information systems make up a critical
component of communication, commerce, and control of the physical infrastructure
(Benioff & Lazowska, 2005). Along with data, infrastructure components include
networks, computers, routers, domain servers, switches, and transmission lines (Bishop,
2003). Taken together, these systems allow for the exchange and flow of information.
These connections can be tied directly to one another through dedicated paths or indirectly
through the ubiquity of interlaced, non-centralized networks. Unbounded networks, such as
the Internet, represent a growing collection of interconnected systems, devices and
organizations (Ellison et al., 1999). Because of their distributed nature and lack of central
control, unbounded networks increase both risk and exposure to abuse. It is not possible for
any system connected to an unbounded network to be completely immune from attack
(Ellison et al., 1997). The digital infrastructure of unbound networks provides new areas
and avenues for malicious exploitation leaving governments, corporations, and private
citizens vulnerable to such attacks. The protection and securing of this infrastructure is
vital, as their destruction would have an immediate impact on the economy, livelihood, and
psychology of the nation (Chakrabarti & Manimaran, 2002; Lewis, 2006).
The US Department of Homeland Security defines critical infrastructure into 11
sectors (Lewis, 2006).
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1. Agriculture
2. Water
3. Public Health
4. Emergency Services
5. Defense Industrial Base
6. Telecommunications
7. Energy
8. Transportation
9. Banking and Finance
10. Chemical and Hazardous Materials
11. Postal and Shipping

Each of the 11 critical infrastructures relies heavily on the use of information
technology and interconnected systems through the use of unbounded networks (Ellison et
al., ; Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001).
Integrating security throughout the entire organization has long been understood as being
very important (Hoglund & McGraw, 2004).
A wide variety of standards and technologies have emerged to address the rise of
security risks. Generally, these standards and technologies are grouped into one of four
categories, which include: 1) standards and policies, 2) library and tools, 3) administrative
and system management, and 4) physical tools (Wang & Wang, 2003). Standards and
policies are a series of best practices that work to alleviate specific security issues.
Libraries and tools are integrated directly into the software development process and have
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the ability to provide protection from the planning phase. Administrative and management
technologies include any tool that a system administrator would use to guard against
security attacks. Physical tools include physical and external hardware designed for the
specific purpose of security protection (Wang & Wang, 2003). Most security managers
attempt to provide system security by using a combination of these standards and
technologies. Unfortunately, these standards and technologies alone are not enough to fully
prevent all attacks from executing and causing harm to the software system.
The loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information systems due to
security problems such as Trojan horses, backdoors, denial of services, viruses, worms,
misuse, buffer overflows, and configuration errors continues to rise. Even though these
attacks have been studied, the appropriate mitigation strategies and solutions are not well
understood.
Each year, the number, severity and sophistication of computer, network, and
software security attacks continues to increase at an alarming rate (Hansman & Hunt,
2005). The ability to organize, comprehend and disseminate these attacks is a critical
component in defending against them. System administrators, managers, and security
experts must be able to understand the individual characteristics of each attack as well as
how the attacks relate to one another (Jajodia, 2007). As the complexity of systems,
networks and software continues to grow, the ability to keep track of attack specific details
and relationships becomes increasingly difficult.
The process of learning, dissecting and understanding computer, network, and
software security attacks requires an extra ordinary amount of effort. The need for a
standard which addresses multiple audiences is important as security depends on people in
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many different capacities, such as requirement specifiers, designers, coders, users,
maintenance personnel, managers, and administrators (Neumann, 2004). The use of a
formal language and defined structure provides a modular approach which eases the
inclusion and discovery of new attacks as well as giving users an increased ability to
predict new attacks (DeLooze, 2004).
In March of 2007, the National Cyber Security Division of the Department of
Homeland Security in conjunction with Cigital and MITRE Corporation released an
official dictionary of 101 attack patterns. The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and
Classification (CAPEC) Release 1 Dictionary provides an official schema and formal
representation for defining attack patterns (Barnum & Amit, 2006a; capec.mitre.org, 2007).
CAPEC further organizes attack patterns by gathering and displaying both primary and
supporting data elements for each identified attack (Sean Barnum, 2007) .

1.2. Problem Definition
The inability to gather, analyze and share various aspects of an attack has made it
difficult to effectively counter real-world information system attacks. The lack of a
formally defined vocabulary which can express an “attacker‟s-perspective” makes
collaboration of research difficult. Simultaneously, this problem leads to significant
confusion by security managers and decision makers who are constantly bombarded by the
media and security vendors attempting to describe or prevent the latest attack (Hoglund &
McGraw, 2004).
A taxonomy is needed in order to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of
information system attacks (Chakrabarti & Manimaran, 2002). While a wide variety of
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network, computer and software security attack classifications have been suggested, very
few have attempted to address more than one specific audience (Lindqvist & Jonsson,
1997). CAPEC provides a useful framework for classifying attacks, but each of the 101
attack patterns provides approximately 30 descriptive fields, thus making it difficult to
implement. (Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a, 2008b).
While CAPEC has addressed the need to create an industry standard for
representing attacks from an attacker‟s perspective, several issues pertaining to usability
and consistency remain as introduced below.
1.

CAPEC’s Release 1 Dictionary is inconsistent level of information for
“Solutions and Mitigation” element. CAPEC includes nearly 400 individually
prescribed controls in the “Solutions and Mitigations” element. These controls can
be used to mitigate or reduce the effects of the defined 101 attack patterns. The
current level of detail documented in the “Solutions and Mitigations” element is
inconsistent. Some attack patterns provide an extremely granular level of detail. For
example, one of the prescribed mitigations for attack pattern 42 (MIME
Conversion) calls for disabling “the 7 to 8 bit conversion by removing the F=9 flag
from all Mailer specifications in the sendmail.cf file.” (capec.mitre.org, 2007). This
level of detail may lead CAPEC adopters to believe that they need not be concerned
with MIME Conversion attacks if they implement a Microsoft Exchange server
rather than a Sendmail-based email server. Such a mistake could lead to an
increased attack exposure and a false sense of security. The reverse is also true;
some attack patterns provide only a high level overview of potential mitigation
strategies. Attack pattern 9 (Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities)
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includes the “Do not unnecessarily expose services” mitigation (capec.mitre.org,
2007). This is too vague and undefined to be of use. The Solutions and Mitigations
is also inconsistent in its specificity of mitigation. As demonstrated in the example
above some solutions are presented at the architectural level while others are
presented at the system or product level.

2.

CAPEC’s Release 1 Dictionary is inconsistent use of elements to describe
attack patterns. In many cases attack pattern elements are missing completely.
CAPEC‟s disjointed structure leads to confusion and frustration when attempting to
make use of the current CAPEC Dictionary (Engebretson et al., 2008). The
inconsistent use of elements makes it problematic to discern the relationship, if any,
between the descriptive fields. The lack of a defined and consistent structure makes
it difficult for new adopters to fully understand the context of each attack. This
problem is exacerbated when descriptive elements are missing. The current
inconsistent use of elements and presentation of information represents a significant
challenge to increased adoption of CAPEC (Engebretson et al., 2008; J Pauli &
Engebretson, 2008a, 2008b).

3.

The volume of information presented to users is overwhelming. CAPEC defines
101 unique attack patterns. Each attack pattern can make use of up to 28 elements
to describe attack details. Given the number of attacks and volume of information
presented about each attack, deep understanding of the CAPEC library is difficult
(Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a). This issue is further complicated by the inability to
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quickly and accurately discern related attack patterns. Ideally, a user interested in
CAPEC attack patterns should be able to quickly and accurately identify the threat
family that the particular attack pattern belongs to. The lack of a formally defined
“Parent Threat” element results in a disjointed presentation. The parent threat data
is currently available via the CAPEC website, but it is not part of the 101 formal
attack pattern definitions. This structure leads to confusion and frustration when
attempting to make use of the current CAPEC Dictionary (Engebretson & Pauli,
2008).

4.

CAPEC R1 does not include associated metrics to measure the effectiveness of
chosen mitigation strategies. The CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary does not include
any metrics which can be used to measure the effectiveness of prescribed mitigation
strategies. Metrics are a critical component in aiding security related decisions. The
lack of a defined metric remains a significant hurdle to the widespread adoption of
CAPEC outside of academia. The creation of a metric would provide value for
many potential CAPEC adopters including software designers, administrators,
managers and researchers (Engebretson & Pauli, 2008).

1.3. Objectives and Approach
Our objective is to develop and demonstrate an approach that meets the needs of the
problem definition.
1.

Create a Parent Mitigation element for inclusion into the CAPEC standard to
provide consistency to the currently given child mitigations. This objective will
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simultaneously create a manageable and serviceable list of accepted mitigation
strategies.
2.

Creation of an enhanced CAPEC view to augment the existing CAPEC standard by
re-include the Parent Threat element into the view to provide logical grouping of
the 101 Attack Patterns at the Parent Threat level.

3.

Further refine the enhanced CAPEC view by trimming the element set. Only
descriptive elements which have an entry in each of the 101 attack patterns will be
considered for inclusion into the view. This will provide a consistent framework
for viewing the details of each attack pattern.

4.

Create a graphical representation and textual description of each attack pattern for
purpose of viewing information in a condensed and meaningful way. This will
provide contextual information for each attack.

5.

Create security metrics from the CAPEC standard which can be used to make
security related decisions. These metrics provide a numeric value to help make
security decisions for different situations that include specific threats.

Our objectives are accomplished through the creation of an approach that includes
three processes which provide a level of consistency and standardization to the CAPEC
library that it had previously lacked. Our models specify which information needs to be
documented for each attack and how that information is documented. We also provide
context through the use of standardized threats and mitigations. These threats and
mitigations frame each attack and provide relationship data between each attack element.
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Our approach is best understood when broken down into three distinct processes which
provide a level of consistency to make the CAPEC library more useable for multiple
audiences including requirement specifiers, designers, coders, users, maintenance
personnel, managers, and administrators. A breakdown of our approach is introduced in
Figure 1.

Figure 1. High-Level Overview of Our Approach with Problem Addressed.

Process one creates a framework for introducing a series of general Parent
Mitigations for each attack pattern. Attack patterns can be defined as a formalized
representation of an attacker‟s perspective including specific and clear terminology
(Barnum, 2008). Parent mitigations are abstracted directly from the “solutions and
mitigation” element currently defined in the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary. CAPEC
provides the following definition for the “Solutions and Mitigations” element: “the actions
or approaches that can potentially prevent or mitigate the risk of this type of attack. These
solutions and mitigations are targeted to improve the resistance of the target software and
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thereby reduce the likelihood of the attack‟s success or to improve the resilience of the
target software and thereby reduce the impact of the attack if it is successful” (Barnum,
2008).
This element is a required field in order to make the standard effective for
mitigating attacks (Engebretson et al., 2008). Ideally, a user concerned with a given attack
pattern must be able to review the CAPEC standard for the particular attack and formulate
a plan for reducing exposure to the attack. However, as previously highlighted some attack
patterns provide details that are too granular while others provide information that are too
vague. The objective of this process is to leverage this vast repository of attack pattern
information and add an addition layer of information thus providing a uniform standard for
mitigation strategies for each attack pattern.
Process one adds the appropriate NIST-based Parent Mitigation element. In the first
step, mitigations are listed individually from the CAPEC “Solutions and Mitigation”
element to create a list. Each mitigation is then matched up to a corresponding NIST Child
Element from the NIST 800-53r2 control list (NIST, 2007). The final step in Process 1 is to
abstract the NIST Child level control to its corresponding Parent level control. The Parent
level control is then documented as a new mitigation element. This process is repeated for
each control listed under the current CAPEC “Solutions and Mitigation” element.
Just as adding a level of consistency to the mitigation element is an important step
in increasing usability, another benefit of this process is the creation of a unifying Parent
Threat element (Engebretson et al., 2008). While this information is available via the
CAPEC website, it is currently separated from the formal attack pattern definitions
(capec.mitre.org, 2007). Process 2 re-includes a Parent level threat as an attack pattern
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element. The goal of adding the Parent Threat element to the formal definition set is to
assist in placing all 101 of the attack patterns into context without having to manually
interact with both the full Release 1 dictionary and the CAPEC Classification Tree. Adding
Parent Threat as a formal element increases usability by simplifying the process of
identifying threat families. We also use the Parent Threat element to provide structure and
introduce the top node in our hierarchy-based model for viewing attack patterns. The
purpose of this hierarchy is to logically group each attack pattern with related attack
patterns from the same Parent Threat.
An illustration of this point can be seen by examining attack pattern 101, “Server
Side Includes”. The CAPEC website provides the following elements to describe Attack
Pattern 101: Attack Pattern ID, Typical Severity, Description, Attack Pattern Prerequisites,
Typical Likelihood of Exploit, Methods of Attack, Examples-Instances, Attacker Skill or
Knowledge Required, Resources Required, Probing Techniques, Solutions and Mitigations,
Attack Motivation Consequences, Context Description, Injection Vector, Payload,
Activation Zone, Payload Activation Impact, Related Weaknesses, Related Security
Principles, Related Guidelines, Purpose, CIA Impact, Technical Context, and Source.
In order to determine the general threat classification, a CAPEC user is forced to
navigate away from the “Full CAPEC Dictionary” on the CAPEC web site and search the
“CAPEC Classification Tree”. The user must then wade through three levels of detail to
uncover “Server Side Includes” (attack pattern 101) as a member of the “Injection” threat
family.
Our hierarchy structure also increases usability by documenting relationships
between the descriptive elements. In order to facilitate learning and foster a deeper
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understanding of attack patterns, our model reduces the number of descriptive elements
displayed. Using a smaller number of elements presents adopters with a more manageable
and usable dataset. Trimming the current CAPEC dataset and presenting the elements in a
hierarchical fashion was a technique previously used to introduce students to the concept of
attack patterns without overwhelming the audience (Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a). The
trimmed element set provides usability, consistency, structure, and logical organization to
the model. The top of this model will include the 11 Parent Threats and be tied together at
the bottom of the hierarchy by 17 Parent Mitigations which were introduced in Process 1.
An example of this model is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Trimmed Hierarchical Model for Viewing Attack Patterns.

The hierarchy can be traversed in either direction. Each attack pattern is framed by
the use of Parent Threats at the top of the hierarchy and Parent Mitigations at the bottm.
These elements serve to provide natural grouping and context. Process 3 creates two

13
security metrics as part of each hierarchy and textual attack description. Our first metric,
Knock-Out Effect (KOE), is the total number of Parent Mitigations abstracted in Process 1
for each attack pattern. KOE provides a metric for quickly determining the number of
Parent Mitigations needed to fully mitigate an individual attack pattern. This metric
remains the same for each attack pattern no matter what the system configuration is.
Our second metric, Parent Mitigation Power (PMP), is calculated at the conclusion
of Process 3. PMP is a numeric summary expressing two types of mitigation in a “X.Y”
format, where:


X = Number of unique attacks that the parent mitigation helped to mitigate.



Y = Total number of child mitigations that can be traced back to the parent
mitigation.

It is important to note the goal of our approach is not to challenge or advocate
replacement of the current CAPEC standard. Original element details will always be
readily available in addition to the hierarchy and textual attack descriptions that our
approach creates.
Our approach will make use of the design science research methodology.
Specifically use the seminal work which formalized these concepts for the IS world to
ensure that our methodology is appropriately applied (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004).
Design science was chosen because of its natural fit with our approach. The goal of design
science is to extend human and organizational capabilities through the creation of artifacts
and models. Our artifact is a model which combines two federally funded standards, NIST
and CAPEC, into a singular consistent framework.
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Our work can be evaluated by examining each of the seven guidelines prescribed by
Hevner et al., (2004).



Guideline 1: Design as an Artifact
o Requirement: “Design-science must produce a viable artifact in the form of
a construct, a model, a method, or an instantiation.” (Hevner et al., 2004)
o How our work meets Guideline 1: Our work provides an innovative
solution, in the form of a model, which solves a previously identified and
unsolved problem.



Guideline 2: Problem Relevance
o Requirement: “The objective of design-science research is to develop
technology based solutions to important and relevant business problems”
(Hevner et al., 2004)
o How our work meets Guideline 2: Our work is based on problems which
have been identified, discussed, and accepted into the knowledgebase.
Specifically, CAPEC is too large and inconsistent to be useful outside of a
theoretical context. (Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a, 2008b).



Guideline 3: Design Evaluation
o Requirement: “The utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artifact must be
rigorously demonstrated via well-executed evaluation methods.” (Hevner et
al., 2004)
o How our work meets Guideline 3: Our work can be viewed as functional,
complete, and consistent. Furthermore our work was completed in an
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iterative sequence which allowed several cycles of incremental activity and
evaluation while the model was being developed. Our model solves each of
the identified problem statements. We make use of informed argument,
experimental and analytical validation techniques. We provide details of the
validation techniques in the Discussion section of each chapter. We provide
further validation through the execution and simulation of our model by use
of a case study comprised of 11 attack patterns.


Guideline 4: Research Contributions
o Requirement: “Effective design-science research must provide clear and
verifiable contributions in the areas of the design artifact, design
foundations, and/or design methodologies.” (Hevner et al., 2004)
o How our work meets Guideline 4: Our approach provides new and
interesting contributions by providing an artifact which solves a heretofore
unsolved problem. Our contribution is a model. This design artifact applies
existing knowledge in new and innovative ways.



Guideline 5: Research Rigor
o Requirement: “Design-science research relies upon the application of
rigorous methods in both the construction and evaluation of the design
artifact.” (Hevner et al., 2004)
o How our work meets Guideline 5: “The artifact itself must be rigorously
defined, formally represented, coherent, and internally consistent” (Hevner
et al., 2004). Our work clearly follows this guideline through the creation of
a defined, represented, consistent model which is presented in Figure 1. We
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provide further rigor through application of the knowledgebase. Both
CAPEC and NIST are well established, highly respected standards. Our
work relies on the use and application of these bodies to provide rigor.


Guideline 6: Design as a Search Process
o Requirement: “The search for an effective artifact requires utilizing
available means to reach desired ends while satisfying laws in the problem
environment.” (Hevner et al., 2004)
o How our work meets Guideline 6: Our artifact was created through an
iterative process. Our development cycle consisted of construction,
feedback, and incorporation of feedback into a new model. This process
was repeated over a half a dozen times.



Guideline 7: Communication of Research
o Requirement: “Design-science research must be presented effectively both
to technology-oriented as well as management-oriented audiences.” (Hevner
et al., 2004)
o How our work meets Guideline 7: This dissertation and the subsequent
academic publications serve to provide communication to technical
audiences. Our approach as provided in this dissertation is well documented
and can be used to establish repeatability for further research. The scenarios
provided in each chapter, future grant applications, and whitepapers will
provide communication to business oriented audiences. Research
communication is also being achieved by incorporating the research results
into teaching.
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1.4. Results and Significance
The result of this dissertation is an approach for increasing the usability and
consistency of the CAPEC standard. The use of a taxonomy for cataloging and organizing
attacks can increase awareness and communication about attacks as well as provide a
framework for collecting consistent data about each attack (Hansman & Hunt, 2005).
While the current CAPEC standard provides a significant amount of information, there are
tremendous variations in the depth and breadth of the “Mitigations and Solutions” currently
outlined for each attack pattern. The result of our approach is the abstraction of nearly 400
unique mitigation strategies into one of 17 commonly accepted and federally standardized
Parent Mitigations.
The introduction of a “Parent Mitigation” element into the dictionary provides
consistency to the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary. Because the current “Mitigation and
Solutions” element provides valuable information, we are not advocating its removal. One
intention of our approach is to add the “Parent Mitigation” element to provide a more
manageable number of mitigations. This is a valuable step to the increased adoption and
wide spread acceptance of the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary.
The re-inclusion of a “Parent Threat” element into the dictionary provides
consistency and context to the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary. We present a new model for
presenting CAPEC attack patterns by refining nearly 30 descriptive elements to provide a
standardized set of useable and consistent elements. The creation of a graphical hierarchy
provides CAPEC with a new visual representation for each attack without becoming
overwhelming to the user. The introduction of a defined hierarchy between descriptive
elements assists with learning and processing attack patterns. The significance of this
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process is a much clearer and less convoluted picture of the attack, resulting in a more
usable element set.
The creation of security metrics derived from defined mitigation strategies increases
the usability of CAPEC for several audiences. This process creates measurable numeric
values which can allow security personnel to make more informed security decisions and
play "what-if" scenarios.
A deep understanding of attack patterns can lead to the permeation of security
throughout an organization, as well as heighten awareness of known exploits,
vulnerabilities and weaknesses (Gegick & Williams, 2005). Integrating attack pattern
knowledge into managerial level IT security decisions can result in a higher level of
security by creating less exposure to identified bugs and known flaws (Hoglund &
McGraw, 2004). Attack patterns can be used by developers, administrators and managers
to provide a deeper understanding of security (S. Barnum, 2007).

1.5. Outline
The study is structured where Chapter 2 covers related work. Chapter 3 covers
Process 1 of our approach for abstracting Parent Mitigations from the CAPEC attack
pattern dictionary. Chapter 4 covers Process 2 of our approach of formally re-including the
Parent Threat element into the attack dictionary. Chapter 4 also covers the new models
created for viewing and using CAPEC attack patterns. This process includes trimming the
element set, defining a hierarchy, and creating a graphical representation and textual attack
description for each attack. Chapter 5 covers the creation, explanation, and use of our

19
Knock-Out Effect and Parent Mitigation Power security metrics. This is Process 3 of our
approach. Chapter 6 is the Conclusions reached from this study.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Risk Assessment
The identification and mitigation of risks to information systems are paramount to
the sustainability and survival of organizations (Rowe, 1977; Stoneburner, Goguen, &
Feringa, 2002). The study and analysis of risk has become common practice throughout
several industries including medical, insurance, earth science, financial, investment, public
health, environmental, engineering and economics. The concept of studying, analyzing and
scientifically framing the risk assessment procedure specifically for use in protecting and
safeguarding information systems has been grossly under-managed and underutilized
(Coleman & Jamieson, 1991; Farbey, Land, & Targett, 1992; Willcocks, 1992).
Information technology risks can be defined as the probability of a threat to a
system, the probability of a vulnerability being discovered, or the probability of equipment
or software malfunctioning (Whitman & Mattord, 2003). Risk assessment is an analysis
that identifies the risks and protection requirements for the system through a formal
process. It is also a key component of risk management that brings together important
information for officials regarding the identification of threats and vulnerabilities and
includes the potential impact on an organization‟s operations, assets or individuals which
can result in the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability (Grance, Hash, & Stevens,
2003; McCumber, 2004). By identifying and computing the probability of a threat
occurring and separately determining the ramifications of the particular threat, an
organization can begin to determine its risk level (Blakley, McDermott, & Geer, 2001).
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Early information system risk assessment models can be traced back to system
security modeling. Security modeling allowed for the definition of relationships. In this
model, users were defined as subjects and data was defined as objects. This process
allowed for enforcing the state of information within a system (Bell, 1996).
Attackers are constantly evolving their attacks and technologies through the
creation of new tools and the discovery of new vulnerabilities (Recipes). In order to be
effective against such attackers, the risk assessment process must be updated regularly and
allow for flexibility in dealing with these new threats and vulnerabilities (Myerson, 2002).
The risk assessment process defines threats as that which could cause potential harm to
resources or the organization; while a vulnerability is defined as weakness in the asset
which could be exploited by a threat (Ciampa, 2005; Hansche, Berti, & Hare, 2003;
Hoglund & McGraw, 2004).
The keys to completing a viable and accurate risk assessment are clear and
complete documentation of the information system, its relationship to other systems, and
the information system‟s relationship to the business itself (P. Fung & Longley, 2003). The
accurate documentation of each system and its contents naturally leads to a more precise
risk assessment. Knowing where your critical information is stored and who has access to it
is equally important as knowing the probability and impact of a particular threat to a
system. Often times this documentation process is overlooked or simply not addressed.
Because media outlets tend to sensationalize hacker activity and malicious code such as
viruses and worms, many companies disproportionately invest in attempting to mitigate
these types of risks(P. Fung & Longley, 2003). The blending of these two points can lead
to disastrous results. A clear illustration of this problem was brought to light recently when
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a laptop containing the confidential records of 26.5 million retired veterans was stolen from
the home of a Veterans Affairs employee. The largest security breach in the history of the
United States Government was not the result of nefarious hacker activity or the use of some
exotic code exploit, rather it was simple theft (Burger, 2006). Proper documentation and
risk assessment would have prevented the employee from leaving the government facility
with such a valuable asset.
As businesses continue to grow and become more dependent on large scale
computing systems, managers and organizations must learn to effectively identify and
assess risks to these systems. Organizations have several choices and methodologies for
attempting to quantify risk. Bayesian Probabilistic Risk Analysis is the process of risk
management which includes identifying system weaknesses and reducing the probability of
the particular system from being impacted by the exposed weaknesses (Ali, Hilton, &
Peter, 1985). Bayesian risk analysis was originally developed for use in the nuclear power
industry. A measurement of risk can be determined by answering four fundamental
questions (Ali et al., 1985; Bedford & Cooke, 2001).


What can go wrong?



How frequently can it be expected to happen?



What would be its consequences?



How certain are we about the answers to the first three questions?

While much has changed through the use of advanced computer modeling and the
creation of complex risk assessment software, the answers to these four questions can still
provide a highly useful and accurate level of information system risk analysis.
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The ability to defend an information system depends upon fully understanding the
risks associated with that system and applying controls commensurate with the defined
level of risk (Holden, 2003). This process of risk assessment helps organizations and
managers appropriately spend time and money defending and protecting assets which need
it most. In this way, risk assessment can be seen as a productivity tool that saves the
organization time, money and reputation.
While several common underlying themes are often found in the risk assessment
process such as, risk = impact x probability, there are often many different and widely
accepted models used to complete the actual risk assessment (Woerner, 2007). Some
methodologies focus on system failure to help identify risk (Gautam, Kenneth, &
Kazuhiko, 1989). These models present a qualitative modeling technique to enhance the
risk assessment process and facilitate the design of a risk assessment system. This approach
helps overcome uncertainties associated with the unpredictability of human behavior and
the failure rate of information systems, which must be factored into an overall risk rating
(Gautam et al., 1989).
Other approaches call for the combined use of a knowledge based system and
qualitative problem solving which can result in the creation of a generic and portable risk
assessment tool (Gautam et al., 1989). A prevalent theme in the use of such knowledge
based systems is the incorporation of event and fault trees. Event and fault tree analysis
involves identifying unique potential failure as individual “tree-roots or trunks”, then
properly identifying each of the potentially impacted system as a branch on the tree. The
result of this concept is that given a particular failure, a detailed list of all potentially
impacted systems can be accurately generated (Haasl, Roberts, Vesely, & Goldberg, 1981).
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One of the primary advantages of developing a knowledge based system using fault tree
analysis is that it provides for an excellent tool to model “what-if” scenarios. By examining
the potential system failures, organizations and managers can get a broad and accurate
picture of potential risk.
Another popular method for measuring risk is through the concept of Annualized
Loss Expectation. Annualized Loss Expectation helps to quantify risk in terms of a
financial definition where companies predict a specific value or cost associated with the
occurrence of a particular risk (Blakley et al., 2001). Using this model, an organization
calculates risk by multiplying a specific dollar amount against the probability of the risk‟s
occurrence. Cost is estimated by totaling both the direct and indirect dollar amounts over
the course of one year, which are related to the occurrence of the risk. Examples of direct
and indirect dollar amounts include physical damage, equipment replacement, labor costs
to repair, decreased employee productivity, lost sales, reputation damage, and legal costs.
Probability is determined by weighing the likelihood of a risk event on a 1 to “x” scale.
This probability is then multiplied by the cost associated with the annual loss resulting in a
final dollar value which is representative of risk for the particular system (Visintine, 2003).
Others methodologies have taken a different approach to defining the risk
assessment process. One model defines risk assessment in six distinct steps (Ye, Barry, &
Betsy, 2006). This approach begins with identifying a cost factor rating system. Once the
rating system has been defined, risks are identified. The next step is assigning risk
probability. This is followed by analyzing risk severity where an overall risk can be
normalized on a scale from 1-100. The scale of 1-100 can then be disseminated into the
following categories. Systems with an overall risk from 0-5 are considered “low risk”, 5-15
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are marked as “moderate risk”, 15-50 are said to be “high risk” while 50-100 should be
labeled as “very high risk”. The final step is to offer ways of reducing the presented risk
(Ye et al., 2006).
Not every framework for assessing risk is concerned with both impact and
probability. Some risk assessments focus solely on the probability of the risk occurring
(Benoit, Michel, & Suzanne, 2005). This type of risk assessment can be especially useful
when the impact or occurrence of a particular risk results in an irreversible state. The
medical community provides several examples of this type of risk assessment. Often times
medical risk assessments will focus solely on the probability of a particular disease because
the resulting impact is death. In these cases, because the impact is irreversible, it is no
longer given consideration (Benoit et al., 2005).
Many organizations mistakenly assume that increased spending on security
investments will lead to a direct decrease in overall information system risk. The level of
risk obtained from an organization‟s completed risk assessment often determines the
organization‟s willingness to invest in appropriate security controls (Cavusoglu, Mishra, &
Raghunathan, 2004). This type of organizational philosophy illustrates the importance of
an appropriate and accurate risk assessment as there are clear implications to an
organization‟s financial health and bottom line.
The process of assessing risk is often too difficult to perform accurately without the
use of automated software. Because of the complexity involved in accurate risk assessment,
there is a need for the creation of an automated system (Hamdi & Boudriga, 2003).
Several standards have been introduced which can help organizations understand
and complete the risk assessment process. ISO 27001, COBIT and NIST each provide
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guidance to ensure that risk assessment is handled appropriately (Brenner, 2007; NIST,
2002; von Solms, 2005).
Completing an accurate risk assessment is both valuable and necessary for an
organization and its ability to properly protect its information system assets. Upon
completion of the risk assessment process the organization and management staff will be
ready to make precise and informed decisions with regard to budgeting, staffing and
resource management. A well defined risk assessment leads to a deeper and more complete
understanding of both the overall level of risk associated with the implemented technology
and the risks associated with each individual system.
Upon completion of the risk assessment process, organizations have four options
when addressing each risk (Blakley et al., 2001).
1.

Liability Transfer: This occurs when a business is able to convey the risk to another
party outside of the organization, effectively removing the responsibility or
accountability for the particular risk. Most often this is accomplished through use of
a disclaimer or other type of binding agreement.

2.

Indemnification: Indemnifying risks is effectively insuring the organization against
the occurrence of a particular risk.

3.

Mitigation: This is the process of reducing identified risks through procedure,
processes, or controls. Mitigations can be used to specifically reduced the impact,
probability, or both impact and probability of a risk.

4.

Retention: This is an organization‟s acceptance of a given risk. The specific risk is
acknowledged and documented during the risk assessment process but no further
steps are taken to reduce the current level of risk. This path is typically chosen
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when the probability or impact of a risk occurring is very small. Retention is also a
viable option when the “return on risk reduction spending” does not produce a
meaningful return.

Accurate, complete, and meaningful risk assessment of a business‟s information
systems is a vital function for every organization across all industries. As standards
continue to mature, processes continue to evolve, and new forms of risk assessment are
introduced, organizations must find way to make sense of it all. A thorough risk assessment
process gives companies a greater degree of power by ensuring risks have been accounted
for and accurate, meaningful controls are in place (Peltier, 2005).

2.2. Attack Modeling
Modeling is a technique for organizing and viewing the details of a system or
process. Models can provide relevant information through the process of abstraction and
demonstration of relationships (Booch, Rumbaugh, & Jacobson, 1999). The goal of
modeling is to better understand the systems or processes we are studying; modeling
accomplishes this goal by providing the following (Booch et al., 1999; Scheer &
Habermann, 2000).


Aiding in the visualization of a system or process



Specifying the structure or behavior of a system or process



Providing a template which can be used to further advance, create, or study a
system or process
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Providing documentation

Attack modeling is an approach for documenting commonly occurring computer,
hardware, software, or network attack details while providing information in a structured
and reusable form (Moore, Ellison, & Linger, 2001). Attack models can be used by system
administrators, security analysts, system developers and managers. Attacks on information
systems are often described via a single vulnerability or exploit and therefore lack the
descriptive depth needed to fully capture the complexity and detail of most attacks
(Templeton & Levitt, 2001). Utilizing modeling to describe attacks can help to fill in the
appropriate level of detail.
Proper techniques for avoiding and mitigating information system attacks require an
awareness of the risks associated with a particular system. Knowledge sharing through
modeling can be useful for increasing awareness and collaboration of information system
attack details (Steffan & Schumacher, 2002). Analysis, prediction and collaboration of
attacks are valuable tools in the effort to protect information systems. The use of models to
describe attacks can be extremely helpful in providing these tools (Daley, Larson, &
Dawkins, 2002). A coherent model of exploits and vulnerabilities provides a solid
foundation which can be used to educate system administrators as well as offering valuable
details for appropriately responding to such attacks (Tidwell, Larson, Fitch, & Hale, 2001).
Attack Trees and Threat Models are two examples of common techniques used to
organize and present details of attacks. Attack Trees offer a goal-oriented perspective for
modeling the behavior and effects of an attack while Threat Modeling is often used to
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provide descriptions of threats at the code level (Schneier, 2000; Swiderski & Snyder,
2004).

2.2.1. Attack Trees
Attack trees provide a formal and systematic way of describing threats and counter
measures to threats for a given information system (Schneier, 1999). Attack trees provide
users with an ability to make calculations and compare various types of attacks. These
graphical representations also allow us to visualize, enumerate and weigh information
system attacks (Salter, Saydjari, Schneier, & Wallner, 1998). Each attack tree consists of a
root and leaf structure. The end goal of the attack is represented as the tree‟s root while the
various ways of achieving that goal are represented by its leaves. Despite this apparent
simplicity, attack trees can be extremely useful in threat analysis (C. Fung et al., 2005). It is
important to note that some leaves have sub-nodes (child-leaves). This structure indicates
there are multiple steps needed to accomplish the goal. Each leaf node can be either
conjunctive or disjunctive in nature (Tidwell et al., 2001). Conjunctive leaves are
represented using an “AND” and inform the user that all of the child nodes must be
completed in order to satisfy their parent node. Disjunctive leaf nodes are considered standalone alternatives and do not require other leaves to be satisfied before accomplishing its
parent node. Disjunctive leaf nodes are represented using the “OR” designation. Upon
completion of the attack tree each node can be evaluated and assigned a value of either “I”
for impossible or “P” for possible depending on the probability of the attack. An example
of a simple attack tree is introduced in Figure 3 (Schneier, 2000).
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Figure 3. Attack Tree for Accessing a Physical Safe adopted from “Secrets and Lies” (Schneier, 2000).

Figure 3 illustrates the classic example of an attack against a physical safe
(Schneier, 2000). The goal, represented by the root, is to gain access to a physical safe
(open safe). The leaves, listed individually below the goal, represent different approaches
for achieving the goal.
Upon completion of the attack tree, it is possible to assign a cost to each node. Doing so
allows for further analysis and comparison of the various attack costs. Evaluating the costs
of cyber and network attacks is an integral part of understanding both the risks and their
mitigating countermeasures (Futoransky, Notarfrancesco, Richarte, & Sarraute). Attackers
often demonstrate a negative correlation between the use of an attack and its cost. The
insight gained from this process can be extremely helpful in determining which specific
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attacks an information system may face (Schechter, 2005). Figure 4, introduces the costs
associated with each node of the “Open Safe” attack tree (Schneier, 1999).

Figure 4. Attack Tree with Cost-Per-Node Included adopted from “Attack Trees” (Schneier, 1999).

As shown in Figure 4, it is possible to “Cut Open the Safe” for $10,000 while
“Learning Combo” through eavesdropping would cost the attacker $60,000 (Listening to
Conversation + Get Target to State Combo). This type of analysis can be helpful in
determining which specific attacks you are likely to encounter.
Attack trees can also be useful for examining technical attacks and environments.
Consider the various scenarios in which an attacker could gain root (administrative) access
to a web server. Figure 5, introduces a partially completed attack tree for completing this
attack (Tidwell et al., 2001).
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Figure 5. Partial Attack Tree for Gaining Root Access to a Web Server adopted from “Modeling Internet Attacks”
(Tidwell et al., 2001).

In this example, attack tree nodes are assigned weighted values to represent the
likelihood of success in achieving the root goal. Assigned values range from 1 (Least
Likely) to 10 (Most Likely). The “Steal Password” leaf is made up from the children nodes
“Sniff Network” and “Root Telnet”. The lowest child score is inherited by the parent to
signal the path of least resistance. As a result of this process, “Steal Password” would be
assigned a value of 3. Ranking the listed attacks would result in the following (From “Most
Likely” to occur to “Least Likely” to occur).


Sendmail Exploit (6)



Steal Password (3)



Poor Configuration (2)

Attack trees provide an effective aid for modeling threats (Mauw & Oostdijk,
2005). The ability to clearly model and understand threats is vital to today‟s security
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professionals. Carnegie Mellon CERT shows a dramatic growth in the number of new
vulnerabilities reported each year. 262 new vulnerabilities were catalogedin 1998, while
7236 new vulnerabilities were recorded in 2007 (CERT, 2007). As the number of reported
vulnerabilities continues to rise, the need for additional ways to manage and visualize the
complexity of such attacks grows as well. Attack trees can be an effective methodology for
understanding threat-based inter-relationships and ranking threats according to risk (Byres,
Franz, & Miller, 2004).

2.3. Attack Patterns
An attack is a specific action carried out to exploit a vulnerability (Fong, Gaucher,
Okun, Black, & Dalci, 2008). The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC) framework is a model for identifying, classifying, cataloging, sharing and
refining various types of information about attacks (Barnum & Amit, 2006a). The CAPEC
framework provides this information through descriptive schema or elements used to
specify the various components which make up an attack. Each attack pattern is a
generalized outline of the attack which has been developed by reviewing large sets of
exploits (McGraw, 2006). Attack patterns also detail the approach and methodology used
by attackers to generate an exploit (Barnum & Sethi).
Like attack trees, attack patterns represent the objective of the attacker and the
techniques which may be used by attackers to achieve their goals and provide an organized
way to analyze the details of a specific attack (Barnum & Amit, 2006b; Viega & McGraw,
2002). The ability to view threats from an attackers perspective is a vital component in
protecting information systems (Arce, 2004). Security research is often slowed because of
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the level of secrecy surrounding attacks, vulnerabilities and exploits (Barnum & Amit,
2006b; Logan & Clarkson, 2005). Attack patterns can be used to expose the details of such
attacks. In the past, security experts have been hesitant to create and share the details of
exploits, fearing such data could be used to further malicious attacker‟s knowledge
(Russell, 2002).
Creating a deeper understanding of attackers, attacks, and countermeasures can lead to a
more effective ability to combat and counter these threats (Schneier, 1999). Fostering this
deep understanding of attack patterns can also lead to the permeation of security
throughout the software development life cycle and heighten the awareness of known
exploits, vulnerabilities and weaknesses (Gegick & Williams, 2005). Integrating and
increasing attack pattern knowledge can result in adding security by creating less exposure
to identified bugs and known flaws (Hoglund & McGraw, 2004). Attack patterns can also
be used to create a security checklist, which in turn can lead to a higher level of security (S.
Barnum, 2007).
The origins of attack patterns can be traced back to the 1960‟s when the foundation
for today‟s attack patterns were established as the concept of a general and repeatable
solution to identified system development problems (Gamma, Helm, Johnson, & Vlissides,
1995). More recently the concept of presenting from an attacker‟s perspective was done on
an individual basis, with no agreed upon formula, structure, or common language for
consistently presenting such a viewpoint (Hoglund & McGraw, 2004).
The lack of a common vocabulary makes it difficult to gather, analyze, and share
pertinent information which could be used to advance the discipline of software
security(Hoglund & McGraw, 2004). The term “attack pattern” was introduced in 2001 to
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describe the concept of combining various types of malicious attacks and present the
attacker‟s perspective within a specified framework (Gamma et al., 1995; Moore et al.,
2001). Further research was done to formally define descriptive attack pattern elements and
the create 48 original and complete attack patterns (Hoglund & McGraw, 2004).
The National Cyber Security Division of the Department of Homeland Security in
conjunction with Cigital and MITRE Corporation agreed to sponsor CAPEC (S. Barnum,
2007; Barnum & Amit, 2006b). The final result of this collective effort was published in
March of 2007 as the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary and included a formalized attackdriven perspective of software security with 101 different attack patterns outlined (Barnum
& Amit, 2006a).
The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) list provides
an official schema and formal representation for defining individual attack patterns
(Barnum, 2008; Barnum & Amit, 2006a). CAPEC formally organizes and presents each
attack pattern by gathering and displaying both primary and supporting data elements (Sean
Barnum, 2007). Primary elements include the following list (Barnum, 2008;
capec.mitre.org, 2007).


Attack Pattern ID



Attack Pattern Name



Description



Related Weaknesses



Related Vulnerabilities



Methods of Attack



Examples-Instances
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References



Solutions and Mitigations



Typical Severity



Typical Likelihood of Exploit



Attack Prerequisites



Attacker Skill or Knowledge Requirements



Resources Required



Attack Motivation-Consequences



Context Description

Supporting elements include the following list (Barnum, 2008; capec.mitre.org, 2007).


Injection Vector



Payload



Activation Zone



Payload Activation Impact



Probing Techniques



Indicators/Warnings of Attack



Obfuscation Techniques



Related Attack Patterns



Relevant Security Requirements



Relevant Design Patterns



Relevant Security Principles



Related Guidelines
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Exploration and examination of the various techniques used by malicious attackers
are important steps in providing better security for our technology resources (Skoudis &
Liston, 2006). “Know thy enemy” is a classic adage amongst security researchers which
suggests that security professionals need the ability to understand system vulnerability
from the perspective of a potential attacker (Fadia, 2002; Jones, Shema, & Johnson, 2002;
Koziol et al., 2004; McClure, Scambray, & Kurtz, 2005). The best penetration tests are
built on a solid understanding of both design and risks (McGraw, 2006). This type of
understanding can only be achieved when we have a formal set of definitions to build and
share knowledge. CAPEC attack patterns provide such a framework.
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3. ABSTRACTING PARENT MITIGATIONS
The CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary includes nearly 400 individually prescribed
controls which can be used to mitigate or reduce the effects of the defined attack patterns.
This current level of detail in the “Solutions and Mitigations” element tends to be too
inconsistent (Engebretson & Pauli, 2008). Some attack patterns provide an extremely
granular level of detail. For example, one of the prescribed mitigations for attack pattern 1
(Accessing Functionality Not Proper Constrained by ACLs) calls for changing a Java
setting. Specifically the Solutions and Mitigations element prescribes, “In a J2EE setting,
deployers can associate a role that is impossible for authenticator to grant users, such as
„NoAccess‟, with all Servlets to which access is guarded by a limited number of servlets
visible to, and accessible by, the user”. This level of detail can lead CAPEC adopters to
assume that attacks based off accessing functionality not properly constrained by ACL‟s
are confined only to environments where Java or J2EE are deployed. Such a belief could
lead to an increased attack exposure and a false sense of security because attacks that focus
on “Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs” include a much broader
attack vector than just the Java environments.
The reverse is also true. Some attack patterns provide only a brief overview of
potential mitigation strategies. Attack pattern 5 (Analog In-Band Switching Signals (aka
Blue Boxing)) includes “Upgrade phone lines” as a mitigation strategy. This generalized
strategy is too open-ended to be of use to many users. This type of vagueness leaves many
basic questions unanswered related to infrastructure, physical design, layout, speed, and
quality issues.
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In order to increase the effectiveness and consistency of mitigation strategies, we
propose the inclusion of a new element to the CAPEC standard. Our Parent Mitigation
element is directly abstracted from the currently prescribed CAPEC “Solutions and
Mitigations” element.
We examined several standards when looking for a complete set of parent
mitigation strategies to complement the CAPEC Dictionary. It is vital to make use of a
predefined, currently accepted and standardized list of controls to remove the heuristic tone
of an ad-hoc approach. Our approach is both detailed and specific to ensure individuals
following our prescribed processes will reach the same findings.
We reviewed COBIT 4.1, ISO 27002:2005, and NIST SP 800-53 for an acceptable
list of controls to use as Parent Mitigations in our approach (ISACA, 2008; ISO, 2005;
NIST, 2007). After reviewing the controls outlined in each of these standards, we choose to
make use of NIST 800-53 (revision 2). Both NIST and CAPEC have strong ties to the
United States Federal government. NIST is a non-regulatory federal agency funded through
the U.S. Department of Commerce, while CAPEC is the direct result of funding from the
Department of Homeland Security (NIST, 2006). CAPEC is a federally funded
classification of attacks and NIST is a federally funded list of controls.
During the selection process, we were able to reject the controls outlined in the
COBIT standard, because it is less specific to Information Systems or Information
Technology details than the controls outlined in ISO (Flowerday & Von Solms, 2005).
Because of the technical nature of attack patterns, we focus on controls which provide the
most technical details. ISO was rejected because of its emphasis on being a management
system, rather than a technology specification (Calder, 2006). We are providing a technical

40
specification for mitigations as part of our approach. We view NIST as a stronger match
than the business process-oriented ISO standard.
Additionally, we chose to use NIST because the controls provide a ready-made
hierarchy which fits within our Parent-Child model. This additional level of detail and
structure not only correlates directly with our work, but will also be used in future work to
further extend the relationship between NIST and CAPEC.
NIST 800-53 provides an established and usable control-based hierarchy. At the top
level this hierarchy consists of Family controls which are general and wide-reaching. The
final draft of 800-53-r2 includes a total of 17 Family controls which are presented in a
well-defined and organized structure. A two character identifier is used to uniquely identify
individual family controls. NIST Family level controls and their corresponding identifiers
are introduced in Table 1 (NIST, 2007).

Table 1. NIST 800-53 17 Family Level Controls and Their Unique Identifier.

IDENTIFIER
AC
AT
AU
CA
CM
CP
IA
IR
MA
MP
PE
PL
PS
RA
SA
SC
SI

FAMILY
Access Control
Awareness and Training
Audit and Accountability
Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments
Configuration Management
Contingency Planning
Identification and Authentication
Incident Response
Maintenance
Media Protection
Physical and Environmental Protection
Planning
Personnel Security
Risk Assessment
System and Services Acquisition
System and Communications Protection
System and Information Integrity

41

Each of the 17 Family level controls is further broken down into individual controls
identified by NIST. In order to identify individual NIST controls, a number is appended to
the family identifier. This combination of “Family identifier – control number” is used to
uniquely identify each control outlined in the NIST 800-53r2 (NIST, 2007). For example,
CM-8 corresponds to the 8th control listed under the “Configuration Management” Family
control. Our approach introduces the appropriate NIST control into the existing CAPEC
dictionary as a “Parent Mitigation” to provide a more generalized mitigation strategy for
each of the 400 CAPEC attack patterns. Our process groups all 400 mitigations into 17
standardized Parent Mitigations.

3.1. Abstracting Parent Mitigations from the CAPEC Dictionary
To illustrate our approach we completed a case study utilizing the CAPEC attack
pattern dictionary. This case study consists of 11 unique attack patterns. In order to provide
adequate sampling, we‟ve chosen one attack pattern from each of the 11 Parent Threats
outlined on the CAPEC classification tree. Parent Threats are as follows (Engebretson &
Pauli, 2008):


Abuse of Functionality



Spoofing



Probabilistic Techniques



Exploration of Authentication



Resource Depletion
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Exploitation of Privilege/Trust



Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane)



Data Structure Attacks



Data Leakage Attacks



Resource Manipulation



Time and State Attacks

The same 11 attack patterns were used to demonstrate the three processes that make
up our approach. The entire approach was carried out for all 101 attack patterns and a
complete listing of these results can be found in Appendix 1. The chosen attack patterns for
the case study and corresponding Parent Threat are introduced in Table 2.
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Table 2. Selected Parent Threats and Corresponding Attack Patterns for Case Study.

Parent Threat

Attack Patter Name (Attack Pattern
Number)

Abuse of Functionality

Forceful Browsing (87)

Spoofing

Man in the Middle Attack (94)

Probabilistic Techniques

Rainbow Table Password Cracking (55)

Exploration of Authentication

Reusing Session IDs (Session Replay) (60)

Resource Depletion

XML Denial of Service (XDoS) (82)

Exploitation of Privilege/Trust

Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files
(75)

Injection (Injecting Control Plane content
through the Data Plane)

Server Side Includes (SSI) Injection (101)

Data Structure Attacks
Data Leakage Attacks
Resource Manipulation
Time and State Attacks

Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables
(10)
Passively Sniff and Capture Application
Code Bound for Authorize Client (65)
Using Leading „Ghost‟ Character Sequences
to Bypass Input Filters (3)
Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-ofUse (TOCTOU) Race Conditions (29)

NIST provides significant detail for each child control including unique control
number, name, brief control description, and supplemental guidance. The control
description provides a concise description of the control. The supplemental guidance
provides additional examples and requirements (NIST, 2007). Both the control description
and the supplemental guidance are useful in order to accurately match the NIST and
CAPEC controls. The process matches a CAPEC Solutions and Mitigations element and
one of the NIST details.
The process of abstracting Parent Mitigations from the CAPEC Attack Pattern
Release 1 Dictionary is made up of 4 steps as introduced in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Steps Required to Abstract Parent Mitigations from the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary.

The process of abstracting Parent Mitigations starts by breaking down the attack
pattern‟s Solutions and Mitigation element into a list of individual controls as shown in
step 1. Step 2 introduces a line item review of each mitigation strategy. Using the control
definitions outlined in NIST 800-53, we match each CAPEC control to a corresponding
NIST control. Although we are only interested in the NIST Family control, we map each of
the current CAPEC mitigations to the detailed controls in NIST 800-53 to ensure accuracy.
Step 3 allows us to determine the appropriate Family level controls for inclusion into the
CAPEC standard. The abstracted NIST Family controls are then added to the CAPEC
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Dictionary as a Parent Mitigation element. Step 4 checks for the repeating of this process
until each of the Solutions and Mitigations listed in step 1 have been abstracted.
The detailed steps in Process 1 are listed below.

1.

Create a table to create a list of individual controls taken directly from the attack
pattern‟s Solutions and Mitigations element. Controls should be listed 1 per row
under the column heading “Solutions and Mitigations”.

2.

Select an individual control from the table created in step 1 and match the CAPEC
Solutions and Mitigations element to the appropriate 800-53r2 NIST Child
Mitigation(s). It is possible that individual controls from step 1 will match up with
more than one NIST Child control. For this reason, it is important to review
individual CAPEC controls against all of the 800-53r2 NIST controls. When a
definition match is found, record the NIST Child Mitigation abbreviation under the
column heading “NIST Child Mitigation”. When multiple matches for a single
control are found, they should be recorded in the same cell and separated by a
comma.

3.

Abstract the individual NIST Child Mitigation(s) to its corresponding NIST Family
Control by removing the specific control number from the recorded Child
Mitigation. It is important to review the table to verify if this Parent Threat has been
previously recorded. If not, record the NIST Family Control under the Parent
Mitigation column heading in the table.

4.

If another Solutions and Mitigations control is listed, repeat steps 2-3. Continue this
process until all controls for the attack pattern have been abstracted.
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Table 3 introduces the table which is required to complete this process.

Table 3. Table Used to Abstract the Parent Mitigations.

Attack Pattern

Solutions and
Mitigations

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)

Parent Mitigation(s)

Our case study begins with a detailed analysis of attack pattern ID 3: “Using
Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters”. Attack pattern 3 belongs to
the Resource Manipulation Threat Family as first introduced in Table 2. Step 1 requires
that we create a table to list individual controls from the CAPEC definition for attack
pattern 3. We utilize the first two columns presented in Table 3 to complete step 1.
Examination of the CAPEC Dictionary provides three individual mitigations for this attack
as introduced in Table 4.

Table 4. Individually Listed Controls for Attack Pattern 3.

Attack Pattern
Using Leading
'Ghost' Character
Sequences to Bypass
Input Filters

Solutions and Mitigations
Perform white list, rather than black list, input validation.
Cononicalize all data prior to validation.
Take an iterative approach to input validation (defense in depth)

Step 2 of Process 1 requires that we select an individual control from step 1 and
match the control to the appropriate NIST 800-53r2 Child Mitigation(s). Careful review
and examination is needed to align this control with the appropriate control descriptions
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provided as part of the NIST 800-53r2 standard. The first individual Solution and
Mitigation listed in Table 3 is “Perform white list, rather than black list, input validation”.
The NIST child mitigation definitions which relate to this control are listed below:


AC-3 ACCESS ENFORCEMENT
o Access Enforcement (AC-3) was chosen because “white list” is a type of
access control enforcement (Chow, Hui, Yiu, Chow, & Lui, 2005).
Furthermore, examination of the NIST AC-3 Supplemental Guidance
provides the following detail which aligns closely with the CAPEC control,
“Access control policies and associated access enforcement mechanisms are
employed by the organization to control access between users (or processes)
and objects (e.g., devices, files, records, processes, programs, domains) in
the information system. In addition to controlling access at the information
system level, access enforcement mechanisms are employed at the
application level, when necessary, to provide increased information security
for the organization.” (NIST, 2007).



AC-4 INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT
o Selection of Information Flow Enforcement (AC-4) can be justified by
examination of the NIST child control description, “The information system
enforces assigned authorizations for controlling the flow of information
within the system and between interconnected systems in accordance with
applicable policy.” (NIST, 2007) as well as the supplemental guidance
which provides the following information, “Flow control is based on the
characteristics of the information and/or the information path. Specific
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examples of flow control enforcement can be found in boundary protection
devices (e.g., proxies, gateways, guards, encrypted tunnels, firewalls, and
routers) that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict
information system services or provide a packet filtering capability” (NIST,
2007). White list input validation is an effective means of controlling the
flow of information.


CM-7 LEAST FUNCTIONALITY
o Least functionality (CM-7) was chosen as a result of CAPEC‟s use of the
terms “white list rather than black list”. White lists are more restrictive in
nature and employ the concept of least functionality by allowing denying
any services not explicitly allowed. Black lists are less restrictive by
allowing any service not explicitly blocked (Emmanuel & Yu).



SI-9 INFORMATION INPUT RESTRICTIONS
o Information Input Restrictions (SI-9) present a natural fit with the given
CAPEC control as the NIST control description provides the following
definition, “The organization restricts the capability to input information to
the information system” (NIST, 2007). Both the NIST and CAPEC controls
are describing an input validation process.



SI-10 INFORMATION ACCURACY, COMPLETENESS, VALIDITY, AND
AUTHENTICITY
o Information Accuracy, Completeness, Validity, and Authenticity (SI-10)
provides the following information in the supplemental guidance, “Checks
for accuracy, completeness, validity, and authenticity of information are
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accomplished as close to the point of origin as possible. Rules for checking
the valid syntax of information system inputs (e.g., character set, length,
numerical range, acceptable values) are in place to verify that inputs match
specified definitions for format and content. Inputs passed to interpreters are
prescreened to prevent the content from being unintentionally interpreted as
commands.” (NIST, 2007). This description presents another clear example
of input validation and is therefore included as a match for the prescribed
CAPEC mitigation.

The completed second step for the first control in attack pattern 3 is introduced in
Table 5.

Table 5. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for the First CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 3.

Attack Pattern
Using Leading
'Ghost' Character
Sequences to
Bypass Input
Filters

Solutions and Mitigations
NIST Child Mitigation(s)
Perform white list, rather than black AC-3, AC-4, CM-7, SI-9, SI-10
list, input validation.

Step 3 requires that we abstract the individual Child Mitigations chosen in step 2.
Step 3 also necessitates that each Parent Mitigation be recorded only one time. Parent
Mitigations are abstracted by recording a single entry for each unique NIST Family
mitigation shown under the NIST Child Mitigations column. Table 6 introduces the
completed table for the first CAPEC mitigation including the abstracted Parent Mitigation
column.
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Table 6. Addition of Parent Mitigations for the First CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 3.

Attack Pattern
Using Leading
'Ghost' Character
Sequences to Bypass
Input Filters

Solutions and
Mitigations
Perform white list,
rather than black list,
input validation.

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC-3, AC-4, CM-7,
SI-9, SI-10

Parent Mitigation(s)
AC, SI, CM

Step 4 of Process 1 mandates that we repeat step 2 if another CAPEC control exists.
The second control outlined for attack pattern 3 by CAPEC is “Canonicalize all data prior
to validation”. Using the NIST 800-53 guidelines, we correlate this with the following
NIST controls:


SI-9 INFORMATION INPUT RESTRICTIONS
o Canonicalization is the process by which a potentially flexible data type can
be altered into one that has guaranteed characteristics. Canonicalization is a
frequent technique for input data validation and therefore relates well to the
NIST standard SI-9 (Fithen, 2005). An example of canonicalization is seen
when the same input data can be encoded in many ways, such as ASCII or
Unicode. This transformation of data into a known and expected type is a
useful form or input validation.



SI-10 INFORMATION ACCURACY, COMPLETENESS, VALIDITY, AND
AUTHENTICITY
o Canonicalization is a frequent technique for input data validation and
therefore relates well to the NIST standard SI-10 (Fithen, 2005). An
example of canonicalization is seen when the same input data can be
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encoded in many ways, such as ASCII or Unicode. This transformation of
data into a known and expected type is a useful form or input validation.

The first two controls for attack pattern 3 and the corresponding NIST Child
Mitigations are introduced in Table 7.

Table 7. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for the First and Second CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 3.

Attack Pattern
Using Leading
'Ghost' Character
Sequences to
Bypass Input
Filters

Solutions and Mitigations
NIST Child Mitigation(s)
Perform white list, rather than black AC-3, AC-4, CM-7, SI-9, SI-10
list, input validation.
Canonicalize all data prior to
validation

SI-9, SI-10

Repeating step 3 requires that we abstract the individual Child Mitigations chosen
in step 2. Table 8 introduces the completed table for the second CAPEC mitigation
including the addition of the abstracted Parent Mitigation column and values. Because
System and Information Integrity (SI) has already been listed in first row, it is not
necessary to repeat the Parent Mitigation.

Table 8. Addition of Parent Mitigations for the First CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 3.

Attack Pattern
Using Leading
'Ghost' Character
Sequences to Bypass
Input Filters

Solutions and
Mitigations
Perform white list,
rather than black list,
input validation.

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC-3, AC-4, CM-7,
SI-9, SI-10

Canonicalize all data
prior to validation

SI-9, SI-10

Parent Mitigation(s)
AC, SI, CM
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The final control for attack pattern 3 is listed as: “Take an iterative approach to
input validation (defense in depth)”. We correlate this CAPEC mitigation with the
following NIST control.


SI-10 INFORMATION ACCURACY, COMPLETENESS, VALIDITY, AND
AUTHENTICITY
o Justification for the selection of Information Accuracy, Completeness,
Validity and Authenticity (SI-10) can be found in both the control
description, “The information system checks information for accuracy,
completeness, validity, and authenticity.” as well as the supplemental
guidance “Rules for checking the valid syntax of information system inputs
(e.g., character set, length, numerical range, acceptable values) are in place
to verify that inputs match specified definitions for format and content.
Inputs passed to interpreters are prescreened to prevent the content from
being unintentionally interpreted as commands. The extent to which the
information system is able to check the accuracy, completeness, validity,
and authenticity of information is guided by organizational policy and
operational requirements.” (NIST, 2007) Both of these definitions pertain
directly with input validation.

The three original CAPEC controls and the justified NIST Child Mitigations are
introduced in Table 9.
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Table 9. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for All CAPEC Controls Assigned for Attack Pattern 3.

Attack Pattern
Using Leading
'Ghost' Character
Sequences to
Bypass Input
Filters

Solutions and Mitigations
NIST Child Mitigation(s)
Perform white list, rather than black AC-3, AC-4, CM-7, SI-9, SI-10
list, input validation.
Canonicalize all data prior to
validation
Take an iterative approach to input
validation (defense in depth)

SI-9, SI-10
SI-10

Because System and Information Integrity (SI) has already been listed in the Parent
Mitigation column, we do not relist this information again.

Table 10. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 3.

Attack Pattern
Using Leading
'Ghost' Character
Sequences to Bypass
Input Filters

Solutions and
Mitigations
Perform white list,
rather than black list,
input validation.

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC-3, AC-4, CM-7,
SI-9, SI-10

Canonicalize all data
prior to validation
Take an iterative
approach to input
validation (defense
in depth)

SI-9, SI-10

Parent Mitigation(s)
AC, SI, CM

SI-10

The original CAPEC Solutions and Mitigations element provides three controls for
attack pattern 3. Our process of abstraction results in the same number of controls needed
to mitigate the risk. We are not concerned with reducing the number of controls for each
attack pattern. Our approach reduces the total mitigations from nearly 400 (from CAPEC)
to no more than 17 (from the NIST “Family”). Adding the “Parent” mitigation into the
CAPEC dictionary brings a level of consistency. The CAPEC Dictionary‟s mitigation
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strategies are now standardized into 17 “Parents” at the same level of abstraction. Users are
less likely to dismiss a particular attack pattern because the mitigation is too detailed or too
specific. This is currently a risk for CAPEC adopters who believe that they are not at risk
for a given attack because they do not have the specific technology mentioned in the
CAPEC mitigation.
This same process was followed for attack pattern 75: “Manipulating Writable
Configuration Files”. Attack pattern 75 belongs to the Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
family. The CAPEC Dictionary provides five individual mitigations for this attack as
introduced in Table 11.

Table 11. Individually Listed Controls for Attack Pattern 75.

Attack Pattern
Manipulating
Writable
Configuration Files

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
Design: Backup copies of all configuration files
Implementation: Integrity monitoring for configuration files
Implementation: Enforce audit logging on code and configuration
promotion procedures.
Implementation: Load configuration from separate process and
memory space, for example a separate physical device like a CD

The first Solution and Mitigation listed in Table 11 is “Design: Enforce principle of
least privilege”. NIST provides a clear match with this control.


AC-6 LEAST PRIVILEGE
o Least Privilege was chosen as a result of a direct match between the CAPEC
and NIST controls. The AC-6 NIST control definition provides the
following definition: “The information system enforces the most restrictive
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set of rights/privileges or accesses needed by users (or processes acting on
behalf of users) for the performance of specified tasks.” (NIST, 2007).

The completed process for the first control in attack pattern 75 is introduced in
Table 12.

Table 12. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for the First CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 75.

Attack Pattern
Manipulating
Writable
Configuration
Files

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Enforce principle of least
privilege

NIST Child Mitigation(s)
AC-6

Next we abstract the Parent Mitigations from the individual Child Mitigations.
Table 13 introduces the completed table for the first CAPEC mitigation, including the
abstracted Parent Mitigation column.

Table 13. Addition of Parent Mitigation Column for the First CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 75.

Attack Pattern
Manipulating
Writable
Configuration Files

Solutions and
Mitigations
Design: Enforce
principle of least
privilege

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC-6

Parent Mitigation(s)
AC

The second control outlined for attack pattern 75 by CAPEC is “Design: Backup
copies of all configuration files”. Using the NIST 800-53 guidelines, we correlate this with
the following NIST controls:
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CP-9 INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP
o Information System Backup (CP-9) was chosen as a counterpart for the
CAPEC solution because of the direct match between the CAPEC and NIST
controls. Both mitigations are directly concerned with backups. Specifically,
NIST provides the following information as part of the control description,
“The organization conducts backups of user-level and system-level
information (including system state information) contained in the
information system” (NIST, 2007). Because configuration files are an
important component of system backups, the CAPEC and NIST controls
present a natural fit.



CP-10 INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION
o Information system recovery and reconstitution (CP-10) is included as a
result of both the NIST control definition as well as the supplemental
guidance. The NIST control provides the following description,” The
organization employs mechanisms with supporting procedures to allow the
information system to be recovered and reconstituted to a known secure
state after a disruption or failure.” (NIST, 2007). Backup of the
configuration files is a crucial component of a “mechanism to allow the
information system to be recovered and reconstituted to a known secure
state after a disruption or failure.” Without a backup of the current
configuration file, a complete system restore would result in the loading of a
default configuration file.
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CM-2 BASELINE CONFIGURATION
o Baseline Configuration (CM-2) was selected as a result of the NIST control
definition, “The organization develops, documents, and maintains a current
baseline configuration of the information system.” (NIST, 2007). One
component of maintaining a baseline configuration is through the backup of
the configuration.

The first two controls for attack pattern 75, and corresponding NIST Child
Mitigations are introduced in Table 14.

Table 14. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for the First and Second CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 75.

Attack Pattern
Manipulating
Writable
Configuration
Files

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Enforce principle of least
privilege
Design: Backup copies of all
configuration files

NIST Child Mitigation(s)
AC-6
CP-9, CP-10, CM-2

Table 15 introduces the completed table for the second CAPEC mitigation
including the abstracted Parent Mitigation column and values. Even though “Contingency
Planning” has two entries (CP-9, CP-10) in the NIST Child Mitigation(s) column, the
Parent Mitigation is listed only once.
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Table 15. Addition of Parent Mitigations for the First CAPEC Control for Attack Pattern 75.

Attack Pattern
Manipulating
Writable
Configuration Files

Solutions and
Mitigations
Design: Enforce
principle of least
privilege
Design: Backup
copies of all
configuration files

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC-6

Parent Mitigation(s)

CP-9, CP-10, CM-2

CP, CM

AC

The next CAPEC mitigation for attack pattern 75 is “Implementation: Integrity
Monitoring for Configuration Files”. We correlate this CAPEC mitigation with the
following NIST controls.


AU-6 AUDIT MONITORING, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING
o Audit Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting (AU-6) was chosen because of
its close natural match to the CAPEC solution “monitoring for configuration
files”. Both mitigations pertain directly to monitoring. Specifically NIST
uses the following definition, “The organization regularly reviews/analyzes
information system audit records for indications of inappropriate or unusual
activity, investigates suspicious activity or suspected violations, reports
findings to appropriate officials, and takes necessary actions.” (NIST, 2007).



CA-7 CONTINUOUS MONITORING
o Justification for Continuous Monitoring (CA-7) again stems from the key
mitigation strategy of monitoring. Moreover, the NIST control definition
provides the following information, “The organization monitors the security
controls in the information system on an ongoing basis.” and the
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supplemental guidance for CA-7 offers this insight, “This control is closely
related to and mutually supportive of the activities required in monitoring
configuration changes to the information system.” (NIST, 2007).


CM-4 MONITORING CONFIGURATION CHANGES
o Monitoring Configuration Changes (CM-4) is included as a direct match
between CAPEC‟s solution and NIST‟s control definition, “The
organization monitors changes to the information system” (NIST, 2007).



CM-6 CONFIGURATION SETTINGS
o Configuration Settings (CM-6) is added to the list of applicable child
controls because of the NIST supplemental guidance which states
“Organizations monitor and control changes to the configuration settings in
accordance with organizational policies and procedures” (NIST, 2007).



SI-4 INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES
o Information systems monitoring tools and techniques (SI-4) is justified
through examination of the following control definition “The organization
employs tools and techniques to monitor events on the information system”
(NIST, 2007). Both the CAPEC and NIST controls make use of information
system monitoring for protection purposes and are therefore directly
connected.



SI-7 SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY
o The final NIST control selected as a match for the CAPEC solution and
mitigation element is Software and Information Integrity (SI-7). This control
was selected based off the NIST supplemental guidance, which directly
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addresses monitoring the integrity of the information system. Specifically
NIST provides the following information, “The organization employs
integrity verification applications on the information system to look for
evidence of information tampering, errors, and omissions.” (NIST, 2007).

The first three original CAPEC controls and the justified NIST Child Mitigations
are introduced in Table 16.

Table 16. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for Three CAPEC Control Assigned for Attack Pattern 75.

Attack Pattern
Manipulating
Writable
Configuration
Files

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Enforce principle of least
privilege
Design: Backup copies of all
configuration files
Implementation: Integrity
monitoring for configuration files

NIST Child Mitigation(s)
AC-6
CP-9, CP-10, CM-2
AU-6, CA-7, CM-4, CM-6, SI4, SI-7

Table 17 introduces the complete abstracted table including the Parent Mitigation
column for CAPEC attack pattern 75.

Table 17. Abstracted Parent Mitigation Table for Three CAPEC Controls for Attack Pattern 75.

Attack Pattern

Solutions and Mitigations

Manipulating
Writable
Configuration Files

Design: Enforce principle
of least privilege
Design: Backup copies of
all configuration files
Implementation: Integrity
monitoring for
configuration files

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC-6

Parent Mitigation(s)

CP-9, CP-10,
CM-2
AU-6, CA-7,
CM-4, CM-6,
SI-4, SI-7

CP, CM

AC

AU, CA, SI
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The fourth control listed in the CAPEC Solutions and Mitigations element is
“Implementation: Enforce audit logging on code and configuration promotion procedures”.
We correlate this CAPEC mitigation with the following NIST controls:


AU-1 AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY POLICY AND PROCEDURES
o Audit and Accountability Policy and Procedures (AU-1) was selected as a
result of the NIST control definition, “The organization develops,
disseminates, and periodically reviews/updates: (i) a formal, documented,
audit and accountability policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles,
responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among
organizational entities, and compliance; and (ii) formal, documented
procedures to facilitate the implementation of the audit and accountability
policy and associated audit and accountability controls.” (NIST, 2007). Both
of these controls deal directly with auditing and their subsequent
procedures.



AU-2 AUDITABLE EVENTS
o Auditable Events (AU-2) was selected as a match because of the NIST
supplemental guidance which states the following, “The purpose of this
control is to identify important events which need to be audited as
significant and relevant to the security of the information system. The
organization specifies which information system components carry out
auditing activities.” (NIST, 2007). Both the CAPEC and NIST controls are
focused on the auditing process.
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CM-3 CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL
o Configuration Change Control (CM-3) can be justified by examination of
both the control definition which states, “The purpose of this control is to
identify important events which need to be audited as significant and
relevant to the security of the information system. The organization
specifies which information system components carry out auditing
activities.” (NIST, 2007). Additionally, the supplemental guidance offers the
following information, “Configuration change control includes changes to
the configuration settings for information technology products (e.g.,
operating systems, firewalls, routers).” and “The organization audits
activities associated with configuration changes to the information system.”
(NIST, 2007). Each of these statements lines up with the currently selected
CAPEC Solution and Mitigation.



CM-4 MONITORING CONFIGURATION CHANGES
o Monitoring Configuration Changes was (CM-4) was selected because of the
control definition which states, “The organization monitors changes to the
information system” (NIST, 2007). This correlates well with the CAPEC
mitigation of logging configuration changes.



CM-5 ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE
o Access Restrictions for Change (CM-5) was chosen as a result of the
following information provided by NIST for CM-5, “The organization: (i)
approves individual access privileges and enforces physical and logical
access restrictions associated with changes to the information system; and
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(ii) generates, retains, and reviews records reflecting all such changes.”
(NIST, 2007). This definition clearly aligns itself to the monitoring and
logging of configuration changes.


CM-6 CONFIGURATION SETTINGS
o NIST‟s Configuration Settings (CM-6) control was selected because of the
supplemental guidance which provides the following definition,
“Organizations monitor and control changes to the configuration settings in
accordance with organizational policies and procedures.” (NIST, 2007).
Again, clear parallels between the two controls are easily identified. Both
controls pertain directly with logging and monitoring of configuration
settings.

The first three original CAPEC controls and the justified NIST Child Mitigations
are introduced in Table 18.

Table 18. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for Four CAPEC Controls Assigned for Attack Pattern 75.

Attack Pattern
Manipulating
Writable
Configuration
Files

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Enforce principle of least
privilege
Design: Backup copies of all
configuration files
Implementation: Integrity
monitoring for configuration files

NIST Child Mitigation(s)
AC-6

Implementation: Enforce audit
logging on code and configuration
promotion procedures.

AU1, AU2, CM3, CM4, CM5,
CM6

CP-9, CP-10, CM-2
AU-6, CA-7, CM-4, CM-6, SI4, SI-7
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Audit and Accountability (AU) and Configuration Management (CM) have already
been listed under the Parent Mitigation column, so there is no need to fill in this
information again. Table 19 introduces the complete abstracted table including the Parent
Mitigation column for CAPEC attack pattern 75.

Table 19. Abstracted Parent Mitigation Table for Four Attack Pattern 75 Solutions.

Attack Pattern
Manipulating
Writable
Configuration Files

Solutions and
Mitigations
Design: Enforce
principle of least
privilege
Design: Backup
copies of all
configuration files
Implementation:
Integrity monitoring
for configuration
files
Implementation:
Enforce audit
logging on code and
configuration
promotion
procedures.

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC-6

Parent Mitigation(s)

CP-9, CP-10, CM-2

CP, CM

AU-6, CA-7, CM-4,
CM-6, SI-4, SI-7

AU, CA, SI

AC

AU1, AU2, CM3,
CM4, CM5, CM6

The final Solution and Mitigation listed in Table 10 is “Implementation: Load
configuration from separate process and memory space, for example a separate physical
device like a CD”. NIST Child Mitigation definitions which relate to this control are as
follows:


AC-5 SEPARATION OF DUTIES
o Separation of Duties (AC-5) was chosen as a match for the CAPEC solution
because of the link between the CAPEC and NIST controls. Specifically
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NIST provides the following detail in the control definition, “The
information system enforces separation of duties through assigned access
authorizations.” (NIST, 2007). Loading the configuration from a separate
space is an example of separation of process duties.


SC-2 APPLICATION PARTITIONING
o Justification for the selection of Application Partitioning (SC-2) stems from
the correlation between the CAPEC control and the NIST supplemental
guidance, “The information system separates user functionality (including
user interface services) from information system management
functionality.” (NIST, 2007). Loading the configuration is a clear example
of application management functionality.



SC-3 SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION
o Security and Function Isolation (SC-3) is included as a result of the NIST
supplemental guidance which states, “The information system isolates
security functions from nonsecurity functions by means of partitions,
domains, etc., including control of access to and integrity of, the hardware,
software, and firmware that perform those security functions. The
information system maintains a separate execution domain (e.g., address
space) for each executing process” (NIST, 2007). Loading the configuration
file from a separate space is clearly aligned with this NIST control.

All five of the original CAPEC controls and the justified NIST Child Mitigations
are introduced in Table 20.
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Table 20. Matching NIST Child Mitigations for all CAPEC Controls Assigned for Attack Pattern 75.

Attack Pattern
Manipulating
Writable
Configuration
Files

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Enforce principle of least
privilege
Design: Backup copies of all
configuration files
Implementation: Integrity
monitoring for configuration files

NIST Child Mitigation(s)
AC-6

Implementation: Enforce audit
logging on code and configuration
promotion procedures.
Implementation: Load
configuration from separate process
and memory space, for example a
separate physical device like a CD

AU-1, AU-2, CM-3, CM-4,
CM-5, CM-6

CP-9, CP-10, CM-2
AU-6, CA-7, CM-4, CM-6, SI4, SI-7

AC-5, SC-2, SC-3

Because Access Control (AC) has already been listed under the Parent Mitigation
column, we are only required to list Systems and Communication Protection (SC) as a new
entry. Table 21 introduces the complete abstracted table including the Parent Mitigation
column for CAPEC attack pattern 75.
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Table 21. Complete Abstracted Parent Mitigation Table for Attack Pattern 75.

Attack Pattern
Manipulating
Writable
Configuration Files

Solutions and
Mitigations
Design: Enforce
principle of least
privilege
Design: Backup
copies of all
configuration files
Implementation:
Integrity monitoring
for configuration
files
Implementation:
Enforce audit
logging on code and
configuration
promotion
procedures.
Implementation:
Load configuration
from separate
process and memory
space, for example a
separate physical
device like a CD

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC-6

Parent Mitigation(s)

CP-9, CP-10, CM-2

CP, CM

AU-6, CA-7, CM-4,
CM-6, SI-4, SI-7

AU, CA, SI

AC

AU1, AU2, CM3,
CM4, CM5, CM6

AC-5, SC-2, SC-3

SC

3.2. Results of Case Study
In addition to the two attack patterns shown in section 3.1, our case study followed
each of the required four steps in Process 1 for the nine remaining attack patterns identified
in Table 2. Table 22 introduces the complete results for attack pattern 87 (“Forceful
Browsing”).

68
Table 22. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 87 (“Forceful Browsing”).

Attack Pattern

Solutions and Mitigations

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC17, IA2, IA3,
MA4, SC8, SC23,
SI10

Forceful Browsing:
87

Authenticate request to every
resource. In addition, every page
or resource must ensure that the
request it is handling has been
made in an authorized context.
Forceful browsing can also be
SC18, AT3, CA2,
made difficult to a large extent by CA4, PL2, SA3,
not hard coding names of
SA8, SA10
application pages or resources.
This way, the attacker cannot
figure out, from the application
alone, the resources available
from the present context.

Parent
Mitigation(s)
AC, IA, MA,
SC, SI

AT, CA,
PL,SA

Table 23 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 94 (“Man in the
Middle”).
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Table 23. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 94 (“Man in the Middle”).

Attack Pattern

Solutions and Mitigations

Man in the Middle:
94

Get your Public Key signed by a
Certificate Authority
Encrypt your communication
using cryptography (SSL,...)

Use Strong mutual authentication
to always fully authenticate both
ends of any communications
channel.
Exchange public keys using a
secure channel

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
CA4, IA5, IA7, SC13,
SC17
AC3, AC4, SC7,
AC17, IA7, SC8,
SC9, SC12, SC13,
SI7
AC17, IA1, IA2, IA3,
IA4, IA5, SC8, SC11,
SC23, SI10

Parent
Mitigation(s)
CA, IA, SC
AC ,SI

SC17, SC12, SC13

Table 24 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 55 (“Rainbow Table
Password Cracking”).

Table 24. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 55 (“Rainbow Table Password Cracking”).

Attack Pattern

Solutions and Mitigations

Rainbow Table
Pswd Cracking: 55

Use salt when computing
password hashes. That is,
concatenate the salt (random bits)
with the original password prior
to hashing it.

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
SI7, SC13, IA5

Parent
Mitigation(s)
SI, SC, IA

Table 25 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 60 (“Reusing Session
ID‟s”).
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Table 25. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 60 (“Reusing Session ID‟s”).

Attack Pattern
Reusing Session
ID's: 60

Solutions and Mitigations

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
Always invalidate a session ID
AC3, IA5, SC10,
after the user logout.
SC23, IA4
Setup a session time out for the
AC11, AC12,
session IDs.
SC23, IA4
Protect the communication
AC4, IA2, IA3,
between the client and server. For IA7, SC8, SC9,
instance it is best practice to use
SC11, SC12, SC13,
SSL to mitigate man in the
SC16, SC17, SC20,
middle attack.
SC21, SC22, SC23
Do not code send session ID with SC9, SC4, SC14,
GET method, otherwise the
SC16, SA8
session ID will be copied to the
URL. In general avoid writing
session IDs in the URLs. URLs
can get logged in log files, which
are vulnerable to an attacker.
Encrypt the session data
AC3, SC4, SC7,
associated with the session ID.
SC23
Use multifactor authentication.
IA2

Parent
Mitigation(s)
AC, IA, SC

SA

Table 26 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 82 (“XML Denial of
Service”).
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Table 26. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 82 (“XMLDoS”).

Attack Pattern

Solutions and Mitigations

XMLDoS (XDoS):
82

Design: Utilize a Security
Pipeline Interface (SPI) to
mediate communications between
service requester and service
provider The SPI should be
designed to throttle up and down
and handle a variety of payloads.
Design: Utilize clustered and fail
over techniques, leverage
network transports to provide
availability such as HTTP load
balancers
Implementation: Check size of
XML message before parsing

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC4, SI9, SI10,
AC3, CM6

Parent
Mitigation(s)
AC, SI, CM

AC4, CA3, SC6,
SI4, CP10, SC5,
SC22

CA,SC, CP

SI7, SI9, SI10

Table 27 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 65 (“Passive
Sniffing”).

Table 27. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 65 (“Passive Sniffing”).

Attack Pattern
Passive Sniffing:
65

Solutions and Mitigations
Do not store secrets in client code
Use Well-Known Cryptography
Appropriately and Correctly
Use Authentication Mechanisms,
Where Appropriate, Correctly

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
CM6, PE19,
RA3, SA8, PL4
AC3, AC17, IA7,
MA4, SC8, SC9,
SC12, SC13
IA2, IA7, SC23,
SI10

Parent
Mitigation(s)
CM, PE, RA,
SA, PL
AC, IA, MA,
SC
SI
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Table 28 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 101 (“Server Side
Includes”).

Table 28. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 101 (“Server Side Includes”).

Attack Pattern

Solutions and Mitigations

Server Side
Includes (SSI): 101

Set the OPTIONS
IncludesNOEXEC in the global
access.conf file or local .htaccess
(Apache) file to deny SSI
execution in directories that do
not need them
All user controllable input must
be appropriately sanitized before
use in the application. This
includes omitting, or encoding,
certain characters or strings that
have the potential of being
interpreted as part of an SSI
directive
Server Side Includes must be
enabled only if there is a strong
business reason to do so. Every
additional component enabled on
the web server increases the
attack surface as well as
administrative overhead

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
CM1, CM6, CM7,
SI6, SC3, AC6

Parent
Mitigation(s)
CM, SI, SC,
AC

SI7, SI9, SI10

AC6

Table 29 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow
via Environment Variables”).
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Table 29. Process 1 Results for Attack Pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables”).

Attack Pattern

Solutions and Mitigations

Buffer Overflow
via Environment
Variables: 10

Do not expose environment
variable to the user.
Do not use untrusted data in your
environment variables.

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC6, CM6, RA3,
RA5, SA10, SA11,
SC4, SI10
AC3, CM6, IA2,
SC23, SI17, SI19,
SI10
SA8, PL2

Use a language or compiler that
performs automatic bounds
checking
There are tools such as Sharefuzz MA3, PL6 RA5,
(http://sharefuzz.sourceforge.net/) SA10, SA11, SI2,
which is an environment variable SI4
fuzzer for Unixes that support
loading a shared library. You can
use Sharefuzz to determine if you
are exposing an environment
variable vulnerable to buffer
overflow.

Parent
Mitigation(s)
AC, CM, RA,
SA, SC, SI
IA,

PL

MA

Table 30 introduces the results of Process 1 for attack pattern 29 (“Race Conditions,
Time of Check and Time of Use”).
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Table 30. Process 1Results for Attack Pattern 29 (“Race Conditions, Time of Check and Time of Use”).

Attack Pattern

Solutions and Mitigations

Race Conditions
(TOCTOU): 29

Use safe libraries to access
resources such as files.
Be aware that improper use of
access function calls such as
chown(), tempfile(), chmod(),
etc. can cause a race condition.
Use synchronization to control
the flow of execution.
Use static analysis tools to find
race conditions.
Pay attention to concurrency
problems related to the access of
resources.

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
SI7, SC18,

Parent
Mitigation(s)
SI, SC

AT2, AC3, IA2

AT, AC, IA

SC3, AC4
SA11,SI10
SA8, SC4

SA

3.3. Discussion and Validation
While CAPEC‟s Release 1 Dictionary provides a solid framework, the current
format and presentation of information provided in the Solutions and Mitigations element
is inconsistent. There are tremendous variations in the depth and breadth of the
“Mitigations and Solutions” currently outlined for each attack pattern. Some attack patterns
provide detail that is too granular while others provide information that is vague. This
chapter introduced the process to add a new Parent Mitigation element to provide
consistency and mitigation strategies to be used by CAPEC adopters.
Our approach injects a Parent Mitigation element into the dictionary to provide
consistency to the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary. Because the current Mitigation and
Solutions element provides valuable information, we are not advocating its removal. Our
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intention is to add a Parent Mitigation element to provide a manageable and consistent
number of more abstracted mitigations.
There is significant value in completing this abstraction process. Adding the Parent
Mitigation into the CAPEC dictionary provides a needed level of consistency and
standardization. The CAPEC Dictionary‟s mitigation strategies are now standardized into
17 “Parents” (down from the nearly 400) each at the same level of abstraction. By
abstracting these mitigations into 17 categories, users are less likely to dismiss a particular
attack pattern because the mitigation is too detailed or too vague. This is currently a risk for
CAPEC adopters who believe that they are not at risk for a given attack because they do
not have the specific technology mentioned in the CAPEC mitigation.
Validation for Process 1 can be found by connecting our work to a strong
theoretical basis. Overcoming usability issues associated with the organization and
presentation of large amounts of information is a difficult task (English, Hearst, Sinha,
Swearingen, & Yee, 2002). Faceted classification analysis can be used to create common
categories from large amounts of data. Research has shown that these categories can be
used to organize, manage, and aid in the meaningful classification of large data collections
(Hearst, 2006). Similar to the use of faceted classification theory, the inclusion of the
Parent Mitigation element allows for the categorization and classification of the CAPEC
standard via common mitigation strategies. The Parent Mitigation element can be viewed
as a facet by which the CAPEC standard can be examined and organized.
Faceted theories make use of classification systems which are organized according
to specific disciplines. In this regard each facet is unique to the discipline that will utilize
the classification (Hong). The inclusion of a Parent Mitigation element can be viewed as a

76
facet which is specific to, and accepted by, the information assurance discipline. The NIST
800-53r2 makes use of a similar classification structure through the use of a Family level
mitigation. Prior classification based on the Solutions and Mitigations element was not
possible. Individual mitigations were unique to their corresponding attack pattern. The
inclusion of a Parent Mitigation element allows for creation of classification system based
off of 17 common mitigations.
The use of hierarchical faceted theory allows users to more intuitively access
subcategories and underlying data (Hearst, 2006). The inclusion of the Parent Mitigation
element provides similar results. CAPEC users can now access a broad category of
common mitigation strategies. These strategies can be further drilled down to find the
detailed and specific mitigations.
The use of faceted analysis allows for multiple perspectives of the same unit
(Kwasnik, 1999). The inclusion of the Parent Mitigation element allows CAPEC users to
view attack information by attack pattern name as well as by common attack pattern
mitigation strategies.
The results from Process 1 are used in the completion of Process 2 and Process 3.
The creation of a Parent Mitigation element is used by Process 2 to provide attack pattern
context and serve as the root view in our new model for viewing attack pattern information.
Parent Mitigations also provide the means for building security metrics which are presented
in Process 3.
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4. MODELING HIERARCHY-BASED ATTACK PATTERNS
Process 2 presents a new attack pattern model which focuses on the re-inclusion of
the Parent Threat element and the inclusion of the Parent Mitigation element to logically
group each of the 101 attack patterns. This model creates a graphical hierarchy for each of
the attack patterns and groups them not only by Parent Threats (such as “Spoofing” and
“Injection”), but also by Parent Mitigations (such as “Access Control” and “Configuration
Management”). We also provide individual textual attack descriptions for each of the 101
attack patterns to provide a stand-alone, perspective of each attack pattern. Process 2
allows individual attack patterns to be traced upward to its Parent Threat and downward to
its Parent Mitigation in a hierarchical tree. The traceability from the top of the tree (Parent
Threat), through the selected elements of the attack patterns, to the roots of the tree (Parent
Mitigation) eases the introduction of the CAPEC standard to audiences who are not
familiar with attack patterns. This grouping also allows experienced users to leverage the
attack information from a standardized set of elements. There is a great amount of
information in the CAPEC dictionary that we are capturing and documenting with this fanin/fan-out approach.
Process 2 includes four steps as introduced in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. The Required Steps to Complete Process 2.

Step 1 includes Parent Threat information as a required element for each attack
pattern in the CAPEC Release 1 dictionary. Step 2 reduces the number of the descriptive
elements used to document each attack pattern. Step 2 is completed by populating each of
the selected elements and ensuring that each element has at least one entry. The purpose of
reducing the element set is to create a user-friendly model for viewing the most critical
information about each of the 101 attack patterns without overwhelming the user.
Justification for the selected elements is presented later in this chapter. Step 3 creates a
graphical hierarchy tree which is used to model each attack pattern. The elements selected

79
in step 2 will be used in our new model. Step 4 creates a textual attack description which is
based on the trimmed element set.
Process 2 begins with the re-inclusion of a Parent Threat element into the CAPEC
Dictionary to increase the usability of the standard. Currently each attack pattern can be
traced to one of 11 Parent Threats via a Classification Tree which is available on the
CAPEC website (capec.mitre.org, 2007). The Parent Threat information is not officially
included in the CAPEC Dictionary as one of the formally defined attack pattern descriptive
elements. As a result, finding the Parent Threat and related CAPEC attack patterns is a
time-consuming and error prone task. This disjointed structure leads to confusion and
frustration when attempting to make use of the current CAPEC Dictionary because this
vital element is not included (Engebretson & Pauli, 2008). By including a Parent Threat
element into the tree, we provide contextual information for the attack patterns and each
related attack pattern.
The number of elements used to describe each attack pattern can present a
significant problem when attempting to make use of the current CAPEC dictionary in an
applied setting (Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a, 2008b). Step 2 trims the element set to
provide only meaningful information of the attack pattern without overwhelming the user.
The full dictionary with all descriptive elements will continue to be available for review.
Step 3 and 4 utilize the trimmed element set created in Step 2 to build hierarchies
for presenting attack pattern information and viewing relationships among attack patterns.
These hierarchies are derived directly from the 11 Parent Threats and are tied together by
17 Parent Mitigations introduced in chapter 3.
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4.1. Re-including Parent Threats
Step 1 of Process 2 is completed by executing the following steps:
1.

Open the completed table for the given attack pattern which was created in Process
1. Insert a Parent Threat column to the left of the Attack Pattern column. The new
Parent Threat column will become the first column in the table.

2.

Navigate to the CAPEC Classification Tree and select the “Expand All” link.

3.

Locate the required attack pattern in the Classification Tree, which is listed under
the attack pattern column of the chosen table.

4.

Trace up the expanded classification tree to find the top level Threat Family.

5.

Record this top level Family Threat in the Parent Threat column.

A template for this new table is introduced in Table 31.

Table 31. Sample Table Used to Abstract the Parent Threat.

Parent Threat

Attack
Pattern

Solutions and
Mitigations

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)

Parent
Mitigation(s)

CAPEC provides the following top level threats in the Classification Tree:


Abuse of Functionality



Spoofing



Probabilistic Techniques



Exploration of Authentication



Resource Depletion
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Exploitation of Privilege/Trust



Injection



Data Structure Attacks



Data Leakage Attacks



Resource Manipulation



Time/State Attacks

The results of our case study for step 1 are presented below where Table 32
introduces the results of step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 3.

Table 32. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 3 (“Using „Ghost‟ Characters to Bypass Input Filters”).

Parent
Threat
Resource
Manipulation

Attack
Pattern
Using
Leading
'Ghost'
Character
Sequences to
Bypass Input
Filters

Solutions and
Mitigations
Perform white list,
rather than black list,
input validation.

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC-3, AC-4, CM-7,
SI-9, SI-10

Canonicalize all data
prior to validation
Take an iterative
approach to input
validation (defense
in depth)

SI-9, SI-10

Parent
Mitigation(s)
AC, CM, SI

SI-10

Table 33 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 75.
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Table 33. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 75 (“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”).

Parent
Threat
Exploitation
of Privilege
/ Trust

Attack Pattern
Manipulating
Writable
Configuration
Files 75

Solutions and
Mitigations
Design: Enforce
principle of least
privilege
Design: Backup
copies of all
configuration
files
Implementation:
Integrity
monitoring for
configuration
files
Implementation:
Enforce audit
logging on code
and
configuration
promotion
procedures.
Implementation:
Load
configuration
from separate
process and
memory space,
for example a
separate physical
device like a CD

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC-6

Parent
Mitigation(s)
AC

CP-9, CP-10,
CM-2

CP, CM

AU-6, CA-7,
CM-4, CM-6,
SI-4, SI-7

AU, CA, SI

AU1, AU2,
CM3, CM4,
CM5, CM6

AC-5, SC-2,
SC-3

SC

We use attack pattern 101 “Server Side Includes” as an example to introduce one
benefit of this Process. CAPEC provides the following elements to describe Attack Pattern
101:


Attack Pattern ID, Typical Severity, Description, Attack Pattern Prerequisites,
Typical Likelihood of Exploit, Methods of Attack, Examples-Instances, Attacker
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Skill or Knowledge Required, Resources Required, Probing Techniques, Solutions
and Mitigations, Attack Motivation Consequences, Context Description, Injection
Vector, Payload, Activation Zone, Payload Activation Impact, Related Weaknesses,
Related Security Principles, Related Guidelines, Purpose, CIA Impact, Technical
Context, and Source.

Parent Threat is not listed among the elements currently used to describe the attack.
In order to determine the general threat classification that attack pattern 101 is derived
from, a CAPEC user is currently required to search the expanded CAPEC Classification
Tree for the given attack pattern by Attack Pattern ID or Attack Pattern Title. The
Classification Tree document is separate from the CAPEC Release 1 dictionary forcing the
user to move away from the descriptive elements provided within the dictionary. Within
the Classification Tree, the user must wade through three levels of detail to uncover
“Server Side Includes” (attack pattern 101) as a member of the “Injection” Threat Family.
Step 1 in Process 2 will eliminate this manual process.
Adding the Parent Threat element to the formal definition set for all 101 of the
attack patterns provides a context for viewing attack pattern information without having to
manually interact with both the Full Dictionary and the Classification Tree. Adding Parent
Threat as a formal element to our hierarchy increases usability by removing this manual
search.
Step 1 allows users to quickly and accurately locate related threats. Figure 8
introduces a side-by-side comparison of the current and proposed steps which are required
to locate threat-related CAPEC attack patterns.
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Figure 8. Benefit of Adding Parent Threat Element for Locating Related Threats.

Both approaches in Figure 8 assume the user is currently reviewing the details
(elements) of a specific attack pattern. Process 2 not only reduces the number of required
steps, but includes the necessary information needed to know from what Parent Threat the
chosen attack pattern is derived. There is no heuristic nature to this process as the
relationship between attack pattern and Parent Threat is already documented in the CAPEC
Classification Tree.
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In addition to the Parent Threat element, we considered proposing a “Related
CAPEC Attack Pattern” element. However due to the criticism of the large number of
descriptive elements currently used for each attack pattern, we chose not to create an
additional element (Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a, 2008b). Adopters who are interested in
finding related CAPEC attack patterns will be aided by the creation of our new Parent
Threat element.
To demonstrate how this process makes the CAPEC dictionary more usable, we
introduce attack pattern 98 “Phishing”. It is not possible to find related attacks or a general
threat for attack pattern 98 in CAPEC‟s current format. By leveraging our process, it is
now explicitly known that “Phishing” is a type of “Spoofing” attack. Furthermore, CAPEC
lists the following attack patterns under “Spoofing”.


Leveraging/Manipulating Configuration File Search Paths (Attack Pattern 38)



Man in the Middle Attack (Attack Pattern 94)



Utilizing Rest‟s Trust in the System Resources to Register Man in the Middle
(Attack Pattern 57)



Reflection Attack in Authentication Protocol (Attack Pattern 90)



Pharming (Attack Pattern 89)

Because the Parent Threat is included as one of the attack pattern elements, it is
now known what related threats should also be considered in addition to “Phishing” when
concerned with “Spoofing”.
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4.2. Trimming the Element Set
The current CAPEC Release 1 dictionary includes 101 attack patterns with each
attack pattern including up to 31 descriptive elements. The volume of information
presented in the current CAPEC dictionary presents a major obstacle for the learning and
application of the standard (Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a, 2008b). Furthermore, the
currently prescribed element set is inconsistent. For example, attack patterns 17
(Accessing, Modifying or Executing Executable Files), 33 (HTTP Request Smuggling) and
67 (String Format Overflow in syslog()) each include the Injection Vector, Payload, and
Activation Zone elements while attack patterns 1 (Accessing Functionality Not Properly
Constrained by ACLs), 22 (Exploiting Trust in Client), and 44 (Overflow Binary Resource
File) do not. Reducing the element set provides a level of consistency and usability by
leveraging our newly added Parent Threat and Parent Mitigation elements.
Step 2 of Process 2 is the refining of the CAPEC descriptive elements. The outcome
of this process is a new model for viewing relevant information about each attack pattern.
We trim the CAPEC elements by focusing on elements which can be used to portray the
attack fully and provide a meaningful representation for the user. It is important that our
new model makes use of a reduced number of elements while still describing the attack
pattern in totality. We selected the following attack pattern elements:


Parent Threat



Attack Pattern ID



Attack Pattern Name



Description



Solutions and Mitigations
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Parent Mitigation

To complete step 2, we ensure that each element (listed above) for each attack
pattern has at least one entry. We avoid the large number of descriptive elements which
lead to information overload when attempting to make use of the CAPEC dictionary (Pauli
& Engebretson, 2008a, 2008b). The process of trimming the element set from 31 to 6 is
justified by examining each of the selected elements. The Parent Threat element is
included because it increases usability by grouping related attack patterns as introduced in
step 1. Leveraging the significant work done in creating the Parent Threat element requires
the use of the Attack Pattern ID. As a result, we include both the Attack Pattern ID and the
Parent Threat. Parent Mitigation is added because it documents a consistent and usable
mitigation strategy for each attack pattern. Parent Mitigation is based on the Solutions and
Mitigations element so we include both of these elements into our model. Finally, Attack
Pattern Name and Description are included as they are essential to complete the description
of the attack pattern. The use of a hierarchy capped by Parent Threat and Parent Mitigation
elements allows for the tracing of attack patterns from individual Parent Mitigations up to
Parent Threats and vice versa.
Previously accepted models have made use of a reduced CAPEC element set for the
purpose of introducing new audiences to the CAPEC standard without overwhelming them
(Pauli & Engebretson, 2008b). However, like the current CAPEC dictionary, previous
models were inconsistent in their use of the descriptive elements. Our model requires that
each of the selected elements is used for all 101 attack patterns.
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The goal of trimming the element set is not to advocate element set replacement,
but rather to present CAPEC adopters with a simple, easy-to-use, organized, and uniform
presentation of all 101 attack patterns. The original CAPEC library will be available for
further detail review.
The new hierarchy model will be used to complete steps 3 and 4 of Process 2. The
use of a hierarchy makes the graphical trees more usable because it demonstrates
previously undefined relationships. The new model allows us to view relationship between
elements, attack patterns, Parent Threats, and Parent Mitigations. The use of a graphical
tree allows users to view details from either the Parent Threat or Parent Mitigation point of
view. The model will be used to make the textual attack descriptions more usable by
providing a stand-alone view of each attack pattern. The use of a textual attack description
is beneficial for allowing users to view details from an attack pattern-driven point of view.
Our usable model is consistent because all hierarchy trees and textual descriptions
are completely populated.

4.3. Building Hierarchy-Based Graphical Trees and Textual Attack Descriptions
Hierarchy-based representations of attack patterns have been previously used to
facilitate learning of the CAPEC standard (Pauli & Engebretson, 2008a). One of the major
categories for learning strategies is the creation or use of a hierarchy (Weinstein & Mayer,
1986). Information presented in a hierarchical fashion is easier to learn and recall than
information presented in a format with not clear connection between details (Weinstein &
Mayer, 1986). Presenting attack pattern elements via a hierarchy allows users to see the
connections between each of the elements. This knowledge can then be leveraged when
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analyzing and designing secure software, building networks, or making security related
decisions.
Our model includes both a defined graphical tree hierarchy for describing element
organization, structure and relationships as well as textual attack descriptions for presenting
readable attack pattern details. The use of a hierarchy can also help to define relationships
among the 101 attack patterns, 17 Parent Mitigations, and 11 Parent Threats.
We apply our hierarchy in a fan-in-fan-out manner to the trimmed element set
selected in section 4.3. The highest level of our hierarchy provides general and wideranging information. The Parent Threat element is used at the top level because it is broad.
There are only 11 possible Parent Threats. Subsequent hierarchy levels become specific in
nature and scope. Attack pattern ID, Attack Pattern Name, Description, and the Solutions
and Mitigations elements are each specific to a single attack pattern and cannot be
generalized. The model concludes with a fan-out approach as it abstracts back out to more
general information in the Parent Mitigation element. This element represents a direct
abstraction of the 400+ Solutions and Mitigations into 17 possible mitigations. Our
hierarchy model for attack pattern elements is introduced in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Hierarchy Model for Attack Patterns and Elements.

The hierarchical tree is completed by filling in each of the elements described in
Figure 9. The purpose of this representation is to show relationships between elements and
attack patterns. This representation can also be used to group attack patterns by related
Parent Threats or Parent Mitigations. The textual attack descriptions, which are presented
in a tabular format for each attack pattern, aid in documenting all of the selected elements
and information for each attack pattern. Textual attack descriptions also provide
consistency and usability for each attack pattern.
Step 3 of Process 2 creates both the graphical hierarchies and the textual attack
descriptions for the attack pattern. We create the graphical hierarchies by filling in the
required elements outlined in figure 9. The case study results for step 3 for Process 2 for
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attack pattern 3 and 75 are presented below. The remaining graphical hierarchies for our
case study are shown in section 4.4.
The completed graphical hierarchy for attack patterns 3 is introduced in Figure 10.
Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

ID: 3

Name: Using ‘Ghost’ Characters to Bypass Input Filters

Description:
The API that is being targeted ignores the leading ghost characters, and processes the
attacker‟s input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several
syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent way, while the filter does not take into
account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms

Solutions and Mitigations:
 Perform white list rather than black list input validation.




Canonicalize all data prior to validation.
Take an iterative approach to input validation (defense in depth).

Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, SI

Figure 10. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 3 (“Using „Ghost‟ Characters to Bypass Input Filters”).

The completed graphical hierarchy for attack patterns 75 is introduced in Figure 11.
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege / Trust

ID: 75

Name: Manipulating Writable Configuration Files

Description:
An attacker modifies the contents of configuration files that influence/control the operation of the
target software. This attack exploits the ever-growing number, size and complexity of
configuration files and the often lax access controls on these files.
This attack exploits a program's trust in configuration files that may have weaker permissions.
System configuration in distributed systems such as J2EE servers have many administration
points.

Solutions and Mitigations:







Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
Design: Backup copies of all configuration files
Implementation: Integrity monitoring for configuration files
Implementation: Enforce audit logging on code and configuration promotion procedures.
Implementation: Load configuration from separate process and memory space, for example a
separate physical device like a CD

Parent Mitigation: AC, CP, CM, AU, CA, SI, SC
Figure 11. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 75 (“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”).

Step 4 creates a textual attack description which presents attack pattern information
in a tabular format. This process is completed by extracting information from the
hierarchies into the textual template provided in table 34.

Table 34. Example of Textual Attack Description.

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description
Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations
Parent Mitigation

93

The outcome of step 4 provides a trimmed element set which is usable, readable,
and presents information from the individual attack pattern perspective for each of the 101
CAPEC attacks. The textual attack descriptions for attack patterns 3 and 75 are introduced
below. The outcome of step 4 for the remaining attack patterns can be found in section 4.4.
Table 35 introduces the completed textual attack description for attack pattern 3.

Table 35. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 3 (“Using „Ghost‟ Characters to Bypass Input Filters”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

3
Using „Ghost‟ Characters to Bypass Input Filters
The API that is being targeted ignores the leading ghost
characters, and processes the attacker‟s input. This occurs when
the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic
forms and interpret it in the equivalent way, while the filter does
not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms
acceptable to the targeted API.
Resource Manipulation
Perform white list rather than black list input validation.
Canonicalize all data prior to validation.
Take an iterative approach to input validation (defense in
depth).
AC, CM, SI

Table 36 introduces the textual description for attack pattern 75.
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Table 36. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 75 (“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

75
Manipulating Writable Configuration Files
An attacker modifies the contents of configuration files that
influence/control the operation of the target software. This
attack exploits the ever-growing number, size and complexity of
configuration files and the often lax access controls on these
files.
This attack exploits a program's trust in configuration files that
may have weaker permissions. System configuration in
distributed systems such as J2EE servers have many
administration points. For example, permissions may be set on
the administrative GUI, the configuration file for the server as a
whole, configuration files for specific domains and applications,
special jar and other class files used to load resources at
runtime, and even policy specific in .war and .ear files. A
mistake in permissions setting in either the file acl or the content
is an opening an attacker can use to elevate privilege.
Exploitation of Privilege / Trust
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
Design: Backup copies of all configuration files
Implementation: Integrity monitoring for configuration files
Implementation: Enforce audit logging on code and
configuration promotion procedures.
Implementation: Load configuration from separate process and
memory space, for example a separate physical device like a CD
AC, CP, CM, AU, CA, SI, SC

4.4. Results of Case Study
Our case study presents one attack pattern from each Parent Threat. The results of
our case study for Step 1 are presented below where Table 37 introduces the results of Step
1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 87.
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Table 37. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 87 (“Forceful Browsing”).

Parent
Threat
Abuse of
Functionality

Attack
Pattern
Forceful
Browsing: 87

Solutions and
Mitigations
Authenticate request to
every resource. In
addition, every page or
resource must ensure that
the request it is handling
has been made in an
authorized context.
Forceful browsing can
also be made difficult to a
large extent by not hard
coding names of
application pages or
resources. This way, the
attacker cannot figure
out, from the application
alone, the resources
available from the present
context.

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC17, IA2,
IA3, MA4,
SC8, SC23,
SI10

Parent
Mitigation(s)
AC, IA, MA,
SC, SI

SC18, AT3,
CA2, CA4,
PL2, SA3,
SA8, SA10

AT, CA,
PL,SA

Table 38 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 94.
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Table 38. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 94 (“Man in the Middle”).

Parent
Attack Pattern
Threat
Spoofing Man the
Middle: 94

Solutions and
Mitigations
Get your Public Key
signed by a Certificate
Authority
Encrypt your
communication using
cryptography (SSL,...)

Use Strong mutual
authentication to always
fully authenticate both
ends of any
communications
channel.
Exchange public keys
using a secure channel

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
CA4, IA5,
IA7, SC13,
SC17
AC3, AC4,
SC7, AC17,
IA7, SC8,
SC9, SC12,
SC13, SI7
AC17, IA1,
IA2, IA3, IA4,
IA5, SC8,
SC11, SC23,
SI10

Parent
Mitigation(s)
CA, IA, SC

AC ,SI

SC17, SC12,
SC13

Table 39 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 55.

Table 39. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 55 (“Rainbow Table Password Cracking”).

Parent
Threat
Probabilistic
Techniques

Attack
Pattern
Rainbow
Table Pswd
Cracking: 55

Solutions and
Mitigations
Use salt when computing
password hashes. That is,
concatenate the salt
(random bits) with the
original password prior
to hashing it.

NIST Child
Parent
Mitigation(s) Mitigation(s)
SI7, SC13,
SI, SC, IA
IA5

Table 40 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 60.
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Table 40. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 60 (“Reusing Session Id‟s”).

Parent
Threat
Exploitation
of
Authorization

Attack
Pattern
Reusing
Session
ID's: 60

Solutions and
Mitigations
Always invalidate a
session ID after the user
logout.
Setup a session time out
for the session IDs.
Protect the
communication between
the client and server. For
instance it is best
practice to use SSL to
mitigate man in the
middle attack.
Do not code send session
ID with GET method,
otherwise the session ID
will be copied to the
URL. In general avoid
writing session IDs in the
URLs. URLs can get
logged in log files, which
are vulnerable to an
attacker.
Encrypt the session data
associated with the
session ID.
Use multifactor
authentication.

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC3, IA5,
SC10, SC23,
IA4
AC11, AC12,
SC23, IA4
AC4, IA2, IA3,
IA7, SC8, SC9,
SC11, SC12,
SC13, SC16,
SC17, SC20,
SC21, SC22,
SC23
SC9, SC4,
SC14, SC16,
SA8

Parent
Mitigation(s)
AC, IA, SC

SA

AC3, SC4,
SC7, SC23
IA2

Table 41 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 82.
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Table 41. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 82 (XML Denial of Service”).

Parent
Threat
Resource
Depletion

Attack
Pattern
XMLDoS
(XDoS):
82

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Utilize a Security
Pipeline Interface (SPI) to
mediate communications
between service requester
and service provider The SPI
should be designed to throttle
up and down and handle a
variety of payloads.
Design: Utilize clustered and
fail over techniques, leverage
network transports to provide
availability such as HTTP
load balancers
Implementation: Check size
of XML message before
parsing

NIST Child Parent
Mitigation(s) Mitigation(s)
AC4, SI9,
AC, SI, CM
SI10, AC3,
CM6

AC4, CA3,
SC6, SI4,
CP10, SC5,
SC22

CA,SC, CP

SI7, SI9,
SI10

Table 42 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 65.

Table 42. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 65 (“Passive Sniffing”).

Parent
Threat
Data
Leakage
Attacks

Attack
Solutions and Mitigations
Pattern
Passive
Do not store secrets in client code
Sniffing:
65
Use Well-Known Cryptography
Appropriately and Correctly

Use Authentication Mechanisms,
Where Appropriate, Correctly

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
CM6, PE19,
RA3, SA8,
PL4
AC3, AC17,
IA7, MA4,
SC8, SC9,
SC12, SC13
IA2, IA7,
SC23, SI10

Parent
Mitigation(s)
CM, PE, RA,
SA, PL
AC, IA, MA,
SC

SI

Table 43 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 101.
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Table 43. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack pattern 101 (“Server Side Includes”).

Parent
Attack Pattern
Threat
Injection Server Side
Includes (SSI):
101

Solutions and Mitigations NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
Set the OPTIONS
CM1, CM6,
IncludesNOEXEC in the
CM7, SI6, SC3,
global access.conf file or
AC6
local .htaccess (Apache)
file to deny SSI execution
in directories that do not
need them
All user controllable input SI7, SI9, SI10
must be appropriately
sanitized before use in the
application. This includes
omitting, or encoding,
certain characters or
strings that have the
potential of being
interpreted as part of an
SSI directive
Server Side Includes must AC6
be enabled only if there is
a strong business reason to
do so. Every additional
component enabled on the
web server increases the
attack surface as well as
administrative overhead

Parent
Mitigation(s)
CM, SI, SC,
AC

Table 44 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 10.
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Table 44. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables”).

Parent
Threat
Data
Structure
Attacks

Attack
Pattern
Buffer
Overflow via
Environment
Variables: 10

Solutions and Mitigations
Do not expose environment
variable to the user.

Do not use untrusted data in your
environment variables.

Use a language or compiler that
performs automatic bounds
checking
There are tools such as Sharefuzz
(http://sharefuzz.sourceforge.net/)
which is an environment variable
fuzzer for Unixes that support
loading a shared library. You can
use Sharefuzz to determine if you
are exposing an environment
variable vulnerable to buffer
overflow.

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC6, CM6,
RA3, RA5,
SA10, SA11,
SC4, SI10
AC3, CM6,
IA2, SC23,
SI17, SI19,
SI10
SA8, PL2

Parent
Mitigation(s)
AC, CM,
RA, SA, SC,
SI

MA3, PL6
RA5, SA10,
SA11, SI2,
SI4

MA

IA,

PL

Table 45 introduces the results of Step 1 for Process 2 for attack pattern 29.
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Table 45. Addition of Parent Threat Column for Attack Pattern 29 (“Race Conditions, Time of Check Time of Use”).

Parent
Threat
Time
and
State
Attacks

Attack Pattern

Solutions and Mitigations

Race
Conditions
(TOCTOU): 29

Use safe libraries to access
resources such as files.
Be aware that improper use
of access function calls
such as chown(),
tempfile(), chmod(), etc.
can cause a race condition.
Use synchronization to
control the flow of
execution.
Use static analysis tools to
find race conditions.
Pay attention to

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
SI7, SC18,

Parent
Mitigation(s)
SI, SC

AT2, AC3, IA2

AT, AC, IA

SC3, AC4

SA11,SI10
SA8, SC4

SA

concurrency problems
related to the access of
resources.

Step 3 of Process 2 requires us to create both the graphical hierarchies and the
textual attack descriptions for the attack pattern. We create the graphical hierarchies by
filling in the required elements outlined in Figure 9 for each attack pattern. The completed
graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 87 is introduced in Figure 12.
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality

ID: 87

Name: Forceful Browsing

Description:
An attacker employs forceful browsing to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable through
direct URL entry.
Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web
application.
Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach
sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.

Solutions and Mitigations




Authenticate request to every resource. In addition, every page or resource must ensure that
the request it is handling has been made in an authorized context.
Forceful browsing can also be made difficult to a large extent by not hardcoding names of
application pages or resources. This way, the attacker cannot figure out, from the application
alone, the resources available from the present context.

Parent Mitigations: IA, MA, SC, SI, AT, CA, PL, SA, AC
Figure 12. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 87 (“Forceful Browsing”).

The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 94 is introduced in Figure 13.
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Parent Threat: Spoofing

ID: 94

Name: Man in the Middle

Description:
This type of attack targets the communication between two components (typically client and server). The
attacker places himself in the communication channel between the two components. Whenever one component
attempts to communicate with the other (data flow, authentication challenges, etc.), the data first goes to the
attacker, who has the opportunity to observe or alter it, and it is then passed on to the other component as if it
was never intercepted. This interposition is transparent leaving the two compromised components unaware of the
potential corruption or leakeage of their communications. The potential for Man-in-the-Middle attacks yields an
implicit lack of trust in communication or identify between two components.

Solutions and Mitigations:
 Get your Public Key signed by a Certificate Authority
 Encrypt your communication using cryptography (SSL,...)
 Use Strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate both
ends of any communications channel.
 Exchange public keys using a secure channel

Parent Mitigation: CA, IA, SC, AC, SI
Figure 13. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 94 (“Man in the Middle”).

The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 55 is introduced in Figure 14.
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques

ID: 55

Name: Rainbow Table Password Cracking

Description:
An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of passwords are stored. He then uses a rainbow table
of precomputed hash chains to attempt to look up the original password. Once the original password
corresponding to the hash is obtained, the attacker uses the original password to gain access to the system.
A password rainbow table stores hash chains for various passwords. A password chain is computed,
starting from the original password, P, via a a reduce(compression) function R and a hash function H. A
recurrence relation exists where Xi+1 = R(H(Xi)), X0 = P. Then the hash chain of length n for the original
password P can be formed: X1, X2, X3, ... , Xn-2, Xn-1, Xn, H(Xn). P and H(Xn) are then stored together in
the rainbow table.

Solutions and Mitigations
 Use salt when computing password hashes. That is,
concatenate the salt (random bits) with the original password
prior to hashing it.

Parent Mitigation: SI, SC, IA
Figure 14. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 94 (“Rainbow Table Password Cracking”).

The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 60 is introduced in Figure 15.
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Authentication

ID: 60

Name: Reusing Session ID’s

Description:
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system
in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID
used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session
hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
Solutions and Mitigations








Always invalidate a session ID after the user logout.
Setup a session time out for the session IDs.
Protect the communication between the client and server. For instance it is best practice to
use SSL to mitigate man in the middle attack.
Do not code send session ID with GET method, otherwise the session ID will be copied to
the URL. In general avoid writing session IDs in the URLs. URLs can get logged in log files,
which are vulnerable to an attacker.
Encrypt the session data associated with the session ID.
Use multifactor authentication.

Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, SC, IA
Figure 15. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 60 (“Reusing Session ID‟s”).

The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 82 is introduced in Figure 16.
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Parent Threat: Resource Depletion

ID: 82

Name: XML Denial of Service (XDoS)

Description:
XML Denial of Service (XDoS) can be applied to any technology that utilizes XML data. This is, of course,
most distributed systems technology including Java, .Net, databases, and so on. XDoS is most closely associated
with web services, SOAP, and Rest, because remote service requesters can post malicious XML payloads to the
service provider designed to exhaust the service provider's memory, CPU, and/or disk space. The main weakness
in XDoS is that the service provider generally must inspect, parse, and validate the XML messages to determine
routing, workflow, security considerations, and so on. It is exactly these inspection, parsing, and validation
routines that XDoS targets. There are three primary attack vectors that XDoS can navigate
Target CPU through recursion: attacker creates a recursive payload and sends to service provider
Target memory through jumbo payloads: service provider uses DOM to parse XML. DOM creates in memory
representation of XML document, but when document is very large (for example, north of 1 Gb) service provider
host may exhaust memory trying to build memory objects.
XML Ping of death: attack service provider with numerous small files that clog the system.
All of the above attacks exploit the loosely coupled nature of web services, where the service provider has little
to no control over the service requester and any messages the service requester sends.

Solutions and Mitigations





Design: Utilize a Security Pipeline Interface (SPI) to mediate communications between
service requester and service provider The SPI should be designed to throttle up and down
and handle a variety of payloads.
Design: Utilize clustered and fail over techniques, leverage network transports to provide
availability such as HTTP load balancers
Implementation: Check size of XML message before parsing

Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, CM, CA, SC, CP
Figure 16. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 82 (“XML Denial of Service”).

The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 101 is introduced in Figure 17.
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Parent Threat: Injection

ID: 101

Name: Server Side Includes

Description:
An attacker can use Server Side Include (SSI) Injection to send code to a web application that then
gets executed by the web server. Doing so enables the attacker to achieve similar results to Cross
Site Scripting, viz., arbitrary code execution and information disclosure, albeit on a more limited
scale, since the SSI directives are nowhere near as powerful as a full-fledged scripting language.
Nonetheless, the attacker can conveniently gain access to sensitive files, such as password files,
and execute shell commands.

Solutions and Mitigatins:





Set the OPTIONS IncludesNOEXEC in the global access.conf file or local .htaccess
(Apache) file to deny SSI execution in directories that do not need them
All user controllable input must be appropriately sanitized before use in the application. This
includes omitting, or encoding, certain characters or strings that have the potential of being
interpreted as part of an SSI directive
Server Side Includes must be enabled only if there is a strong business reason to do so. Every
additional component enabled on the web server increases the attack surface as well as
administrative overhead

Parent Mitigation: CM, SI, SC, AC
Figure 17. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 101 (“Server Side Includes”).

The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 10 is introduced in Figure 18.
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks

ID: 10

Name: Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables

Description:
This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through
manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds that they
can modify an environment variable, they may try to overflow associated
buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust often placed in environment
variables.
Solutions and Mitigations:






Do not expose environment variable to the user.
Do not use untrusted data in your environment variables.
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking
There are tools such as Sharefuzz (http://sharefuzz.sourceforge.net/) which is an environment
variable fuzzer for Unixes that support loading a shared library. You can use Sharefuzz to
determine if you are exposing an environment variable vulnerable to buffer overflow.

Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, RA, SA, SC, SA, IA, PL, MA
Figure 18. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables”).

The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 65 is introduced in Figure 19.
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Parent Threat: Data Leakage Attacks

ID: 65

Name: Passive Sniffing

Description:
Attackers can capture application code bound for the client and can use it, as-is or
through reverse-engineering, to glean sensitive information or exploit the trust
relationship between the client and server.
Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a
client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate
with the server.

Solutions and Mitigations:
 Do not store secrets in client code
 Use Well-Known Cryptography Appropriately and Correctly
 Use Authentication Mechanisms, Where Appropriate,
Correctly
Parent Mitigation: CM, PE, RA, SA, PL, AC, IA, MA, SC, SI
Figure 19. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 65 (“Passive Sniffing”).

The completed graphical hierarchy for attack pattern 29 is introduced in Figure 20.

110

Parent Threat: Time and State Attacks

ID: 29

Name: Race Conditions (Time of Check and Time of Use)

Description:
This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time of check (state) for a
resource and the time of use of a resource. The typical example is the file access. The
attacker can leverage a file access race condition by "running the race", meaning that he
would modify the resource between the first time the target program accesses the file
and the time the target program uses the file. During that period of time, the attacker
could do something such as replace the file and cause an escalation of privilege.
Solutions and Mitigations:







Use safe libraries to access resources such as files.
Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as chown(), tempfile(),
chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition.
Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.
Use static analysis tools to find race conditions.
Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of resources.

Parent Mitigation: SI, SC, AT, AC, IA, SA
Figure 20. Graphical Hierarchy Tree for Attack Pattern 65 (“Race Conditions Time of Check and Time of Use”).

Step 4 calls for the creation of a textual attack description and is completed by
extracting information from the hierarchies into the textual template provided in Table 35.
Table 46 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 87.
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Table 46. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 87 (“Forceful Browsing”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

87
Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing to access portions of a
website that are otherwise unreachable through direct URL
entry.
Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed
to protect access to portions of a web application.
Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information,
perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of
the web application that have been improperly protected.
Abuse of Functionality
Authenticate request to every resource. In addition, every page
or resource must ensure that the request it is handling has been
made in an authorized context.
Forceful browsing can also be made difficult to a large extent by
not hardcoding names of application pages or resources. This
way, the attacker cannot figure out, from the application alone,
the resources available from the present context.
IA, MA, SC, SI, AT, CA, PL, SA, AC

Table 47 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 94.
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Table 47. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 94 (“Man in the Middle”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

94
Man in the Middle
This type of attack targets the communication between two
components (typically client and server). The attacker places
himself in the communication channel between the two
components. Whenever one component attempts to
communicate with the other (data flow, authentication
challenges, etc.), the data first goes to the attacker, who has the
opportunity to observe or alter it, and it is then passed on to the
other component as if it was never intercepted. This
interposition is transparent leaving the two compromised
components unaware of the potential corruption or leakeage of
their communications. The potential for Man-in-the-Middle
attacks yields an implicit lack of trust in communication or
identify between two components.
Spoofing
Get your Public Key signed by a Certificate Authority
Encrypt your communication using cryptography (SSL,...)
Use Strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate
both ends of any communications channel.
Exchange public keys using a secure channel
CA, IA, SC, AC, SI

Table 48 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 55.
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Table 48. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 55 (“Rainbow Table Password Cracking”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations
Parent Mitigation

55
Rainbow Table Password Cracking
An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of
passwords are stored. He then uses a rainbow table of
precomputed hash chains to attempt to look up the original
password. Once the original password corresponding to the
hash is obtained, the attacker uses the original password to gain
access to the system.
A pasword rainbow table stores hash chains for various
passwords. A password chain is computed, starting from the
original password, P, via a a reduce(compression) function R
and a hash function H. A recurrence relation exists where Xi+1
= R(H(Xi)), X0 = P. Then the hash chain of length n for the
original password P can be formed: X1, X2, X3, ... , Xn-2, Xn1, Xn, H(Xn). P and H(Xn) are then stored together in the
rainbow table.
Probabilistic Techniques
Use salt when computing password hashes. That is, concatenate
the salt (random bits) with the original password prior to
hashing it.
SI, SC, IA

Table 49 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 60.
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Table 49. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 60 (“Reusing Session ID‟s”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

60
Reusing Session ID‟s
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the
target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to
reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to
perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this
type of attack is Session Replay.
Exploitation of Authentication
Always invalidate a session ID after the user logout.
Setup a session time out for the session IDs.
Protect the communication between the client and server. For
instance it is best practice to use SSL to mitigate man in the
middle attack.
Do not code send session ID with GET method, otherwise the
session ID will be copied to the URL. In general avoid writing
session IDs in the URLs. URLs can get logged in log files,
which are vulnerable to an attacker.
Encrypt the session data associated with the session ID.
Use multifactor authentication.
AC, IA, SC, SA

Table 50 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 82.
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Table 50. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 82 (“XML Denial of Service”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

82
XMLDoS (XDoS)
XML Denial of Service (XDoS) can be applied to any
technology that utilizes XML data. This is, of course, most
distributed systems technology including Java, .Net, databases,
and so on. XDoS is most closely associated with web services,
SOAP, and Rest, because remote service requesters can post
malicious XML payloads to the service provider designed to
exhaust the service provider's memory, CPU, and/or disk space.
The main weakness in XDoS is that the service provider
generally must inspect, parse, and validate the XML messages to
determine routing, workflow, security considerations, and so on.
It is exactly these inspection, parsing, and validation routines
that XDoS targets.
There are three primary attack vectors that XDoS can navigate
Target CPU through recursion: attacker creates a recursive
payload and sends to service provider
Target memory through jumbo payloads: service provider uses
DOM to parse XML. DOM creates in memory representation of
XML document, but when document is very large (for example,
north of 1 Gb) service provider host may exhaust memory trying
to build memory objects.
XML Ping of death: attack service provider with numerous
small files that clog the system.

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

All of the above attacks exploit the loosely coupled nature of
web services, where the service provider has little to no control
over the service requester and any messages the service
requester sends.
Resource Depletion
Design: Utilize a Security Pipeline Interface (SPI) to mediate
communications between service requester and service provider
The SPI should be designed to throttle up and down and handle
a variety of payloads.
Design: Utilize clustered and fail over techniques, leverage
network transports to provide availability such as HTTP load
balancers
Implementation: Check size of XML message before parsing
AC, SI, CM, CA, SC, CP

116

Table 51 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 101.

Table 51. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 101 (“Server Side Includes”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

101
Server Side Includes (SSI)
An attacker can use Server Side Include (SSI) Injection to send
code to a web application that then gets executed by the web
server. Doing so enables the attacker to achieve similar results
to Cross Site Scripting, viz., arbitrary code execution and
information disclosure, albeit on a more limited scale, since the
SSI directives are nowhere near as powerful as a full-fledged
scripting language. Nonetheless, the attacker can conveniently
gain access to sensitive files, such as password files, and
execute shell commands.
Injection
Set the OPTIONS IncludesNOEXEC in the global access.conf
file or local .htaccess (Apache) file to deny SSI execution in
directories that do not need them
All user controllable input must be appropriately sanitized
before use in the application. This includes omitting, or
encoding, certain characters or strings that have the potential of
being interpreted as part of an SSI directive
Server Side Includes must be enabled only if there is a strong
business reason to do so. Every additional component enabled
on the web server increases the attack surface as well as
administrative overhead
CM, SI, SC, AC

Table 52 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 10.
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Table 52. Textual Description for Attack Pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow via Environment Variable”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

10
Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables
This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through
manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds
that they can modify an environment variable, they may try to
overflow associated buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust
often placed in environment variables.
Data Structure Attacks
Do not expose environment variable to the user.
Do not use untrusted data in your environment variables.
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds
checking
There are tools such as Sharefuzz
(http://sharefuzz.sourceforge.net/) which is an environment
variable fuzzer for Unixes that support loading a shared library.
You can use Sharefuzz to determine if you are exposing an
environment variable vulnerable to buffer overflow.
AC, CM, RA, SA, SC, SA, IA, PL, MA

Table 53 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 65.

Table 53. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 65 (“Passive Sniffing”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations
Parent Mitigation

65
Passive Sniffing
Attackers can capture appplication code bound for the client and
can use it, as-is or through reverse-engineering, to glean
sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between
the client and server.
Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch
being applied to a client component or any such interaction
where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.
Data Leakage Attack
Do not store secrets in client code
Use Well-Known Cryptography Appropriately and Correctly
Use Authentication Mechanisms, Where Appropriate, Correctly
CM, PE, RA, SA, PL, AC, IA, MA, SC, SI
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Table 54 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 29.

Table 54. Textual Description for Attack Pattern 29 (“Race Conditions Time of Check and Time of Use”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

29
Race Conditions (Time of Check and Time of Use)
This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time
of check (state) for a resource and the time of use of a resource.
The typical example is the file access. The attacker can leverage
a file access race condition by "running the race", meaning that
he would modify the resource between the first time the target
program accesses the file and the time the target program uses
the file. During that period of time, the attacker could do
something such as replace the file and cause an escalation of
privilege.
Time and State Attacks
Use safe libraries to access resources such as files.
Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as
chown(), tempfile(), chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition.
Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.
Use static analysis tools to find race conditions.
Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of
resources.
SI, SC, AT, AC, IA, SA

4.5. Discussion and Validation
While the current CAPEC standard provides a significant amount of valuable
information, there are tremendous variations in the depth and breadth of the defined
element set currently outlined for each attack pattern. Users who are presented with vast
amounts of information need assistance and a proper plan to avoid feeling overwhelmed,
lost, or even frustrated (Rockland, 2000). Process 2 includes a Parent Threat element into
the dictionary to provide consistency and usability to the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary. We
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proposed a new model for presenting CAPEC attack patterns which provides a
standardized element set to provide context and describe how the elements are related.
Because the current elements provide valuable information, we are not advocating their
removal. Our intention is to present the data in a manageable and consistent manner. Full
details of the Release 1 dictionary will be readily available. This is a valuable step to the
increased adoption and wide spread acceptance of the CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary.
Our hierarchies allow CAPEC attack pattern information to be viewed from two
distinct points of view. Graphical hierarchies allow for viewing element, attack pattern,
Parent Threat, and Parent Mitigation relationships. This allows users to trace both up from
individual Parent Mitigations or down from individual Parent Threats. The textual attack
descriptions present an attack pattern point of view. The creation of this model provides a
stand-alone description for understanding the attack pattern.
Validation for Process 2 was provided through the execution of a controlled
experiment which produced positive preliminary results to support our claims of increased
usability and consistency. Because utilizing subjects who demonstrate an interest in the
topic being examined is important for usability studies (Borlund & Ingwersen, 1997), we
included a total of ten participants from the undergraduate Computer and Network Security
majors at Dakota State University in our experiment. The data from all ten participants was
used for analysis. Subjects volunteered for participation and were not compensated for their
time. All participants were tested in a computer lab environment with identical computer
hardware and software.
The ten participants were divided into two groups where the first group was asked
to examine attack pattern details using the current CAPEC Release 1 Dictionary. The
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second group was asked to examine attack pattern details utilizing the trimmed element set
created as a result of Process 2. Group assignment was based on a coin toss; the first five
participants to flip “heads” were assigned to the CAPEC group. The remaining five
participants were assigned to the trimmed element set group.
The experiment covered a total of six randomly selected attack patterns. For each
attack pattern, participants were given ten minutes to complete an assigned task using their
predetermined dictionary. All participants worked individually on the same attack pattern
at the same time and were asked to complete two tasks per attack pattern. The first task
was to locate the selected attack pattern using their assigned dictionary. The second task
was to count the number of individual prescribed Solutions and Mitigations for the given
attack pattern. There was a master clock to ensure accurate timing. The master clock was
set to 0:00 at the beginning of each new attack pattern. Once the attack pattern was
revealed to the group, the master clock was started. Participants were asked to record the
number of mitigations they found and the time it took to complete both tasks.
Each participant was assigned a number which could be used to track which attack
dictionary the subject was using. No other identifying information was collected. Data was
recorded by individual participants utilizing Microsoft Notepad. Participants were
instructed to create a single Microsoft Notepad log; data from each of the attack pattern
experiments was recorded on a single line.
At the conclusion of the experiment participants were asked to answer two
questions.

121
1.

“In the process of attempting to locate specific information about specific
attack patterns, did you think there was too much data, not enough data, or
just the right amount of data about each attack pattern?” Answers for the
first question ranged from a low score of, “1 = The dictionary did not
contain enough data / elements”, a medium score of “5 = The amount of
information in the dictionary was appropriate”, and a high score of “10 =
The dictionary contained too much data”.

2.

"Concerning usability (structure, organization, ease of use, format, and
ability to locate information quickly), how likely are you to use this
dictionary again?" Answers for the second question ranged from a low score
of “1 = Not Useable / Will Never Use Again”, a medium score of “5 =
Indifferent”, and a high score of “10 = Very Useable / Will Definitely Use
Again”.
The results of our experiment demonstrate positive preliminary results for both

usability and consistency as introduced in Tables 55-60 where “Average Time to Complete
Task” is the mean number of seconds it took to participants to complete the experiment.
“Average Mitigation Count” is a measurement of the mean number of mitigations found by
each participant. “High Mitigation Count” represents the highest number of mitigations
recorded by any single participant in the group. “Low Mitigation Count” represents the
lowest number of mitigations recorded by any single participant in the group. “% of Users
Who Found the Same” represents the percentage of the group member who agreed on the
number of mitigations listed in dictionary. CAPEC represents the group who utilized the
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CAPEC dictionary and TAD represents the group who utilized our textual attack
descriptions.
Table 55. Results of Usability and Consistency Study for Attack Pattern 43.

Average Time to Complete Task
Average Mitigation Count
High Mitigation Count
Low Mitigation Count
% of Users Who Found the Same

CAPEC
61.4
3.2
5
2
60

TAD
13
3
3
3
100

Table 56. Results of Usability and Consistency Study for Attack Pattern 67.

Average Time to Complete Task
Average Mitigation Count
High Mitigation Count
Low Mitigation Count
% of Users Who Found the Same

CAPEC
57.4
1.4
2
1
60

TAD
15.4
1
1
1
100

Table 57. Results of Usability and Consistency Study for Attack Pattern 34.

Average Time to Complete Task
Average Mitigation Count
High Mitigation Count
Low Mitigation Count
% of Users Who Found the Same

CAPEC
41.8
1.2
2
1
80

TAD
13.8
1
1
1
100
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Table 58. Results of Usability and Consistency Study for Attack Pattern 86.

Average Time to Complete Task
Average Mitigation Count
High Mitigation Count
Low Mitigation Count
% of Users Who Found the Same

CAPEC
50
8.6
9
7
80

TAD
19.6
9
9
9
100

Table 59. Results of Usability and Consistency Study for Attack Pattern 9

Average Time to Complete Task
Average Mitigation Count
High Mitigation Count
Low Mitigation Count
% of Users Who Found the Same

CAPEC
45.2
6.4
7
4
80

TAD
9.6
7
7
7
100

Table 60. Results of Usability and Consistency Study for Attack Pattern 6

Average Time to Complete Task
Average Mitigation Count
High Mitigation Count
Low Mitigation Count
% of Users Who Found the Same

CAPEC
29.2
2.8
3
2
80

TAD
9.2
3
3
3
100

Participants who used our dictionary were able to complete the assigned tasks
quicker. Furthermore, participants who utilized our dictionary were more consistent in
identifying the number of prescribed mitigations. Throughout each of the six exercises,
participants using our approach found the same number of mitigations 100% of the time.
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In zero of the six exercises did subjects using the original CAPEC dictionary agree 100%
of the time and they matched what was documented.
When asked the question “In the process of attempting to locate specific
information about specific attack patterns, did you think there was too much data, not
enough data, or just the right amount of data (about each attack pattern)”, CAPEC users
averaged a 7.4 out of 10 while participants who used our approach averaged a 4.4 out of
10. These results are introduced in Table 61.

Table 61. Results from the Amount of Data Question.

Participant
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Average

CAPEC
9
9
8
3
8

7.4

TAD

5
3
5
5
4
4.4

As introduced earlier a score of 5 meant that the participant felt there was an
appropriate amount of data presented in the given dictionary. Scores above 5 indicated that
the user felt there was too much information presented in the dictionary while scores below
5 indicated that there was too little information presented in the dictionary. The farther
away from 5 (either higher or lower) means a stronger indicator towards too much / too
little information.
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The results from Table 62 show that our When asked the question, "Concerning
usability (structure, organization, ease of use, format, and ability to locate information
quickly), how likely are you to use this dictionary again?", CAPEC users averaged a 4.2
out of 10 while participants who used our dictionary averaged a 9.2 out of 10. These results
are introduced in Table 62.

Table 62. Results from the Usability / Format Question.

Participant
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Average

CAPEC
6
4
6
2
3

4.2

TAD

10
9
9
10
8
9.2

As introduced earlier the higher the score the more usable the participant deemed
the dictionary to be and the more the likely the participant was to reuse this dictionary
again in the future. Scores above 5 indicated that the participant felt the dictionary was
useable while scores below 5 indicated that the participants felt the dictionary was not
usable.
The results of Process 2 are required to complete the final Process of our approach;
the creation of CAPEC-based security metrics. Such metrics will be useful in leveraging
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the vast quantity of information in the current CAPEC dictionary and provide an applied
metric for assisting in security related decisions.
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5. CREATING CAPEC-BASED SECURITY METRICS
Our third process creates two security metrics to measure NIST-based mitigation
strategies when applied to the CAPEC dictionary. This approach re-organizes the work
from chapter 4 into a usable hierarchy that is based on the 11 Parent Threats. Leveraging
the hierarchy model introduced in chapter 4, we group the entire attack dictionary by the 17
Parent Mitigations presented in chapter 3. The creation of CAPEC-based security metrics is
useful in leveraging the vast quantity of information in the current CAPEC dictionary as
well as providing an easy-to-use metric for assisting in security related decisions.
The security metrics are created at two distinct levels. The first metric, Knockout
Effect (KOE), is at the individual attack pattern level. The second metric, Parent Mitigation
Power (PMP), encompasses all 101 attack patterns viewed as a whole. These metrics assist
users in making security decisions when attempting to mitigate a single attack pattern or
determining how effective a single mitigation is across multiple attack patterns.
Knock-out Effect (KOE) is a measure of how many Parent Mitigation strategies are
needed to fully mitigate a detailed attack pattern. Each of the 101 attack patterns has a
KOE calculated and stored as part of the graphical hierarchy and the textual attack
description. The addition of KOE aids in the consistency and usability of CAPEC by
allowing users to quickly determine the number of Parent Mitigations required to fully
mitigate a given attack pattern.
Parent Mitigation Power (PMP) is a measure of the total number of unique attack
patterns that were partially mitigated by an individual Parent Mitigation strategy and the
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total number of Child Mitigation strategies that can be traced to the Parent Mitigation. It is
important to note that KOE for each of the 101 attack patterns must be completed before
the PMP can be computed. We continue our case study to illustrate our approach to
leveraging these metrics by including 1 attack pattern from each of the 11 Parent Threats.
Process 3 builds on the work outlined in Process 1 and Process 2 and is introduced in
Figure 21 where KOE is calculated before PMP. Once these two metrics are calculated our
entire approach is complete. The values calculated for KOE and PMP will not change
regardless of the chosen system implementation.

Figure 21. Individual Steps to Complete Process 3.
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5.1. Knock-Out Effect (KOE)
Process 3 begins by calculating the Knock-out Effect for the current attack pattern.
This is a numeric value created by adding the total number of Parent Mitigations which
were previously abstracted for the attack pattern in Process 2. The KOE value is recorded
in both the graphical hierarchy as well as the textual attack description for each attack
pattern. Step 1 of Process 3 is repeated for any remaining attack patterns. The detailed
actions needed to create the KOE are listed below.
1.

Open the completed table for the given attack pattern which was updated in Process
2 (Table 30). Insert a KOE column to the right of the Parent Mitigation column.
The new KOE column will become the last column in the table.

2.

Count the total number of entries in the Parent Mitigation column for the attack
pattern. Enter this value in the newly created KOE column.

3.

Add the KOE to the previously created graphical hierarchy by appending the KOE
value to the Attack Pattern Name field.

4.

Add KOE to the textual attack description by appending the KOE value to the
Attack Pattern Name field.

5.

Repeat steps 2-4 for any remaining attack patterns.

After a KOE value for all 101 attack patterns has been successfully processed we
move to step 3 of Process 3. Step 3 introduces a new security metric (PMP) which is based
off of the data resulting from the conglomeration of all 101 attack patterns into a hierarchy.
An example of the new table used in step 1 is introduced in Table 55.
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Table 63. Sample Table Used to Complete Step 1 of Process 3.

Parent
Threat

Attack
Pattern

Solutions
and
Mitigations

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)

Parent
Mitigation(s)

KOE

Step 1 of Process 3 adds the KOE value to the previously used attack pattern tables.
KOE counts the total number Parent Mitigations necessary to fully mitigate/prevent the
attack pattern from harming the implementation. KOE measures Parent Mitigations
because they are easily understood by all users and do not provide too much detail that may
intimidate users into non-action. The underlying Child Mitigations that are needed to
adequately mitigate the attack pattern are readily available for review as part of the
hierarchy. KOE is a count of the total number of Parent Mitigations listed. Table 56
introduces the results of steps 1 and 2 Process 3 for attack pattern 3 “Using Leading
„Ghost‟ Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters”.

Table 64. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 3 (“Using Leading „Ghost‟ Character Sequences to Bypass Input
Filters”).

Parent
Threat
Resource
Manipulation

Attack
Pattern
Using
Leading
'Ghost'
Character
Sequences
to Bypass
Input
Filters

Solutions and
Mitigations
Perform white
list, rather than
black list, input
validation.
Canonicalize all
data prior to
validation
Take an iterative
approach to
input validation
(defense in
depth)

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC-3, AC-4,
CM-7, SI-9,
SI-10
SI-9, SI-10

SI-10

Parent
Mitigation
AC, CM, SI

KOE
3
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Table 57 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 75
“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”.

Table 65. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 75 (“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”).

Parent
Threat
Exploitation
of Privilege
/ Trust

Attack
Pattern
Manipulating
Writable
Configuration
Files 75

Solutions and
Mitigations
Design: Enforce
principle of least
privilege
Design: Backup
copies of all
configuration
files
Implementation:
Integrity
monitoring for
configuration
files
Implementation:
Enforce audit
logging on code
and configuration
promotion
procedures.
Implementation:
Load
configuration
from separate
process and
memory space,
for example a
separate physical
device like a CD

NIST Child
Parent
Mitigation(s) Mitigation(s)
AC-6
AC

CP-9, CP-10,
CM-2

CP, CM

AU-6, CA-7,
CM-4, CM-6,
SI-4, SI-7

AU, CA, SI

KOE
7

AU1, AU2,
CM3, CM4,
CM5, CM6

AC-5, SC-2,
SC-3

SC

Step 3 adds the KOE value to the graphical hierarchy trees created for each attack
pattern. The KOE for each attack pattern is shown as part of the Attack Pattern Name field.

132
This allows the total number of Parent Mitigations to be known early in the hierarchy
without having to manually count the bottom of the hierarchy. The completed graphical
hierarchy tree with KOE for attack pattern 3 is introduced in Figure 22.

Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

ID: 3

Name: Using ‘Ghost’ Characters to Bypass Input Filters (3)

Description:
The API that is being targeted ignores the leading ghost characters, and processes the
attacker‟s input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several
syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent way, while the filter does not take into
account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms

Solutions and Mitigations:
 Perform white list rather than black list input validation.




Canonicalize all data prior to validation.
Take an iterative approach to input validation (defense in depth).

Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, SI
Figure 22. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 3 (“Using „Ghost‟ Characters to Bypass Input Filters”).

The completed graphical hierarchy with KOE for attack pattern 75 is introduced in
Figure 23.
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege / Trust

ID: 75

Name: Manipulating Writable Configuration Files (7)

Description:
An attacker modifies the contents of configuration files that influence/control the operation of the
target software. This attack exploits the ever-growing number, size and complexity of
configuration files and the often lax access controls on these files.
This attack exploits a program's trust in configuration files that may have weaker permissions.
System configuration in distributed systems such as J2EE servers have many administration
points.

Solutions and Mitigations:







Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
Design: Backup copies of all configuration files
Implementation: Integrity monitoring for configuration files
Implementation: Enforce audit logging on code and configuration promotion procedures.
Implementation: Load configuration from separate process and memory space, for example a
separate physical device like a CD

Parent Mitigation: AC, CP, CM, AU, CA, SI, SC
Figure 23. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 75 (“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”).

Step 4 updates each of the textual attack descriptions with the KOE value. The
addition of this step adds significant value by allowing users to quickly ascertain the KOE
without having to navigate away from the textual attack descriptions. KOE is appended to
the Attack Pattern Name field of each textual attack description. The results of step 4 for
attack pattern 3 and 75 are introduced in Tables 58 and 59, respectively.
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Table 66. Textual Attack Description with KOE for Attack Pattern 3 (“Using „Ghost‟ Characters to Bypass Input
Filters”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

3
Using „Ghost‟ Characters to Bypass Input Filters (3)
The API that is being targeted ignores the leading ghost
characters, and processes the attacker‟s input. This occurs when
the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic
forms and interpret it in the equivalent way, while the filter does
not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms
acceptable to the targeted API.
Resource Manipulation
Perform white list rather than black list input validation.
Canonicalize all data prior to validation.
Take an iterative approach to input validation (defense in
depth).
AC, CM, SI

Table 59 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 75
“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”.
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Table 67. Textual Attack Description with KOE for Attack Pattern 75 (“Manipulating Writable Configuration Files”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

75
Manipulating Writable Configuration Files (7)
An attacker modifies the contents of configuration files that
influence/control the operation of the target software. This
attack exploits the ever-growing number, size and complexity of
configuration files and the often lax access controls on these
files.
This attack exploits a program's trust in configuration files that
may have weaker permissions. System configuration in
distributed systems such as J2EE servers have many
administration points. For example, permissions may be set on
the administrative GUI, the configuration file for the server as a
whole, configuration files for specific domains and applications,
special jar and other class files used to load resources at
runtime, and even policy specific in .war and .ear files. A
mistake in permissions setting in either the file acl or the content
is an opening an attacker can use to elevate privilege.
Exploitation of Privilege / Trust
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
Design: Backup copies of all configuration files
Implementation: Integrity monitoring for configuration files
Implementation: Enforce audit logging on code and
configuration promotion procedures.
Implementation: Load configuration from separate process and
memory space, for example a separate physical device like a CD
AC, CP, CM, AU, CA, SI, SC

Step 5 requires the repeating of steps 2-4 for any remaining attack patterns.

5.2. Parent Mitigation Power (PMP)
Parent Mitigation Power (PMP) is a two part metric designated in the “x.y”
notation. “x” counts the number of unique Attack Patterns that the Parent Mitigation helped
mitigate. “y” counts the total number of Child Mitigations that can be traced to back to the
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Parent Mitigation. This provides the ability to measure the impact provided by each of the
17 Parent Mitigations. This can useful for answering “what-if” scenarios such as “Which
mitigation provides the most „bang for the buck‟?” and “If I only have „x‟ number of
security dollars to spend, which mitigations should I invest in?”
The PMP security metric mandates a single graphical hierarchy model of all 101
attack patterns. Because of the exhaustive nature of the CAPEC definition of each attack
pattern, there is severe fan-out as Child Mitigations and Parent Mitigations are listed. Once
all the graphical hierarchies are compiled into a single view, it is obvious that there is an
abundance of mapped Child Mitigations (with their NIST details) and Parent Mitigations.
The hierarchy model introduced in chapter 4 (Figure 9) can also be expanded to
incorporate the entire CAPEC dictionary into a single hierarchy structure. This process
allows us to leverage the vast mappings created in earlier steps by providing a “forest”
view of all 101 CAPEC attack patterns. This forest view is the basis for our PMP metric.
When the hierarchy model is used to view individual attack patterns, the model again uses
a fan-in-fan-out approach. Our forest view also utilizes this approach by providing abstract
details at the top and bottom of the model while providing specific attack pattern
information in the middle. The forest view is useful for examining relationship between
attack patterns as a whole. Figure 24 introduces the forest view hierarchy along with the
maximum number of entries for each level. Section 5.3 will show the completed results of
this table for the 11 attack patterns used in our case study.
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Figure 24. Attack Pattern Forest View with Maximum Number of Entries for Each Level.

For readability purposes we modify Figure 24 to include an additional level. This is
accomplished by adding a new row at the bottom to list each of the 17 Parent Mitigations
once. This allows us to tie each of the Parent Mitigations into a single Parent Mitigation
instance. This value will serve as the “x” value for our PMP metric. This process also
provides a location to record the PMP values and fits in with the fan-in-fan-out approach
we have made use of throughout our research. Figure 25 introduces the new hierarchy with
PMP level included, and the maximum number of entries for each field.
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Figure 25. Forest View Hierarchy with Additional PMP and Maximum Number of Entries for Each Level.

Using a model of all 101 attack patterns as outlined in Figure 25 allows for the
review of each attack pattern from both a top-down or bottom-up perspective. From the
top-down perspective, the Parent Threat (such as “Spoofing”) shows all of the attack
patterns derived from it. Similarly, the bottom-up perspective shows all of the attack
patterns that a Parent Mitigation (such as “Auditing and Accountability”) helps to prevent.
An abbreviated outline of this model is introduced in Figure 26.
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Parent
Threat

Parent
Threat

Attack Pattern ID

Attack Pattern ID

Attack Pattern ID

Attack Pattern
Name (KOE)

Attack Pattern
Name (KOE)

Attack Pattern
Name (KOE)

Description

Description

Description

Child Mitigation

Child Mitigation

Child Mitigation

Parent Mitigation

Parent Mitigation

Parent Mitigation

PMP

PMP

PMP

PMP

Figure 26. Sample of the Forest View Including Multiple Hierarchies Funneling From Parent Threat to PMP.

Adding PMP to the bottom of our hierarchy groups all of the individual Parent
Mitigations into no more than 11 Parent Threats at the top and no more than 17 Parent
Mitigations at the bottom. Adding a single instance of Parent Mitigation at the bottom of
our figure rids the hierarchies of repeating Parent Mitigations and summarizes what
mitigation strategies are needed to protect the implementation.
After all of the attack patterns have been added to the forest view presented in
Figure 26, we connect each of the individually listed Parent Mitigations to a single instance
of the newly added PMP level. This is completed by connecting every attack pattern Parent
Mitigation into a single instance of Parent Mitigation at the bottom of our hierarchy. Upon
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completion of this work we are ready to calculate PMP. The detailed steps required to
calculate PMP are listed below.
1.

Calculate the PMP by recording the number of attack patterns each Parent
Mitigation traces back to. Record this value in the “x” position of the metric.

2.

Utilize a “.” To separate the two-part metric.

3.

Calculate the “y” value by adding the total number of entries (across all 101 attack
patterns) found in the NIST Child Mitigation(s) column, which relates to the Parent
Mitigation. Record this value in the “y” position of the PMP metric.

4.

Record the Parent Mitigation and its corresponding PMP in a new table for
readability.

Step 1 of PMP creation calculates the initial “x” PMP value by adding the total
number of attack patterns each Parent Mitigation helps to mitigate. This is the total number
of attack patterns which can be partially or fully mitigated by the given Parent Mitigation.
This process can be accomplished by manually counting the total number of times each
Parent Mitigation is used in the Parent Mitigation Row or by counting the total number of
arrows coming out of the PMP row for each Parent Mitigation. This value is recorded in
place of the “x” for PMP.
We calculate the “y” value by adding the total number of times that a related NIST
Child Mitigation appears across all 101 attack Patterns. This information is found by
reviewing the NIST Child Mitigation column for each attack pattern, as shown in Table 53.
Both the “x” and “y” values (along with the Parent Mitigation name) are recorded in the
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PMP level of the hierarchy introduced in Figure 26. Complete results of these steps will be
shown in section 5.3.
The final step in Process 3 is to review the PMP values and present them in a two
column table for ease of use and readability. This table will allow users to quickly review
PMP without having to review the graphical hierarchies or the textual attack descriptions.
An outline of this table is introduced in table 60.

Table 68. Tabular Format for Presenting PMP Results.

Parent Mitigation

PMP

5.3. Case Study Results
Table 61 introduces the results of Steps 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 87
where the KOE column and values are added to the right side of to the individual attack
pattern tables.
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Table 69. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 87 (“Forceful Browsing”).

Parent
Threat
Abuse of
Functionality

Attack
Pattern
Forceful
Browsing:
87

Solutions and
Mitigations
Authenticate
request to every
resource. In
addition, every
page or resource
must ensure that
the request it is
handling has been
made in an
authorized context.
Forceful browsing
can also be made
difficult to a large
extent by not hard
coding names of
application pages
or resources. This
way, the attacker
cannot figure out,
from the
application alone,
the resources
available from the
present context.

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC17, IA2,
IA3, MA4,
SC8, SC23,
SI10

Parent
Mitigation(s)
AC, IA, MA,
SC, SI

SC18, AT3,
CA2, CA4,
PL2, SA3,
SA8, SA10

AT, CA,
PL,SA

KOE
9

Table 62 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 94
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Table 70. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 94 (“Man in the Middle”).

Parent
Threat

Attack
Pattern

Spoofing Man the
Middle: 94

Solutions and
Mitigations

NIST Child Parent
KOE
Mitigation(s) Mitigation(s)

Get your Public Key
signed by a Certificate
Authority
Encrypt your
communication using
cryptography (SSL,...)

CA4, IA5,
IA7, SC13,
SC17
AC3, AC4,
SC7, AC17,
IA7, SC8,
SC9, SC12,
SC13, SI7
AC17, IA1,
IA2, IA3,
IA4, IA5,
SC8, SC11,
SC23, SI10

Use Strong mutual
authentication to
always fully
authenticate both ends
of any
communications
channel.
Exchange public keys
using a secure channel

CA, IA, SC

5

AC ,SI

SC17, SC12,
SC13

Table 63 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 55.

Table 71. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 55 (“Rainbow Table Password Cracking”).

Parent
Threat
Probabilistic
Techniques

Attack
Pattern
Rainbow
Table
Pswd
Cracking:
55

Solutions and
Mitigations
Use salt when
computing password
hashes. That is,
concatenate the salt
(random bits) with
the original
password prior to
hashing it.

NIST Child Parent
KOE
Mitigation(s) Mitigation(s)
SI7, SC13,
SI, SC, IA
3
IA5

Table 64 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 60.
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Table 72. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 60 (“Resuing Session ID‟s”).

Parent
Threat
Exploitation
of
Authorization

Attack
Pattern
Reusing
Session
ID's: 60

Solutions and
Mitigations
Always invalidate a
session ID after the
user logout.
Setup a session time
out for the session
IDs.
Protect the
communication
between the client
and server. For
instance it is best
practice to use SSL
to mitigate man in
the middle attack.
Do not code send
session ID with GET
method, otherwise
the session ID will be
copied to the URL. In
general avoid writing
session IDs in the
URLs. URLs can get
logged in log files,
which are vulnerable
to an attacker.
Encrypt the session
data associated with
the session ID.
Use multifactor
authentication.

NIST Child Parent
KOE
Mitigation(s) Mitigation(s)
AC3, IA5,
AC, IA, SC
4
SC10, SC23,
IA4
AC11, AC12,
SC23, IA4
AC4, IA2,
IA3, IA7,
SC8, SC9,
SC11, SC12,
SC13, SC16,
SC17, SC20,
SC21, SC22,
SC23
SC9, SC4,
SC14, SC16,
SA8

SA

AC3, SC4,
SC7, SC23
IA2

Table 65 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 82.
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Table 73. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 82 (“XML Denial of Service”).

Parent
Threat
Resource
Depletion

Attack
Pattern
XMLDoS
(XDoS):
82

Solutions and
Mitigations
Design: Utilize a Security
Pipeline Interface (SPI)
to mediate
communications between
service requester and
service provider The SPI
should be designed to
throttle up and down and
handle a variety of
payloads.
Design: Utilize clustered
and fail over techniques,
leverage network
transports to provide
availability such as
HTTP load balancers
Implementation: Check
size of XML message
before parsing

NIST Child Parent
KOE
Mitigation(s) Mitigation(s)
AC4, SI9,
AC, SI, CM
6
SI10, AC3,
CM6

AC4, CA3,
SC6, SI4,
CP10, SC5,
SC22

CA,SC, CP

SI7, SI9,
SI10

Table 66 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 2 for attack pattern 65.

Table 74. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 65 (“Passive Sniffing”).

Parent
Threat

Attack
Pattern

Data
Passive
Leakage Sniffing
Attacks : 65

Solutions and
Mitigations
Do not store secrets in
client code
Use Well-Known
Cryptography
Appropriately and
Correctly
Use Authentication
Mechanisms, Where
Appropriate, Correctly

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)

Parent
Mitigation(s)

KOE

CM6, PE19,
RA3, SA8,
PL4
AC3, AC17,
IA7, MA4,
SC8, SC9,
SC12, SC13
IA2, IA7,
SC23, SI10

CM, PE, RA,
SA, PL

10

AC, IA, MA,
SC

SI
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Table 67 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 101.

Table 75. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 101 (“Server Side Includes”).

Parent
Attack
Threat
Pattern
Injection Server Side
Includes
(SSI): 101

Solutions and
Mitigations
Set the OPTIONS
IncludesNOEXEC in
the global access.conf
file or local .htaccess
(Apache) file to deny
SSI execution in
directories that do not
need them
All user controllable
input must be
appropriately
sanitized before use
in the application.
This includes
omitting, or
encoding, certain
characters or strings
that have the
potential of being
interpreted as part of
an SSI directive
Server Side Includes
must be enabled only
if there is a strong
business reason to do
so. Every additional
component enabled
on the web server
increases the attack
surface as well as
administrative
overhead

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
CM1, CM6,
CM7, SI6,
SC3, AC6

Parent
Mitigation(s)
CM, SI, SC,
AC

KOE
4

SI7, SI9, SI10

AC6

Table 68 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 10.
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Table 76. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables”).

Parent
Threat
Data
Structure
Attacks

Attack
Pattern
Buffer
Overflow
via
Environment
Variables:
10

Solutions and
Mitigations
Do not expose
environment variable
to the user.
Do not use untrusted
data in your
environment
variables.
Use a language or
compiler that
performs automatic
bounds checking
There are tools such
as Sharefuzz
(http://sharefuzz.sour
ceforge.net/) which is
an environment
variable fuzzer for
Unixes that support
loading a shared
library. You can use
Sharefuzz to
determine if you are
exposing an
environment variable
vulnerable to buffer
overflow.

NIST Child
Mitigation(s)
AC6, CM6,
RA3, RA5,
SA10, SA11,
SC4, SI10
AC3, CM6,
IA2, SC23,
SI17, SI19,
SI10
SA8, PL2

Parent
Mitigation(s)
AC, CM, RA,
SA, SC, SI

MA3, PL6
RA5, SA10,
SA11, SI2,
SI4

MA

KOE
9

IA,

PL

Table 69 introduces the results of Step 1 and 2 for Process 3 for attack pattern 29.
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Table 77. Addition of KOE Column for Attack Pattern 29 (“Race Conditions Time of Check and Time of Use”).

Parent
Threat
Time
and
State
Attacks

Attack
Pattern
Race
Conditions
(TOCTOU):
29

Solutions and
Mitigations
Use safe libraries to
access resources such
as files.
Be aware that improper
use of access function
calls such as chown(),
tempfile(), chmod(),
etc. can cause a race
condition.
Use synchronization to
control the flow of
execution.
Use static analysis
tools to find race
conditions.
Pay attention to
concurrency problems
related to the access of
resources.

NIST Child
Parent
KOE
Mitigation(s) Mitigation(s)
SI7, SC18,
SI, SC
6

AT2, AC3,
IA2

AT, AC, IA

SC3, AC4

SA11,SI10

SA8, SC4

SA

Step 3 of Process 3 appends KOE to the graphical hierarchy trees. Figure 27
introduces the KOE metric included as part of the “Name” field in the graphical hierarchy
trees.
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality

ID: 87

Name: Forceful Browsing (9)

Description:
An attacker employs forceful browsing to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable through
direct URL entry.
Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web
application.
Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach
sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.

Solutions and Mitigations




Authenticate request to every resource. In addition, every page or resource must ensure that
the request it is handling has been made in an authorized context.
Forceful browsing can also be made difficult to a large extent by not hardcoding names of
application pages or resources. This way, the attacker cannot figure out, from the application
alone, the resources available from the present context.

Parent Mitigations: IA, MA, SC, SI, AT, CA, PL, SA, AC
Figure 27. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 87 (“Forceful Browsing”).

The completed graphical hierarchy for attack patterns 94 is introduced in Figure 28.
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Parent Threat: Spoofing

ID: 94

Name: Man in the Middle (5)

Description:
This type of attack targets the communication between two components (typically client and server). The
attacker places himself in the communication channel between the two components. Whenever one component
attempts to communicate with the other (data flow, authentication challenges, etc.), the data first goes to the
attacker, who has the opportunity to observe or alter it, and it is then passed on to the other component as if it
was never intercepted. This interposition is transparent leaving the two compromised components unaware of the
potential corruption or leakeage of their communications. The potential for Man-in-the-Middle attacks yields an
implicit lack of trust in communication or identify between two components.

Solutions and Mitigations:
 Get your Public Key signed by a Certificate Authority
 Encrypt your communication using cryptography (SSL,...)
 Use Strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate both
ends of any communications channel.
 Exchange public keys using a secure channel

Parent Mitigation: CA, IA, SC, AC, SI
Figure 28. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 94 (“Man in the Middle”).

The completed graphical hierarchy tree for attack patterns 55 is introduced in
Figure 29.
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques

ID: 55

Name: Rainbow Table Password Cracking (3)

Description:
An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of passwords are stored. He then uses a rainbow table
of precomputed hash chains to attempt to look up the original password. Once the original password
corresponding to the hash is obtained, the attacker uses the original password to gain access to the system.
A password rainbow table stores hash chains for various passwords. A password chain is computed,
starting from the original password, P, via a a reduce(compression) function R and a hash function H. A
recurrence relation exists where Xi+1 = R(H(Xi)), X0 = P. Then the hash chain of length n for the original
password P can be formed: X1, X2, X3, ... , Xn-2, Xn-1, Xn, H(Xn). P and H(Xn) are then stored together in
the rainbow table.

Solutions and Mitigations
 Use salt when computing password hashes. That is,
concatenate the salt (random bits) with the original password
prior to hashing it.

Parent Mitigation: SI, SC, IA
Figure 29. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 94 (“Rainbow Table Password Cracking”).

The completed graphical hierarchy tree for attack patterns 60 is introduced in
Figure 30.
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Authentication

ID: 60

Name: Reusing Session ID’s (4)

Description:
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system
in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID
used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session
hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
Solutions and Mitigations








Always invalidate a session ID after the user logout.
Setup a session time out for the session IDs.
Protect the communication between the client and server. For instance it is best practice to
use SSL to mitigate man in the middle attack.
Do not code send session ID with GET method, otherwise the session ID will be copied to
the URL. In general avoid writing session IDs in the URLs. URLs can get logged in log files,
which are vulnerable to an attacker.
Encrypt the session data associated with the session ID.
Use multifactor authentication.

Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, SC, IA

Figure 30. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 60 (“Reusing Session ID‟s”).

The completed graphical hierarchy tree for attack patterns 82 is introduced in
Figure 31.
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Parent Threat: Resource Depletion

ID: 82

Name: XML Denial of Service (XDoS) (6)

Description:
XML Denial of Service (XDoS) can be applied to any technology that utilizes XML data. This is, of course,
most distributed systems technology including Java, .Net, databases, and so on. XDoS is most closely associated
with web services, SOAP, and Rest, because remote service requesters can post malicious XML payloads to the
service provider designed to exhaust the service provider's memory, CPU, and/or disk space. The main weakness
in XDoS is that the service provider generally must inspect, parse, and validate the XML messages to determine
routing, workflow, security considerations, and so on. It is exactly these inspection, parsing, and validation
routines that XDoS targets. There are three primary attack vectors that XDoS can navigate
Target CPU through recursion: attacker creates a recursive payload and sends to service provider
Target memory through jumbo payloads: service provider uses DOM to parse XML. DOM creates in memory
representation of XML document, but when document is very large (for example, north of 1 Gb) service provider
host may exhaust memory trying to build memory objects.
XML Ping of death: attack service provider with numerous small files that clog the system.
All of the above attacks exploit the loosely coupled nature of web services, where the service provider has little
to no control over the service requester and any messages the service requester sends.

Solutions and Mitigations





Design: Utilize a Security Pipeline Interface (SPI) to mediate communications between
service requester and service provider The SPI should be designed to throttle up and down
and handle a variety of payloads.
Design: Utilize clustered and fail over techniques, leverage network transports to provide
availability such as HTTP load balancers
Implementation: Check size of XML message before parsing

Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, CM, CA, SC, CP
Figure 31. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 82 (“XML Denial of Service”).

The completed graphical hierarchy tree for attack patterns 101 is introduced in
Figure 32.
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Parent Threat: Injection

ID: 101

Name: Server Side Includes (4)

Description:
An attacker can use Server Side Include (SSI) Injection to send code to a web application that then
gets executed by the web server. Doing so enables the attacker to achieve similar results to Cross
Site Scripting, viz., arbitrary code execution and information disclosure, albeit on a more limited
scale, since the SSI directives are nowhere near as powerful as a full-fledged scripting language.
Nonetheless, the attacker can conveniently gain access to sensitive files, such as password files,
and execute shell commands.

Solutions and Mitigatins:





Set the OPTIONS IncludesNOEXEC in the global access.conf file or local .htaccess
(Apache) file to deny SSI execution in directories that do not need them
All user controllable input must be appropriately sanitized before use in the application. This
includes omitting, or encoding, certain characters or strings that have the potential of being
interpreted as part of an SSI directive
Server Side Includes must be enabled only if there is a strong business reason to do so. Every
additional component enabled on the web server increases the attack surface as well as
administrative overhead

Parent Mitigation: CM, SI, SC, AC
Figure 32. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 101 (“Server Side Includes”).

The completed graphical hierarchy tree for attack patterns 10 is introduced in
Figure 33.
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks

ID: 10

Name: Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables (9)

Description:
This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through
manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds that they
can modify an environment variable, they may try to overflow associated
buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust often placed in environment
variables.
Solutions and Mitigations:






Do not expose environment variable to the user.
Do not use untrusted data in your environment variables.
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking
There are tools such as Sharefuzz (http://sharefuzz.sourceforge.net/) which is an environment
variable fuzzer for Unixes that support loading a shared library. You can use Sharefuzz to
determine if you are exposing an environment variable vulnerable to buffer overflow.

Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, RA, SA, SC, SA, IA, PL, MA
Figure 33. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables”).

The completed graphical hierarchy tree for attack patterns 65 is introduced in
Figure 34.
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Parent Threat: Data Leakage Attacks

ID: 65

Name: Passive Sniffing (10)

Description:
Attackers can capture application code bound for the client and can use it, as-is or
through reverse-engineering, to glean sensitive information or exploit the trust
relationship between the client and server.
Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a
client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate
with the server.

Solutions and Mitigations:
 Do not store secrets in client code
 Use Well-Known Cryptography Appropriately and Correctly
 Use Authentication Mechanisms, Where Appropriate,
Correctly
Parent Mitigation: CM, PE, RA, SA, PL, AC, IA, MA, SC, SI
Figure 34. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 65 (“Passive Sniffing”).

The completed graphical hierarchy tree for attack patterns 29 is introduced in
Figure 35.
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Parent Threat: Time and State Attacks

ID: 29

Name: Race Conditions (Time of Check and Time of Use) (6)

Description:
This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time of check (state) for a
resource and the time of use of a resource. The typical example is the file access. The
attacker can leverage a file access race condition by "running the race", meaning that he
would modify the resource between the first time the target program accesses the file
and the time the target program uses the file. During that period of time, the attacker
could do something such as replace the file and cause an escalation of privilege.
Solutions and Mitigations:
 Use safe libraries to access resources such as files.






Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as chown(), tempfile(),
chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition.
Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.
Use static analysis tools to find race conditions.
Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of resources.

Parent Mitigation: SI, SC, AT, AC, IA, SA
Figure 35. Graphical Hierarchy Tree with KOE for Attack Pattern 65 (“Race Conditions Time of Check and Time of
Use”).

Step 4 of Process 3 appends KOE to the textual attack descriptions for each attack
pattern. KOE is show in the textual attack descriptions in order to increase usability. Users
who are reviewing textual attack descriptions are not required to look outside of the
descriptions for the KOE value. The KOE is included as part of the “Attack Pattern Name”
for each of the results below. Table 70 introduces the textual attack description with KOE
for attack pattern 87.
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Table 78. Textual Attack Description with KOE for Attack Pattern 87 (“Forceful Browsing”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

87
Forceful Browsing (9)
An attacker employs forceful browsing to access portions of a
website that are otherwise unreachable through direct URL
entry.
Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed
to protect access to portions of a web application.
Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information,
perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of
the web application that have been improperly protected.
Abuse of Functionality
Authenticate request to every resource. In addition, every page
or resource must ensure that the request it is handling has been
made in an authorized context.
Forceful browsing can also be made difficult to a large extent by
not hardcoding names of application pages or resources. This
way, the attacker cannot figure out, from the application alone,
the resources available from the present context.
IA, MA, SC, SI, AT, CA, PL, SA, AC

Table 71 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 94.
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Table 79. Textual Attack Description with KOE for Attack Pattern 94 (“Man in the Middle”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

94
Man in the Middle (5)
This type of attack targets the communication between two
components (typically client and server). The attacker places
himself in the communication channel between the two
components. Whenever one component attempts to
communicate with the other (data flow, authentication
challenges, etc.), the data first goes to the attacker, who has the
opportunity to observe or alter it, and it is then passed on to the
other component as if it was never intercepted. This
interposition is transparent leaving the two compromised
components unaware of the potential corruption or leakeage of
their communications. The potential for Man-in-the-Middle
attacks yields an implicit lack of trust in communication or
identify between two components.
Spoofing
Get your Public Key signed by a Certificate Authority
Encrypt your communication using cryptography (SSL,...)
Use Strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate
both ends of any communications channel.
Exchange public keys using a secure channel
CA, IA, SC, AC, SI

Table 72 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 55.
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Table 80. Textual Attack Description with KOE for Attack Pattern 55 (“Rainbow Table Password Cracking”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations
Parent Mitigation

55
Rainbow Table Password Cracking (3)
An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of
passwords are stored. He then uses a rainbow table of
precomputed hash chains to attempt to look up the original
password. Once the original password corresponding to the
hash is obtained, the attacker uses the original password to gain
access to the system.
A pasword rainbow table stores hash chains for various
passwords. A password chain is computed, starting from the
original password, P, via a a reduce(compression) function R
and a hash function H. A recurrence relation exists where Xi+1
= R(H(Xi)), X0 = P. Then the hash chain of length n for the
original password P can be formed: X1, X2, X3, ... , Xn-2, Xn1, Xn, H(Xn). P and H(Xn) are then stored together in the
rainbow table.
Probabilistic Techniques
Use salt when computing password hashes. That is, concatenate
the salt (random bits) with the original password prior to
hashing it.
SI, SC, IA

Table 73 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 60.
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Table 81. Textual Attack Description with KOE for Attack Pattern 60 (“Reusing Session ID‟s”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

60
Reusing Session ID‟s (4)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the
target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to
reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to
perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this
type of attack is Session Replay.
Exploitation of Authentication
Always invalidate a session ID after the user logout.
Setup a session time out for the session IDs.
Protect the communication between the client and server. For
instance it is best practice to use SSL to mitigate man in the
middle attack.
Do not code send session ID with GET method, otherwise the
session ID will be copied to the URL. In general avoid writing
session IDs in the URLs. URLs can get logged in log files,
which are vulnerable to an attacker.
Encrypt the session data associated with the session ID.
Use multifactor authentication.
AC, IA, SC, SA

Table 74 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 82.
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Table 82. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 82 (“XML Denial of Service”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

82
XMLDoS (XDoS) (6)
XML Denial of Service (XDoS) can be applied to any
technology that utilizes XML data. This is, of course, most
distributed systems technology including Java, .Net, databases,
and so on. XDoS is most closely associated with web services,
SOAP, and Rest, because remote service requesters can post
malicious XML payloads to the service provider designed to
exhaust the service provider's memory, CPU, and/or disk space.
The main weakness in XDoS is that the service provider
generally must inspect, parse, and validate the XML messages to
determine routing, workflow, security considerations, and so on.
It is exactly these inspection, parsing, and validation routines
that XDoS targets.
There are three primary attack vectors that XDoS can navigate
Target CPU through recursion: attacker creates a recursive
payload and sends to service provider
Target memory through jumbo payloads: service provider uses
DOM to parse XML. DOM creates in memory representation of
XML document, but when document is very large (for example,
north of 1 Gb) service provider host may exhaust memory trying
to build memory objects.
XML Ping of death: attack service provider with numerous
small files that clog the system.

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

All of the above attacks exploit the loosely coupled nature of
web services, where the service provider has little to no control
over the service requester and any messages the service
requester sends.
Resource Depletion
Design: Utilize a Security Pipeline Interface (SPI) to mediate
communications between service requester and service provider
The SPI should be designed to throttle up and down and handle
a variety of payloads.
Design: Utilize clustered and fail over techniques, leverage
network transports to provide availability such as HTTP load
balancers
Implementation: Check size of XML message before parsing
AC, SI, CM, CA, SC, CP
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Table 75 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 101.

Table 83. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 101 (“Server Side Includes”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

101
Server Side Includes (SSI) (4)
An attacker can use Server Side Include (SSI) Injection to send
code to a web application that then gets executed by the web
server. Doing so enables the attacker to achieve similar results
to Cross Site Scripting, viz., arbitrary code execution and
information disclosure, albeit on a more limited scale, since the
SSI directives are nowhere near as powerful as a full-fledged
scripting language. Nonetheless, the attacker can conveniently
gain access to sensitive files, such as password files, and
execute shell commands.
Injection
Set the OPTIONS IncludesNOEXEC in the global access.conf
file or local .htaccess (Apache) file to deny SSI execution in
directories that do not need them
All user controllable input must be appropriately sanitized
before use in the application. This includes omitting, or
encoding, certain characters or strings that have the potential of
being interpreted as part of an SSI directive
Server Side Includes must be enabled only if there is a strong
business reason to do so. Every additional component enabled
on the web server increases the attack surface as well as
administrative overhead
CM, SI, SC, AC

Table 76 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 10.
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Table 84. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 10 (“Buffer Overflow via Environment Variable”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

10
Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables (9)
This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through
manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds
that they can modify an environment variable, they may try to
overflow associated buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust
often placed in environment variables.
Data Structure Attacks
Do not expose environment variable to the user.
Do not use untrusted data in your environment variables.
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds
checking
There are tools such as Sharefuzz
(http://sharefuzz.sourceforge.net/) which is an environment
variable fuzzer for Unixes that support loading a shared library.
You can use Sharefuzz to determine if you are exposing an
environment variable vulnerable to buffer overflow.
AC, CM, RA, SA, SC, SA, IA, PL, MA

Table 77 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 65.

Table 85. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 65 (“Passive Sniffing”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations
Parent Mitigation

65
Passive Sniffing (10)
Attackers can capture application code bound for the client and
can use it, as-is or through reverse-engineering, to glean
sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between
the client and server.
Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch
being applied to a client component or any such interaction
where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.
Data Leakage Attack
Do not store secrets in client code
Use Well-Known Cryptography Appropriately and Correctly
Use Authentication Mechanisms, Where Appropriate, Correctly
CM, PE, RA, SA, PL, AC, IA, MA, SC, SI
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Table 78 introduces the textual attack description for attack pattern 29.

Table 86. Textual Attack Description for Attack Pattern 29 (“Race Conditions Time of Check and Time of Use”).

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and
Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

29
Race Conditions (Time of Check and Time of Use) (6)
This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time
of check (state) for a resource and the time of use of a resource.
The typical example is the file access. The attacker can leverage
a file access race condition by "running the race", meaning that
he would modify the resource between the first time the target
program accesses the file and the time the target program uses
the file. During that period of time, the attacker could do
something such as replace the file and cause an escalation of
privilege.
Time and State Attacks
Use safe libraries to access resources such as files.
Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as
chown(), tempfile(), chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition.
Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.
Use static analysis tools to find race conditions.
Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of
resources.
SI, SC, AT, AC, IA, SA

This concludes the work for calculating and documenting KOE. Before we can
calculate the PMP metric we are required to compile each of the individual attack patterns
into a forest view as introduced in Figure 36.
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Figure 36. Forest Hierarchy View Including all 11 Attack Patterns from Case Study.

In order to conserve space, the “Description” and “Child Mitigations” are labeled
generically. The details for these fields can be found in the textual attack descriptions and
the CAPEC Release 1 dictionary.
More work is required before we can calculate PMP. We next add each of the 17
Parent Mitigations at the bottom of Figure 36. This additional level will be used to tie each
of the individually listed Parent Mitigations into a single instance. The result of this
process is introduced in Figure 37.
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Figure 37. Forest Hierarchy View Including all 11 Attack Patterns from Case Study with 17 Parent Mitigations.

Before we can calculate the PMP metric we must cross reference each of the
individually listed Parent Mitigations for each attack pattern back to a single Parent
Mitigation (added in Figure 37). Figure 38 introduces the completed process of each Parent
Mitigation cross referenced to a single Parent Mitigation.
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Figure 38. Complete results of Case Study in Forest View.

Figure 38 completes the work necessary to calculate the PMP values. The first step
in PMP creation requires that we calculate the PMP “x” value by counting the number of
arrows entering each PMP field. Figure 39 zooms in on the first 4 entries of Figure 38 in
order to clarify the counting process.

169

Abuse of Functionality

Spoofing

Probabalistc Techniques

87

94

55

Forceful Browsing (9)

Man In The Middle (5)

Description

Resource Depletion

Exploitation of Priv / Trust

Injection

Data Structure Attacks

Data Leakage Attacks

Resource Manipulation

Time and State Attacks

60

82

75

101

10

65

3

29

Rainbow Table
(3)

Reusing Session Ids
(4)

XDoS
(6)

Manipulating Writable
Config Files (7)

Server Side Includes (4)

Buffer Overflow (9)

Passive Sniffing (10)

Using Ghost Chars to
Bypass
(3)

Race Conditions
(6)

Description

Description

Description

Description

Description

Description

Description

Description

Description

Description

Child Mitigation

Child Mitigation

Child Mitigation

Child Mitigation

Child Mitigation

Child Mitigation

Child Mitigation

Child Mitigation

Child Mitigation

Child Mitigation

Child Mitigation

IA, MA, SC, SI, AT, CA, PL,
SA, AC

CA, IA, SC, AC, SI

SI, SC, IA

AC, IA, SC, SA

AC, SI, CM, CA, SC, CP

AC, CP, CM, AU, CA, SI,
SC

CM, SI, SC, AC

AC, CM, RA, SA, SC, SI,
IA, PL, MA

CM, PE, RA, SA, PL, AC,
IA, MA, SC, SI

AC, CM, SI

SI, SC, AT, AC, IA, SA

AC

AC

AT

AT

AU

CA

Exploitation of Authentcation

CM

CP

IA

AU

IR

MA

MP

PE

PL

PS

RA

CA

Figure 39. Zoomed in View of Forest View for Purpose of Calculating PMP “x” Value.

SA

SC

SI

170

Figure 39 shows ten arrows entering the AC Parent Mitigation. This Value is
recorded as the “x” value in PMP. Figure 39 shows two arrows entering the AT box, one
entering AU, and four entering CA. Each of these values are recorded in the bottom level
(PMP) of the hierarchy. The complete results of step 1, are introduced in Figure 40.
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Step 2 separates the “x” and “y” values with the use of a period. Step 3 calculates
the PMP “y” value by examining the number of directly related NIST Children to each
Parent Mitigation. This value is calculated by examining the previously created KOE
tables (Tables 56-57 and 61-69). Figure 41 introduces the complete case study results for
KOE and PMP value.
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Figure 41 is different from each of the previous figures because it includes a
complete PMP value as show in the bottom level of the hierarchy. Step 4 creates a new
table summarizing the complete PMP values for our case study. This allows users to
quickly and accurately review PMP values without being overwhelmed by the Forest view
presented in Figure 41. Table 79 introduces the PMP summary table.

Table 87. Summarized Parent Mitigation Power.

PM
AC
AT
AU
CA
CM
CP
IA
MA
PE
PL
RA
SA
SC
SI

PMP
10.25
2.11
1.3
4.5
6.15
2.3
5.23
2.3
1.1
2.4
2.4
5.12
10.54
9.33

Access Control (AC), System and Communication Protection (SC), System and
Information Integrity (SI), and Identification and Authentication (IA) were the most
common “x” values. These four Parent Mitigations account for 35 total attack pattern
touches. The remaining 13 Parent Mitigations account for only 26 total attack pattern
touches. PMP is useful for security managers and decision makers to better leverage where
and when to allocate resources.
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System and Communication Protection (SC), System and Information Integrity
(SI), Access Control (AC), and Identification and Authentication (IA) were the most used
“y” values. The “y” values from these four Parent Mitigations make up 135 NIST Child
Mitigation touches, while the remaining 13 Parent Mitigations are used a total of 61 times.
These findings conclude that System and Communication Protection (SC) is the most
commonly recommended NIST mitigation for the CAPEC Release 1 dictionary.
5.4. Discussion and Results
The Knock-Out Effect (KOE) security metric allows for the necessary mitigation
strategies for each attack pattern to be calculated and documented. The higher the KOE, the
more Child Mitigations it will take to fully prevent and/or recover from a specific attack.
KOE is not a listing of necessary mitigation strategies, but rather a numeric count as to how
many Child Mitigations are necessary. The exact listing of the Child Mitigations is
included as part of the “solutions and mitigation” element for each attack pattern in the full
release of the CAPEC dictionary.
The creation of the Parent Mitigation Power (PMP) security metric is a measurable
score associated with the chosen mitigation strategies of a specific implementation.
Depending on what Parent and Child Threats are to be mitigated, a specific set of Child
Mitigations will be employed. Because every Child Mitigation can be traced to a Parent
Mitigation, we are able to measure how big of an impact each Parent Mitigation is having
on the overall security posture of the system.
Validation for Process 3 can be found through an analytical evaluation of our
results with other relevant findings. In January of 2009 SANS released a list of the “Top
25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors”. This list is the result of a collaborative effort
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between the SANS Institute, MITRE, and prominent software security experts from the
United States and Europe (Christey, 2009). The intended purpose of the list is to raise
awareness and educate consumers, programmers, and IT managers about the most common
programmatic mistakes which lead to serious software vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities
are considered serious because they allow attackers to steal data, compromise systems, or
deny access to critical resources (Christey, 2009). Specific details for each of the Top 25
errors are provided which include Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) ID, Name,
Supporting Data Fields, Discussion, Prevention and Mitigations, Related CWEs, Related
Attack Patterns, Attack Frequency, Ease of Detection, Remediation Cost, and Attacker
Awareness.
KOE in our approach is a count of the number of Parent Mitigations needed to fully
mitigate a given attack pattern. Attack patterns with larger KOE scores require more effort
to mitigate than attack patterns with smaller KOE scores. One of the descriptive fields
provided for each of the Top 25 Programming Errors is “Remediation Cost”. Remediation
Cost is defined as “the amount of effort required to fix the weakness” (Christey, 2009).
Given the structure of the SANS Top 25 Programming Errors, it is possible to correlate our
KOE scores with the SANS Top 25 list. Correlation of data between the KOE and SANS
list can be used to provide validation for our metric.
The completion of Process 3 for all 101 attack patterns resulted in KOE scores
ranging from 1-10. The SANS Institute ranks Remediation Cost on a 5 point scale with the
following values: Low, Low-Medium, Medium, Medium-High, High in the new Top 25.
Table 80 introduces the corresponding KOE and Remediation Cost for each of matching
attacks between CAPEC and the Top 25.
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Table 88. SANS Remediation Cost versus Process 3 KOE.

Error / Attack
Error Message Info Leak / 54
SQL Injection / 66
OS Command Injection / 88
Race Condition / 29
Cross Site Request Forgery / 62

Remediation Cost
Low
Low
Medium
Medium-High
High

KOE
2
3
3
8
6

Table 80 shows a high degree of correlation between our newly generate KOE and
SANS Remediation Cost ranking. It is important to note that only the Errors which had a
directly matching name from the CAPEC Dictionary list were considered for comparison.
Our research resulted in the full creation of 101 graphical hierarchies and 101
textual attack descriptions. Our approach also calculated and documented the KOE for
each of the 101 attack patterns. We combined each of the graphical hierarchies into a
single forest view and calculated the PMP values for all 17 Parent Mitigations across each
of the 101 attack patterns. This work is significant as the results will not have to be
completed again to be useful. Our approach and subsequent metrics can be used
immediately to aid in security related decisions.
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6. CONCLUSIONS

6.1. Contributions and Applicability

Our main contribution is an approach which meets the objectives of the problem
definition. Our approach makes CAPEC more useable and consistent and is made up of
three processes.
1.

Abstracting Parent Mitigations

2.

Creation of Trimmed Hierarchies for Modeling Attack Patterns

3.

Creation of Security Metrics

A breakdown of our approach is introduced in Figure 42.
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Figure 42. Detailed Diagram of Our Approach

Our approach introduces a Parent Mitigation element to provide consistency and
usability to the CAPEC Release 1 dictionary by incorporating the 800:53r2 NIST control
repository directly into the CAPEC dictionary. Utilization of the existing NIST control
group is important because it provides an accepted level of standardization. There is
significant value in completing the abstraction process because CAPEC provides nearly
400 individual controls listed in the current attack pattern dictionary.

Each of the

mitigation strategies are now standardized into 17 Parent Mitigations at the same level of
abstraction thus allowing adopters to make better use of the CAPEC dictionary. By
abstracting these mitigations into 17 categories, users are less likely to dismiss a particular
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attack pattern because the mitigation is too detailed or too vague. This is currently a risk for
CAPEC adopters who believe that they are not at risk for a given attack because they do
not have the specific technology mentioned in the CAPEC mitigation.
Modeling hierarchy-based attack patterns begins by re-including a Parent Threat
element into the dictionary to provide consistency and usability to the CAPEC Release 1
Dictionary. We presented a new model for viewing CAPEC attack patterns which creates a
standardized element set that provides context for how the elements are related. Because
the current elements provide valuable information, we are not advocating their removal.
Rather our intention is to present the data in a manageable and consistent manner and full
details of the Release 1 dictionary will be readily available. Because the current dictionary
can easily overwhelm users, creating consistent and useable views for each attack pattern is
a valuable step to increasing the adoption and wide spread acceptance of the CAPEC
standard.
Our models allow CAPEC attack pattern information to be viewed from two
distinct points of view. Graphical hierarchies allow for viewing element, attack pattern,
Parent Threat and Parent Mitigation relationships. This allows users to trace both up from
individual Parent Mitigations or down from individual Parent Threats. The textual attack
descriptions present an attack pattern point of view. The creation of this model provides a
stand-alone description for understanding the attack pattern.
The ability to accurately implement controls and answer security questions like: “Is
my security better this year?”, “What am I getting for my security dollars?” and “How do I
compare with my peers?” requires the use of security metrics (Geer, Hoo, & Jaquith, 2003).
Metrics are also required to gauge the suitability and effectiveness of controls (Geer et al.,
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2003). The creation of the Knock-Out Effect (KOE) security metric allows for the
necessary mitigation strategies for each attack pattern to be calculated and documented.
The higher the KOE, the more Child Mitigations it will take to fully prevent and/or recover
from a specific attack. KOE is not a listing of necessary mitigation strategies, but rather a
numeric count as to how many Child Mitigations are necessary. The exact listing of the
Child Mitigations is included as part of the “solutions and mitigation” element for each
attack pattern in the full release of the CAPEC dictionary and the textual attack
descriptions.
The creation of the Parent Mitigation Power (PMP) security metric is a score
associated with the chosen mitigation strategies of a specific implementation. Depending
on what Parent and Child Threats are to be mitigated, a specific set of Child Mitigations
will be employed. Because every Child Mitigation can be traced to a Parent Mitigation, we
are able to measure the impact each Parent Mitigation is having on the overall security
posture of the system.
Our research resulted in the creation of a hierarchy including all 101 attack patterns,
101 textual attack descriptions, calculated the KOE for each of the 101 attack patterns, and
calculated the PMP values for all 17 Parent Mitigations. Our approach can be used
immediately to aid security related decisions. It is important to note that the results from
our approach will always be the same regardless of who is completing the processes as
long as they are followed explicitly.
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6.2. Limitations

During Process 1 (Abstracting Parent Mitigations) it may be possible for others to
reach different conclusions when matching CAPEC Solutions and Mitigations to NIST
Parent Mitigations. Repeating this process several times and accumulating the results
would help to alleviate this risk. Rigorous research methods need to be employed to ensure
the elements and views proposed in Process 2 are appropriate for the target audience. Our
approach justified the selection of each element and view, but need to be justified in an
applied setting. The use of surveys and qualitative research method tools would ensure that
each element and view is appropriate when applied outside of an academic environment.
Another identified limitation of our current approach is the lack of an automated
tool for presenting CAPEC attack pattern information. While our approach has made
CAPEC more consistent and usable, the implementation of CAPEC in an applied
environment still requires manual review of the documentation. This causes the amount of
time required to appropriately use CAPEC to be long. Automated tools would help in
reducing the time factor of our approach and reduce or eliminate human error.
Due to the severe fan-in-fan-out and abundance of mappings, the completed Forest
view, containing all 101 attack patterns, is overwhelming. New views, which include
subsets of the tree, are needed if the Forest view is to be useful. The use of an automated
tool would be beneficial for showing various components of the Forest view.

6.3. Future Work
Incorporating our work into an automated system would allow for a much quicker
way of interacting with the standard. For example, a tool that assisted in managing and
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displaying the various views would be of great benefit because of the static nature of our
work. Such a tool would allow security “what-if” scenarios to be quickly and accurately
answered. The tool would present a variety of views and information including: full attack
pattern information, graphical hierarchy trees, textual attack descriptions, attacks related by
Parent Threat, KOE and PMP values, and a full forest view. The ability to quickly and
accurately switch between each of these views would be a positive because time would be
saved and human error avoided.
The work completed here needs to be forwarded on to the CAPEC community for
review and consideration. Our research shares a common goal with the CAPEC organizers:
increasing usability and consistency of the standard. The CAPEC community may be able
to make use of both the Parent Threat and Parent Mitigations elements as well as the KOE
and PMP metrics.
Other future work includes addressing the issues outlined in 6.2. Specifically,
future work calls for ensuring that the views and metrics are both useful and accurate for
end users and adopters. The use of surveys and other quantitative research methods needs
to be employed to be certain that the appropriate elements and the appropriate number of
elements are being used. The use of research methods also need to be applied to measure
the appropriateness and effectiveness of our security metrics.
Given the vast repository of information which can be leveraged between the NIST
and CAPEC standards, other future work could be conducted to include new security
metrics.
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APPENDIX I: 101 Attack Patterns: Complete

Textual Attack Descriptions
Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

1
Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs (2)
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is
mitigated by the authorization framework, whose job it is to map ACLs
to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for
web apps. In the case that the application deployer failed to specify an
ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with
impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not
properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and
possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can
access resources that must be available only to users at a higher
privilege level, can access management sections of the application or
can run queries for data that he is otherwise not supposed to.
Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
1. In a J2EE setting, deployers can associate a role that is impossible
for the authenticator to grant users, such as "NoAccess", with all
Servlets to which access is guarded by a limited number of servlets
visible to, and accessible by, the user.. Having done so, any direct
access to those protected Servlets will be prohibited by the web
container. In a more general setting, the deployer must mark every
resource besides the ones supposed to be exposed to the user as
accessible by a role impossible for the user to assume. The default
security setting must be to deny access and then grant access only
to those resources intended by business logic.
AC, IA

2
Inducing Account Lockout, (2)
An attacker leverages the security functionality of the system aimed at
thwarting potential attacks to launch a denial of service attack against a
legitimate system user. Many systems, for instance, implement a
password throttling mechanism that locks an account after a certain
number of incorrect log in attempts. An attacker can leverage this
throttling mechanism to lock a legitimate user out of their own
account. The weakness that is being leveraged by an attacker is the
very security feature that has been put in place to counteract attacks.
Abuse of Functionality
1. implement intelligent password throttling mechanisms such as
those which take IP address into account, in addition to the login
name.
2. When implementing security features, consider how they can be
misused and made to turn on themselves.
IA, PL
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Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description
Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

3
Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters (3)
An attacker intentionally introduces leading characters that enable
getting the input past the filters.
Resource Manipulation
1. Perform white list rather than black list input validation.
2. Canonicalize all data prior to validation.
3. Take an iterative approach to input validation (defense in depth).
AC, CM, SL

4
Using Alternative IP Address Encodings (3)
This attack relies on the attacker using unexpected formats for
representing IP addresses. Networked applications may expect network
location information in a specific format, such as fully qualified
domains names, URL, IP address, or IP Address ranges. The issue that
the attacker can exploit is that these design assumptions may not be
validated against a variety of different possible encodings and network
address location formats. Applications that use naming for creating
policy namespaces for managing access control may be susceptible to
queryin directly by IP addresses, which is ultimately a more generally
authoritative way of communicating on a network.
Alternative IP addresses can be used by the attacker to bypass
application access control in order to gain access to data that is only
protected by obscuring its location.
In addition this type of attack can be used as a reconnaissance
mechansim to provide entry point information that the attacker gathers
to penetrate deeper into the system.
Resource Manipulation
1. Design: Default deny access control policies
2. Design: Input validation routines should check and enforce both
input data types and content against a positive specification. In
regards to IP addresses, this should include the authorized manner
for the application to represent IP addresses and not accept user
specified IP addresses and IP address formats (such as ranges)
3. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
AC SC SI
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5
Analog In-band Switching Signals (aka Blue Boxing) (2)
This attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been
around for decades. The signal is sent by the attacker to impersonate a
supervisor signal. This has the effect of rerouting or usurping
command of the line and call. While the US infrastructure proper may
not contain widespread vulnerabilities to this type of attack, many
companies are connected globally through call centers and business
process outsourcing. These international systems may be operated in
countries which have not upgraded telco infrastructure and so are
vulnerable to Blue boxing.
Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce
strong authentication for administrative functions. While the
infrastructure is different than standard current applications like web
applications, there are hisotrical lessons to be learned to upgrade the
access control for administrative functions.
Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane)
1. Implementation: Upgrade phone lines. Note this may be
prohibitively expensive
2. Use strong access control such as two factor access control for
adminsitrative access to the switch
AC, MA

6
Argument Injection (2)
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows
an attacker's commands to be directly or indirectly applied as
arguments, for example as shell commands. This may allow an attacker
access to files, network resources, media, and in short anything
accessible through the shell.
The argument injection attack uses the exposed service or method as a
launch pad to invoke other programs. If the service does not validate or
filter the input data then the client program is granted access to execute
commands using the server's privileges. The OS commands can be
appended to standard input for shell programs, HTTP Requests, and
XML messages.
Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane)
1. Design: Do not program input values directly on command shell,
instead treat user input as guilty until proven innocent. Build a
function that takes user input and converts it to applications
specific types and values, stripping or filtering out all unauthorized
commands and characters in the process.
2. Design: Limit program privileges, so if metacharcters or other
methods circumvent program input validation routines and shell
access is attained then it is not running under a privileged account.
chroot jails create a sandbox for the application to execute in,
making it more difficult for an attacker to elevate privilege even in
the case that a compromise has occurred.
3. Implementation: Implement an audit log that is written to a
separate host, in the event of a compromise the audit log may be
able to provide evidence and details of the compromise.
AT, PL
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7
Blind SQL Injection (2)
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL
Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are
considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to
prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection
that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages
that facilitate SQL Injection, the attacker constructs input strings that
probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The
attacker can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was
successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied
iteratively, the attacker determines how and where the target is
vulnerable to SQL Injection.
Injection
1. Security by Obscurity is not a solution to preventing SQL
Injection. Rather than suppress error messages and exceptions, the
application must handle them gracefully, returning either a custom
error page or redirecting the user to a default page, without
revealing any information about the database or the application
internals.
2. Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be
validated and filtered for illegal characters as well as SQL content.
Keywords such as UNION, SELECT or INSERT must be filtered
in addition to characters such as a single-quote(') or SQLcomments (--) based on the context in which they appear.
SI, CM

8
Buffer Overflow in an API Call (2)
This attack targets libraries or shared code modules which are
vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. An attacker who has access to an
API may try to embed malicious code in the API function call and
exploit a buffer overflow vulnerability in the function's
implementation. All clients that make use of the code library thus
become vulnerable by association. This has a very broad effect on
security across a system, usually affecting more than one software
process.
Buffer Overflow, API Abuse, Injection
1. Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds
checking.
2. Use secure functions not vulnerable to buffer overflow.
3. If you have to use dangerous functions, make sure that you do
boundary checking.
4. Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard,
ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this
provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution.
5. Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.
AT, SC
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9
Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities (5)
This attack targets command-line utilities available in a number of
shells. An attacker can leverage a vulnerability found in a commandline utility to escalate privilege to root.
Data Structure Attacks
1. Carefully review the service's implementation before making it
available to user. For instance you can use manual or automated
code review to uncover vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow.
2. Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds
checking.
3. Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a
complete solution.
4. Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard,
ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this
provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution.
5. Operational: Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a
complete solution.
6. Apply the latest patches to your user exposed services. This may
not be a complete solution, specially against zero day attack.
7. Do not unnecessarily expose services.

Parent Mitigation

RA, SI, CM, SA, AC
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10
Buffer Overflow Via Environment Variables (4)
This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through
manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds that
they can modify an environment variable, they may try to overflow
associated buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust often placed in
environment variables.
Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane)
1. Do not expose environment variable to the user.
2. Do not use untrusted data in your environment variables.
3. Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds
checking
4. You can use Sharefuzz to determine if you are exposing an
environment variable vulnerable to buffer overflow
SI,AC,CM, RA

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation
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11
Cause Web Server Misclassification (2)
An attack of this type exploits a Web server's decision to take action
based on filename or file extension. Because different file types are
handled by different server processes, misclassification may force the
Web server to take unexpected action, or expected actions in an
unexpected sequence. This may cause the server to exhaust resources,
supply debug or system data to the attacker, or bind an attacker to a
remote process.
Resource Manipulation
1. Implementation: Server routines should be determined by content
not determined by filename or file extension.
CM, IA

12
Choosing a Message/Channel Identifier on a Public/Multicast Channel
(2)
Attackers aware that more data is being fed into a multicast or public
information distribution means can 'select' information bound only for
another client, even if the distribution means itself forces users to
authenticate in order to connect initally.
Doing so allows the attacker to gain access to possibly privileged
information, possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution
means by impersonation.
If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output
mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of
attack could change its identifier from a less privileged to more so
privileged channel or command.
Abuse of Functionality
1. Associate some ACL (in the form of a token) with an
authenticated user which they provide middleware. The
middleware uses this token as part of its channel/message selection
for that client, or part of a discerning authorization decision for
privileged channels/messages. The purpose is to architect the
system in a way that associates proper authentication/authorization
with each channel/message.
2. Rearchitect system input/output channels as appropriate to
distribute self-protecting data. That is, encrypt (or otherwise
protect) channels/messages so that only authorized readers can see
them.
IA, SC
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13
Subverting Environment Variable Values (3)
The attacker directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used
by or controlling the target software. The attacker‟s goal is to cause
the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner
that benefits the attacker.
Resource Manipulation
1. Protect environment variables against unauthorized read and write
access.
2. Protect the configuration files which contain environment
variables against illegitimate read and write access.
3. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all
valid input to the software system based on the requirements
specifications. Input that does not match against the white list
should not be permitted to enter into the system.
4. Apply the least privilege principles. If a process has no legitimate
reason to read an environment variable do not give that privilege.
AC, SM, SI

14
Client-side Induction-induced Buffer Overflow (10)
This type of attack exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in targeted
client software through injection of malicious content from a custombuilt hostile service.
Data Structure Attacks
1. The client software should not install untrusted code from a non
authenticated server.
2. The client software should have the latest patches and should be
audited for vulnerabilities before being used to communicate with
potentially hostile servers.
3. Perform input validation for length of buffer inputs.
4. Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds
checking.
5. Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a
complete solution.
6. Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard,
ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this
provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution.
7. Ensure all buffer uses are consistently bounds-checked.
8. Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.
AC, CM, IA SA, SI, AU, CA, MA, RA, AT
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15
Command Delimiters (4)
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows
an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command
with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or
database. The system that uses a filter or a blacklist input validation, as
opposed to whitelist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who
predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the
filter or blacklist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the
command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the
application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell
commands, network scanning, and so on.
Injection
1. Design: Perform whitelist validation against a positive
specification for command length, type, and parameters.
2. Design: Limit program privileges, so if commands circumvent
program input validation or filter routines then commands do not
running under a privileged account
3. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
4. Implementation: Use type conversions such as JDBC prepared
statements.

Parent Mitigation

AC, CM, SA, RA
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16
Dictionary-based Password Attack (10)
An attacker tries each of the words in a dictionary as passwords to gain
access to the system via some user's account. If the password chosen
by the user was a word within the dictionary, this attack will be
successful (in the absence of other mitigations). This is a specific
instance of the password brute forcing attack pattern.
Probabilistic Techniques
1. Create a strong password policy and ensure that your system
enforces this policy.
2. Implement an intelligent password throttling mechanism. Care
must be taken to assure that these mechanisms do not excessively
enable account lockout attacks such as CAPEC-02.

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

AC, AT, AU, CA, CM, IA, MP, PL, PS, SI
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17
Accessing, Modifying or Executing Executable Files(3)
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an
attacker to either directly access an executable file, for example
through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an attacker to
upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message
oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are
particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the
administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct
privileges for each interface.
Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
1. Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
2. Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or
utilize chroot jails or other configuration techniques to constrain
privileges even if attacker gains some limited access to commands.
3. Implementation: Perform testing such as pentesting and
vulnerability scanning to identify directories, programs, and
interfaces that grant direct access to executables.

Parent Mitigation

AC, AU, IA
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18
Embedding Scripts in Nonscript Elements (5)
This attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where malicious
scripts are embedded in elements that are not expected to host scripts
such as image tags (<img>), comments in XML documents (< !CDATA->), etc. These tags may not be subject to the same input
validation, output validation, and other content filtering and checking
routines, so this can create an opportunity for an attacker to tunnel
through the application's elements and launch a XSS attack through
other elements.
Injection
1. Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side
scripting.
2. Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is
sanitized against an acceptable content specification.
3. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
4. Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
5. Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in
browser
6. Implementation: Session tokens for specific host
7. Implementation: Service provider should not use the
XMLHttpRequest method to create a local proxy for content from
other sites, because the client will not be able to discern what
content comes from which host.
AC, SI, SC, IA, MP

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation
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19
Embedding Scripts within Scripts (6)
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are
brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute scripts. The attacker
leverages this capability to execute scripts to execute his/her own script
by embedding it within other scripts that the target software is likely to
execute. The attacker must have the ability to inject script into script
that is likely to be executed. If this is done, then the attacker can
potentially launch a variety of probes and attacks against the web
server's local environment, in many cases the so-called DMZ, back end
resources the web server can communicate with, and other hosts.
With the proliferation of intermediaries, such as Web App Firewalls,
network devices, and even printers having JVMs and Web servers,
there are many locales where an attacker can inject malicious scripts.
Since this attack pattern defines scripts within scripts, there are likely
privileges to execute said attack on the host.
Injection
1. Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side
scripting.
2. Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement
3. Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR
or other means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the
server side, the client's browser has no way of discerning where
the data is originating from.
4. Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is
sanitized against an acceptable content specification.
5. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
6. Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
7. Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in
browser
8. Implementation: Session tokens for specific host
9. Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors
for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities
are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in
technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS
countermeasures mitigates this.
10. Implementation: Privileges are constrained, if a script is loaded,
ensure system runs in chroot jail or other limited authority mode
PL, SC, AC, RA, AC, SI
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20
Encryption Brute Force(4)
An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm
used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to
determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.
Probabilistic Techniques
1. In theory a brute force attack performing an exhaustive keyspace
search will always succeed, so the goal is to have computational
security. Moore's law needs to be taken into account that suggests
that computing resources double every eighteen months.
AC, IA, PS, SC

21
Exploitation of Session IDs,Resource IDs, Trusted Credentials (3)
Attacks on session IDs and resource IDs take advantage of the fact that
some software accepts user input without verifying its authenticity.
Exploitation of Authentication
1.
2.

Design: utilize strong federated identity such as SAML to encrypt
and sign identity tokens in transit.
Implementation: Use industry standards session key generation
mechanisms that utilize high amount of entropy to generate the
session key. Many standard web and application servers will
perform this task on your behalf.

Parent Mitigation

AC, IA, SC
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22
Exploitation Trust in Client (aka make client invisible) (3)
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities in
client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity.

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Exploitation of Privlege/Trust

Parent Mitigation

AC, IA,SC

1.

Design: Ensure that client process and/or message is authenticated
so that anonymous communications and/or messages are not
accepted by the system.
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23
File System Function Injection, Content Based (7)
An attack of this type exploits the host's trust in executing remote
content including binary files. The files are poisoned with a malicious
payload (targeting the file systems accessible by the target software) by
the attacker and may be passed through standard channels such as via
email, and standard web content like PDF and multimedia files. The
attacker exploits known vulnerabilities or handling routines in the
target processes. Vulnerabilities of this type have been found in a wide
variety of commercial applications from Microsoft Office to Adobe
Acrobat and Apple Safari web browser. When the attacker knows the
standard handling routines and can identify vulnerabilities and entry
points they can be exploited by otherwise seemingly normal content.
Once the attack is executed, the attacker's program can access relative
directories such as C:\Program Files or other standard system
directories to launch further attacks. In a worst case scenario, these
programs are combined with other propagation logic and work as a
virus.
Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane)
1. Enforce principle of least privilege
2. Validate all input for content including files. Ensure that if files
and remote content must be accepted that once accepted, they are
placed in a sandbox type location so that lower assurance clients
cannot write up to higher assurance processes (like Web server
processes for example)
3. Execute programs with constrained privileges, so parent process
does not open up further vulnerabilities. Ensure that all directories,
temporary directories and files, and memory are executing with
limited privileges to protect against remote execution.
4. Proxy communication to host, so that communications are
terminated at the proxy, sanitizing the requests before forwarding
to server host.
5. Virus scanning on host
6. Host integrity monitoring for critical files, directories, and
processes. The goal of host integrity monitoring is to be aware
when a security issue has occurred so that incident response and
other forensic activities can begin.
AC, CA, CM, CP, SI, SC, IR
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24
Filter Failure Through Buffer Overflow (3)
In this attack, the idea is to cause an active filter to fail by causing an
oversized transaction. An attacker may try to feed overly long input
strings to the program in an attempt to overwhelm the filter (by causing
a buffer overflow) and hoping that the filter does not fail securely (i.e.
lets the user input into the system unfiltered).
Data Structure Attacks
1. Make sure that ANY failure occurring in the filtering or input
validation routine is properly handled and that offending input is
NOT allowed to go through. Basically make sure that the vault is
closed when failure occurs.
2. Pre-design: Use a language or compiler that performs automatic
bounds checking.
3. Pre-design through Build: Compiler-based canary mechanisms
such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio
/GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds checking, it is not
a complete solution.
4. Operational: Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a
complete solution.
5. Design: Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs.
Not a complete solution.

Parent Mitigation

IR, SI, CM
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25
Forced Deadlock (2)
This attack attempts to trigger and exploit a deadlock condition in the
target software to cause a denial of service. A deadlock can occur when
two or more competing actions are waiting for each other to finish, and
thus neither ever does. Deadlock condition are not easy to detect.
Time and State Attacks
1. Use known algorithm to avoid deadlock condition (for instance
non-blocking synchronization algorithms).
2. For competing actions use well known libraries which implement
synchronization
SC, SI

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation
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26
Leveraging Race Conditions (5)
This attack targets a race condition occurring when multiple processes
access and manipulate the same resource concurrently and the outcome
of the execution depends on the particular order in which the access
takes place. The attacker can leverage a race condition by "running the
race", modifying the resource and modifying the normal execution
flow.
Time and State Attacks
1. Use safe libraries to access resources such as files.
2. Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as
chown(), tempfile(), chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition.
3. Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.
4. Use static analysis tools to find race conditions.
5. Pay attention to concurrency problems
AC,MP,SA,SI,CM

27
Leveraging Race Conditions via Symbolic Links (3)
This attack leverages the use of symbolic links (Symlinks) in order to
write to sensitive files. An attacker can create a Symlink link to a target
file not otherwise accessible to her. When the privileged program tries
to create a temporary file with the same name as the Symlink link, it
will actually write to the target file pointed to by the attacker's Symlink
link. If the attacker can insert malicious content in the temporary file
she will be writing to the sensitive file by using the Symlink. The race
occurs because the system checks if the temporary file exists, then
creates the file. The attacker would typically create the Symlink during
the interval between the check and the creation of the temporary file.
Time and State Attack
1. Use safe libraries when creating temporary files. For instance the
standard library function mkstemp can be used to safely create
temporary files. For shell scripts, the system utility mktemp does
the same thing.
2. Access to the directories should be restricted as to prevent
attackers from manipulating the files. Denying access to a file can
prevent an attacker from replacing that file with a link to a
sensitive file.
3. Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights
to files.
4. Ensure good compartmentalization in the system to provide
protected areas that can be trusted.
SA, MP, SI

204
Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

28
Fuzzing (4)
Fuzzing is a software testing method that feeds randomly constructed
input to the system and looks for an indication that a failure in response
to that input has occured. Fuzzing treats the system as a blackbox and
is totally free from any preconceptions or assumptions about the
system.
Probabilistic Techniques
1. Test to ensure that the software behaves as per specification and
that there are no unintended side effects. Ensure that no
assumptions about the validity of data are made.
2. Use fuzz testing during the software QA process to uncover any
surprises, uncover any assumptions or unexpected behavior.
SI, SA, AC, RA

29
Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race
Conditions (8)
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an
attacker to either directly access an executable file, for example
through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an attacker to
upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message
oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are
particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the
administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct
privileges for each interface.
Time and State Attacks
1. Use safe libraries to access resources such as files
2. Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as
chown(), tempfile(), chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition
3. Use synchronization to control the flow of execution
4. Use static analysis tools to find race conditions.
5. Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of
resources.
AC, AU, CM, MP, RA, SA, SC, SI

30
Hijacking a Privileged Thread of Execution (3)
Attackers can sometimes hijack a privileged thread from the
underlying system through synchronous (calling a privileged function
that returns incorrectly) or asynchronous (callbacks, signal handlers,
and similar) means.
Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
1. Application Architects must be careful to design callback, signal,
and similar asynchronous constructs such that they shed excess
privilege prior to handing control to user-written (thus untrusted)
code.
2. Application Architects must be careful to design privileged code
blocks such that upon return (successful, failed, or unpredicted)
that privilege is shed prior to leaving the block/scope.
AC, SA, CM
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31
Accessing / Intercepting / Modifying HTTP Cookies (3)
This attack relies on the use of HTTP Cookies to store credentials, state
information and other critical data on client systems.
The first form of this attack involves accessing HTTP Cookies to mine
for potentially sensitive data contained therein.
The second form of this attack involves intercepting this data as it is
transmitted from client to server. This intercepted information is then
used by the attacker to impersonate the remote user/session.
The third form is when the cookie‟s content is modified by the attacker
before it is sent back to the server. Here the attacker seeks to convince
the target server to operate on this falsified information.
Data Structure Attacks
1. Use input validation for cookies
2. Generate and validate MAC for cookies
3. Use SSL/TLS to protect cookie in transit
4. Ensure the web server implements all relevant security patches,
many exploitable buffer overflows are fixed in patches issued for
the software.
SI, SC, CA

206
Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

32
Embedding Scripts in HTTP Query Strings (4)
A variant of cross-site scripting called "reflected" cross-site scripting,
the HTTP Query Strings attack consists of passing a malicious script
inside an otherwise valid HTTP request query string. This is of
significant concern for sites that rely on dynamic, user-generated
content such as bulletin boards, news sites, blogs, and web enabled
administration GUIs. The malicious script may steal session data,
browse history, probe files, or otherwise execute attacks on the client
side. Once the attacker has prepared the malicious HTTP query it is
sent to a victim user (perhaps by email, IM, or posted on an online
forum), who clicks on a normal looking link that contains a poison
query string. This technique can be made more effective through the
use of services like http://tinyurl.com/, which makes very small URLs
that will redirect to very large, complex ones. The victim will not know
what he is really clicking on.

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane)
1. Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side
scripting.
2. Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement
3. Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR
or other means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the
server side, the client's browser has no way of discerning where
the data is originating from.
4. Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is
sanitized against an acceptable content specification.
5. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content,
including remote and user-generated content
6. Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
7. Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in
browser
8. Implementation: Session tokens for specific host
9. Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors
for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities
are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in
technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS
countermeasures mitigates this.
10. Implementation: Privileges are constrained, if a script is loaded,
ensure system runs in chroot jail or other limited authority mode
SI, AC, CM, AU

Parent Mitigation
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33
HTTP Request Smuggling (3)
HTTP Request Smuggling results from the discrepancies in parsing
HTTP requests between HTTP entities such as web caching proxies or
application firewalls. Entities such as web servers, web caching
proxies, application firewalls or simple proxies often parse HTTP
requests in slightly different ways. Under specific situations where
there are two or more such entities in the path of the HTTP request, a
specially crafted request is seen by two attacked entities as two
different sets of requests. This allows certain requests to be smuggled
through to a second entity without the first one realizing it.
Resource Manipulation
1. HTTP Request Smuggling is usually targeted at web servers.
Therefore, in such cases, careful analysis of the entities must occur
during system design prior to deployment. If there are known
differences in the way the entities parse HTTP requests, the choice
of entities needs consideration.
2. Employing an application firewall can help. However, there are
instances of the firewalls being susceptible to HTTP Request
Smuggling as well.
SA, SI, SC

34
HTTP Response Splitting (2)
This attack uses a maliciously-crafted HTTP request in order to cause a
vulnerable web server to respond with an HTTP response stream that
will be interpreted by the client as two separate responses instead of
one. This is possible when user-controlled input is used unvalidated as
part of the response headers. The target software, the client, will
interpret the injected header as being a response to a second request,
thereby causing the maliciously-crafted contents be displayed and
possibly cached.
Schema Poisoning
1. To avoid HTTP Response Splitting, the application must not rely
on user-controllable input to form part of its output response
stream. Specifically, response splitting occurs due to injection of
CR-LF sequences and additional headers. All data arriving from
the user and being used as part of HTTP response headers must be
subjected to strict validation that performs simple character-based
as well as semantic filtering to strip it of malicious character
sequences and headers.
SI, SC
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35
Leverage Executable Code in Nonexecutable Files (4)
An attack of this type exploits a system's trust in configuration and
resource files, when the executable loads the resource (such as an
image file or configuration file) the attacker has modified the file to
either execute malicious code directly or manipulate the target process
(e.g. application server) to execute based on the malicious
configuration parameters. Since systems are increasingly interrelated
mashing up resources from local and remote sources the possibility of
this attack occurring is high.
Resource Manipulation
1. Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
2. Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or
utilize chroot jails or other configuration techniques to constrain
privileges even if attacker gains some limited access to commands.
3. Implementation: Perform testing such as pentesting and
vulnerability scanning to identify directories, programs, and
interfaces that grant direct access to executables.
4. Implementation: Implement host integrity monitoring to detect any
unwanted altering of configuration files.
5. Implementation: Ensure that files that are not required to execute,
such as configuration files, are not over-privileged, i.e. not allowed
to execute.
AC, CA, CP, CM

36
Using Unpublished Web Service APIs (5)
An attacker searches for and invokes Web Services APIs that the target
system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If these APIs
fail to authenticate requests the attacker may be able to invoke services
and/or gain privileges they are not authorized for.
Abuse of Functionality
1. Authenticating both services and their discovery, and protecting
that authentication mechanism simply fixes the bulk of this
problem. Protecting the authentication involves the standard
means, including: 1) protecting the channel over which
authentication occurs, 2) preventing the theft, forgery, or
prediction of authentication credentials or the resultant tokens, or
3) subversion of password reset and the like.
AC, CA, CM, IA, SC
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37
Lifting Data Embedded in Client Distributions (4)
An attacker can resort to stealing data embedded in client distributions
or client code in order to gain certain information. This information can
reveal confidential contents, such as account numbers, or can be used
as an intermediate step in a larger attack (such as by stealing
keys/credentials).
Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
1. Never Use Unvalidated Input as Part of a Directive to any Internal
Component
2. Treat the Entire Inherited Process Context as Unvalidated Input
3. Use Well-Known Cryptography Appropriately and Correctly
AC, IA, SC, SI

38
Leveraging/Manipulating Configuration File Search Paths (8)
This attack loads a malicious resource into a program's standard path
used to bootstrap and/or provide contextual information for a program
like a path variable or classpath. J2EE applications and other
component based applications that are built from mutliple binaries can
have very long list of dependencies to execute. If one of these libraries
and/or references is controllable by the attacker then application
controls can be circumvented by the attacker.
A standard UNIX path looks similar to this
/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
If the attacker modifies the path variable to point to a locale that
includes malicious resources then the user unwittingly can execute
commands on the attacker's behalf:
/evildir/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
This is a form of usurping control of the program and the attack can be
done on the classpath, database resources, or any other resources built
from compound parts. At runtime detection and blocking of this attack
is nearly impossible, because the configuration allows execution.
Resource Manipulation
1. Enforce principle of least privilege
2. Ensure that the program's compound parts, including all system
dependencies, classpath, path, and so on, are secured to the same
or higher level assurance as the program
3. Host integrity monitoring
AC, AU, CA, CM, MP, RA, SC, SI
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39
Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens (6)
In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side
in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be
manipulated. If client
or server-side application components reinterpret that data as
authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet
information) then even opaquely manipulating
that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker
undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been
adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or
obfuscation.
Probabilistic Techniques
1. One solution to this problem is to protect encrypted data with a
CRC of some sort. If knowing who last manipulated the data is
important, then using a cryptographic "message authentication
code" (or hMAC) is prescribed. However, this guidance is not a
panecea. In particular, any value created by (and therefore
encrypted by) the client, which itself is a "malicous" value, all the
protective cryptography in the world can't make the value 'correct'
again. Put simply, if the client has control over the whole process
of generating and encoding the value--then simply protecting its
integrity doesn't help.
2. Make sure to protect client side authentication tokens for
confidentiality (encryption) and integrity (signed hash)
3. Make sure that all session tokens use a good source of randomness
4. Perform validation on the server side to make sure that client side
data tokens are consistent with what is expected.
AU, IA, SI, CM, SA, SC

40
Manipulating Writeable Terminal Devices (4)
This attack exploits terminal devices that allow themselves to be
written to by other users. The attacker sends command strings to the
target terminal device hoping that the target user will hit enter and
thereby execute the malicious command with their privileges. The
attacker can send the results (such as copying /etc/passwd) to a known
directory and collect once the attack has succeeded.
Injection
IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, AC-6
IA, AC
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41
Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads
(4)
This type of attack involves an attacker leveraging meta-characters in
email headers to inject improper behavior into email programs.
Email software has become increasingly sophisticated and feature-rich.
In addition, email applications are ubiquitous and connected directly to
the Web making them ideal targets to launch and propagate attacks. As
the user demand for new functionality in email applications grows,
they become more like browsers with complex rendering and plug in
routines. As more email functionality is included and abstracted from
the user, this creates opportunities for attackers. Virtually all email
applications do not list email header information by default, however
the email header contains valuable attacker vectors for the attacker to
exploit particularly if the behavior of the email client application is
known. Meta-characters are hidden from the user, but can containt
scripts, enumerations, probes, and other attacks against the user's
system.
Injection
1. Design: Perform validation on email header data
2. Implementation: Implement email filtering solutions on mail
server or on MTA, relay server.
3. Implementation: Mail servers that perform strict validation may
catch these attacks, because metacharacters are not allowed in
many header variables such as dns names
AU, IA, SC, SI

42
MIME Conversion(1)
An attacker exploits a weakness in the MIME conversion routine to
cause a buffer overflow and gain control over the mail server
machine. The MIME system is designed to allow various different
information formats to be interpreted and sent via e-mail. Attack points
exist when data are converted to MIME compatible format and back.
Data Structure Attacks
1. Stay up to date with third party vendor patches
2. Disable the 7 to 8 bit conversion. This can be done by removing
the F=9 flag from all Mailer specifications in the sendmail.cf file.
3. Use the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh)
4. Use mail.local
SI
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43
Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers (4)
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains
sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation
logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over
the input data and processing a “layer” of special characters with each
pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would
otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of
special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing
steps.
The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer
executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go
through the following logic in an application: <<parser1>> --> <<input
validator>> --> <<parser2>>. In such cases, the attacker will need to
provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after
passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the
input validator was supposed to stop.
Leverage Alternate Encoding
1. An iterative approach to input validation may be required to
ensure that no dangerous characters are present. It may be
necessary to implement redundant checking across different input
validation layers. Ensure that invalid data is rejected as soon as
possible and do not continue to work with it.
2. Make sure to perform input validation on canonicalized data (i.e.
data that is data in its most standard form). This will help avoid
tricky encodings getting past the filters.
3. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all
valid input to the software system based on the requirements
specifications. Input that does not match against the white list
should not be permitted to enter into the system.

SI, RA, CM, AT
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44
Overflow Binary Resource File (6)
An attack of this type exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in the
handling of binary resources. Binary resources may includes music
files like MP3, image files like JPEG files, and any other binary file.
These attacks may pass unnoticed to the client machine through normal
usage of files, such as a browser loading a seemingly innocent JPEG
file. This can allow the attacker access to the execution stack and
execute arbitrary code in the target process. This attack pattern is a
variant of standard buffer overflow attacks using an unexpected vector
(binary files) to wrap its attack and open up a new attack vector. The
attacker is required to either directly serve the binary content to the
victim, or place it in a locale like a MP3 sharing application, for the
victim to download. The attacker then is notified upon the download or
otherwise locates the vulnerability opened up by the buffer overflow.
Data Structure Attacks
1. Perform appropriate bounds checking on all buffers.
2. Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
3. Design: Static code analysis
4. Implementation: Execute program in less trusted process space
environment, do not allow lower integrity processes to write to
higher integrity processes
5. Implementation: Keep software patched to ensure that known
vulnerabilities are not available for attackers to target on host.
CA, MA, AC, RA, SC, SI

45
Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links (7)
This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer
overflows. An attacker can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link
file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target
software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow
internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.
Data Structure Attacks
1. Enforce principle of least privilege
2. Protect files, secure location (of files), encryption
3. Data sanitization
4. Abstraction, obfuscation, library checking
AC, AU, CA, CM, MP, SI, SC
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Overflow Variables and Tags (4)
This type of attack leverages the use of tags or variables from a
formatted configuration data to cause buffer overflow. The attacker
crafts a malicious HTML page or configuration file that includes
oversized strings, thus causing an overflow.
Data Structure Attacks
1. Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds
checking.
2. Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a
complete solution.
3. Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard,
ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this
provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution.
4. Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.
5. Do not trust input data from user. Validate all user input.

Parent Mitigation

SC,AC,SI,RA
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47
Buffer Overflow via Parameter Expansion (5)
In this attack, the target software is given input that the attacker knows
will be modified and expanded in size during processing. This attack
relies on the target software failing to anticipate that the expanded data
may exceed some internal limit, thereby creating a buffer overflow.
Data Structure Attacks
1. Ensure that when parameter expansion happens in the code that
the assumptions used to determine the resulting size of the
parameter are accurate and that the new size of the parameter is
visible to the whole system
CP, CM, CA, PL, SC
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48
Passing Local Filenames to Functions That Expect a URL (4)
This attack relies on client side code to access local files and resources
instead of URLs. When the client browser is expecting a URL string,
but instead receives a request for a local file, that execution is likely to
occur in the browser process space with the browser's authority to local
files. The attacker can send the results of this request to the local files
out to a site that they control. This attack may be used to steal sensitive
authentication data (either local or remote), or to gain system profile
information to launch further attacks.
Abuse of Functionality
1. Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is
sanitized against an acceptable content specification.
2. Implementation: Ensure all configuration files and resource are
either removed or protected when promoting code into production.
3. Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side
scripting.
4. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
5. Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
6. Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in
browser
SI, CM, SA, SC

49
Password Brute Forcing (4)
In this attack, the attacker tries every possible value for a password
until they succeed. A brute force attack, if feasible computationally,
will always be successful because it will essentially go through all
possible passwords given the alphabet used (lower case letters, upper
case letters, numbers, symbols, etc.) and the maximum length of the
password.
A system will be particularly vulnerable to this type of an attack if it
does not have a proper enforcement mechanism in place to ensure that
passwords selected by users are strong passwords that comply with an
adequate password policy.
In practice a pure brute force attack on passwords is rarely used,
unless the password is suspected to be weak. Other password cracking
methods exist that are far more effective (e.g. dictionary attacks,
rainbow tables, etc.).
Probabilistic Techniques
1. Implement a password throttling mechanism. This mechanism
should take into account both the IP address and the log in name of
the user.
2. Put together a strong password policy and make sure that all user
created passwords comply with it. Alternatively automatically
generate strong passwords for users.
3. Passwords need to be recycled to prevent aging, that is every once
in a while a new password must be chosen.
IA, AC, CM, SC
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50
Password Recovery Exploitation (2)
An attacker may take advantage of the application feature to help users
recover their forgotten passwords in order to gain access into the
system with the same privileges as the original user. Generally
password recovery schemes tend to be weak and insecure. Most of
them use only one security question . For instance, mother's maiden
name tends to be a fairly popular one. Unfortunately in many cases
this information is not very hard to find, especially if the attacker
knows the legitimate user.
These generic security questions are also re-used across many
applications, thus making them even more insecure. An attacker could
for instance overhear a coworker talking to a bank representative at the
work place and supplying their mother's maiden name for verification
purposes. An attacker can then try to log in into one of the victim's
accounts, click on "forgot password" and there is a good chance that
the security question there will be to provide mother's maiden name.
A weak password recovery scheme totally undermines the
effectiveness of a strong password scheme.
Abuse of Functionality
1. Use multiple security questions (e.g. have three and make the user
answer two of them correctly). Let the user select their own
security questions or provide them with choices of questions that
are not generic.
2. E-mail the temporary password to the registered e-mail address of
the user rather than letting the user reset the password online.
3. Ensure that your password recovery functionality is not vulnerable
to an injection style attack.
IA, SA
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Poison Web Service Registry (7)
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get
schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry
can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a
malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or
metadata (to effect a denial of service), and delete information about
service provider interfaces.
WS-Addressing is used to virtualize services, provide return addresses
and other routing information, however, unless the WS-Addressing
headers are protected they are vulnerable to rewriting. The attacker that
can rewrite WS-addressing information gains the ability to route
service requesters to any service providers, and the ability to route
service provider response to any service.
Content in a registry is deployed by the service provider. The registry
in an SOA or Web Services system can be accessed by the service
requester via UDDI or other protocol. The basic flow for the attacker
consists of either altering the data at rest in the registry or uploading
malicious content by spoofing a service provider. The service requester
is then redirected to send its requests and/or responses to services the
attacker controls.
Resource Manipulation
1. Enforce principle of least privilege
2. Harden registry server and file access permissions
3. Implement communications to and from the registry using secure
protocols

Parent Mitigation
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52
Embedding NULL Bytes (1)
An attacker embeds one or more null bytes in input to the target
software. This attack relies on the usage of a null-valued byte as a
string terminator in many environments. The goal is for certain
components of the target software to stop processing the input when it
encounters the null byte(s).
Resource Manipulation
1. Properly handle the NULL characters supplied as part of user
input prior to doing anything with the data.
SI
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53
Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash (3)
If a string is passed through a filter of some kind, then a terminal
NULL may not be valid. Using alternate representation of NULL
allows an attacker to embed the NULL midstring while postfixing the
proper data so that the filter is avoided. One example is a filter that
looks for a trailing slash character. If a string insertion is possible, but
the slash must exist, an alternate encoding of NULL in midstring may
be used.
Input Data Manipulation
1. Properly handle Null characters. Make sure canonicalization is
properly applied. Do not pass Null characters to the underlying
APIs.
2. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all
valid input to the software system based on the requirements
specifications. Input that does not match against the white list
should not be permitted to enter into the system.
SI, AC, CM

54
Probing an Application Through Targeting its Error Reporting (2)
An attacker, aware of an application's location (and possibly authorized
to use the application) can probe the application's structure and
evaluate its robustness by probing its error conditions (not unlike one
would during a 'fuzz' test, but more purposefully here) in order to
support attacks such as blind SQL injection, or for the more general
task of mapping the application to mount another subsequent attack.
Data Leakage Attacks
1. Application designers can construct a 'code book' for error
messages. When using a code book, application error messages
aren't generated in string or stack trace form, but are cataloged and
replaced with a unique (often integer-based) value 'coding' for the
error. Such a technique will require helpdesk and hosting
personnel to use a 'code book' or similar mapping to decode
application errors/logs in order to respond to them normally.
2. Application designers can wrap application functionality
(preferably through the underlying framework) in an output
encoding scheme that obscures or cleanses error messages to
prevent such attacks. Such a technique is often used in conjunction
with the above 'code book' suggestion.
SC, SI
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55
Rainbow table password cracking (3)
An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of
passwords are stored. He then uses a rainbow table of precomputed
hash chains to attempt to look up the original password. Once the
original password corresponding to the hash is obtained, the attacker
uses the original password to gain access to the system.
A password rainbow table stores hash chains for various
passwords. A password chain is computed, starting from the original
password, P, via a a reduce(compression) function R and a hash
function H. A recurrence relation exists where Xi+1 = R(H(Xi)), X0 =
P. Then the hash chain of length n for the original password P can be
formed: X1, X2, X3, ... , Xn-2, Xn-1, Xn, H(Xn). P and H(Xn) are
then stored together in the rainbow table.
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Constructing the rainbow tables takes a very long time and is
computationally expensive. A separate table needs to be constrcuted
for the various hash algorithms (e.g. SHA1, MD5, etc.). However,
once a rainbow table is computed, it can be very effective in cracking
the passwords that have been hashed without the use of salt.
Probabilistic Techniques
1. Use salt when computing password hashes. That is, concatenate
the salt (random bits) with the original password prior to hashing
it.
SI, SC, IA

56
Removing/short-circuiting 'guard logic' (2)
Attackers can, in some cases, get around logic put in place to 'guard'
sensitive functionality or data.
The attack may involve gaining access to and calling protected
functionality (or accessing protected data) directly, may involve
subverting some aspect of the guard's implementation, or outright
removal of the guard, if possible.
Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
1. Use Authentication Mechanisms, Where Appropriate, Correctly
2. Use Authorization Mechanisms Correctly
AC, IA
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57
Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the
Middle (3)
This attack utlizes a Rest(REpresentational State Transfer)-style
applications' trust in the system resources and environment to place
man in the middle once SSL is terminated. Rest applications premise is
that they leverage existing infrastructure to deliver web services
functionality.
Spoofing
1. Implementation: Implement message level security such as HMAC
in the HTTP communication
2. Design: Utilize defense in depth, do not rely on a single security
mechanism like SSL
3. Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
SA, SI, AC

58
Restful Privilege Elevation (2)
Rest uses standard HTTP (Get, Put, Delete) style permissions methods,
but these are not necessarily correlated generally with back end
programs. Strict interpretation of HTTP get methods means that these
HTTP Get services should not be used to delete information on the
server, but there is no access control mechanism to back up this logic.
This means that unless the services are properly ACL'd and the
application's service implementation are following these guidelines
then an HTTP request can easily execute a delete or update on the
server side.
The attacker identifies a HTTP Get URL such as
http://victimsite/updateOrder, which calls out to a program to update
orders on a database or other resource. The URL is not idempotent so
the request can be submitted multiple times by the attacker,
additionally, the attacker may be able to exploit the URL published as
a Get method that actually performs updates (instead of merely
retrieving data). This may result in malicious or inadvertant altering of
data on the server.
Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
1. Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
2. Implementation: Ensure that HTTP Get methods only retrieve
state and do not alter state on the server side
3. Implementation: Ensure that HTTP methods have proper ACLs
based on what the funcitonality they expose
AC, CM, SI
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59
Session Credential Falsification through Prediction (3)
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges.
The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to
perform spoofing and session hijacking.
Exploitation of Authentication
1. Use a strong source of randomness to generate a session ID.
Use adequate length session IDs.
2. Do not use information available to the user in order to generate
session ID (e.g., time)…
3. Encrypt the session ID if you expose it to the user. For instance
session ID can be stored in a cookie in encrypted format.
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60
Reusing Session ID‟s (aka Session Replay) (6)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target
system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen
session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing
and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session
Replay.
Exploitation of Authentication
1. Always invalidate a session ID after the user logout.
2. Setup a session time out for the session IDs.
3. Protect the communication between the client and server. For
instance it is best practice to use SSL to mitigate man in the
middle attack
4. Do not code send session ID with GET method, otherwise the
session ID will be copied to the URL. In general avoid writing
session IDs in the URLs. URLs can get logged in log files, which
are vulnerable to an attacker.
5. Encrypt the session data associated with the session ID.
6. Use multifactor authentication

Parent Threat
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61
Session Fixation (3)
The attacker induces a client to establish a session with the target
software using a session identifier provided by the attacker. Once the
user successfully authenticates to the target software, the attacker uses
the (now privileged) session identifier in their own transactions
Exploitation of Authentication
1. Use a strict session management mechanism that only accepts
locally generated session identifiers of their own choice.
2. Regenerate and destroy session identifiers when there is a change
in the level of privilege:
3. Use session identifiers that are difficult to guess or brute-force:
AC, IA, SC

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

222
Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

62
Cross Site Request Forgery (aka Session Riding) (6)
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web
pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce
users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some
third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the
malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted
application with the users‟ privilege level.
This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust
placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such
an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a
session cookie is created on the user's system, all following
transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie
including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding"
the existing session cookie.
Exploitation of Authentication
1. Use cryptographic tokens to associate a request with a specific
action. The token can be regenerated at every request so that if a
request with an invalid token is encountered, it can be reliably
discarded. The token is considered invalid if it arrived with a
request other than the action it was supposed to be associated with.
2. Although less reliable, the use of the optional HTTP Referer
header can also be used to determine whether an incoming request
was actually one that the user is authorized for, in the current
context.
3. Additionally, the user can also be prompted to confirm an action
every time an action concerning potentially sensitive data is
invoked. This way, even if the attacker manages to get the user to
click on a malicious link and request the desired action, the user
has a chance to recover by denying confirmation. This solution is
also implicitly tied to using a second factor of authentication
before performing such actions.
4. In general, every request must be checked for the appropriate
authentication token as well as authorization in the current session
context.
AC, CA, CM, IA, SC, SI
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63
Simple Script Injection (5)
An attacker embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to
web browsers. The goal of the attack is for the target software, the
client-side browser, to execute the script with the users‟ privilege level.
Injection
1. Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side
scripting.
2. Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement
3. Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR
or other means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the
server side, the client's browser has no way of discerning where
the data is originating from.
4. Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is
sanitized against an acceptable content specification.
5. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
6. Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
7. Implementation: Session tokens for specific host
8. Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors
for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities
are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in
technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS
countermeasures mitigates this.
CM, SI, SC, MP, AC

64
Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation
Logic (3)
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the
encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the
multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the
URL. An URL may contain special character that need special syntax
handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented
using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the
octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE).
Resource Manipulation
1. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all
valid input to the software system based on the requirements
specifications.
2. When client input is required from web-based forms, avoid using
the “GET” method to submit data
3. Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded
and validated as correct data format
SI, AC, CM
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65
Passively Sniff and Capture Application Code bound for Authorized
Clients (7)
Attackers can capture application code bound for the client and can use
it, as-is or through reverse-engineering, to glean sensitive information
or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server.
Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being
applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client
is authorized to communicate with the server.
Data Leakage Attacks
1. Do not store secrets in client code
2. All potentially sensitive data, including code, transmitted to the
client must be encrypted
AT, SA, SC, SI, CA, IA, PL

66
SQL Injection (3)
This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements
based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the
target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the
resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the
application intended.
Injection
1. Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be
validated and filtered for illegal characters as well as SQL content.
Keywords such as UNION, SELECT or INSERT must be filtered
in addition to characters such as a single-quote(') or SQLcomments (--) based on the context in which they appear.
2. Use of parameterized queries or stored procedures Parameterization causes the input to be restricted to certain
domains, such as strings or integers, and any input outside such
domains is considered invalid and the query fails. Note that SQL
Injection is possible even in the presence of stored procedures if
the eventual query is constructed dynamically.
3. Use of custom error pages - Attackers can glean information about
the nature of queries from descriptive error messages. Input
validation must be coupled with customized error pages that
inform about an error without disclosing information about the
database or application.
SI, AC, MP
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67
String Format Overflow in syslog() (2)
This attack targets the format string vulnerabilities in the syslog()
function. An attacker would typically inject malicious input in the
format string parameter of the syslog function. This is a common
problem, and many public vulnerabilities and associated exploits have
been posted.
Data Structure Attacks
1. The code should be reviewed for misuse of the Syslog function
call. Manual or automated code review can be used. The reviewer
needs to ensure that all format string functions are passed a static
string which cannot be controlled by the user and that the proper
number of arguments are always sent to that function as well. If at
all possible, do not use the %n operator in format strings. The
following code shows a correct usage of Syslog(): ...
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s", cmdBuf); ... The following code shows a
vulnerable usage of Syslog(): ... syslog(LOG_ERR, cmdBuf); //
the buffer cmdBuff is taking user supplied data. ...
SI, AC

68
Subvert Code-signing Facilities (1)
Because languages use code signing facilities to vouch for code's
identity and to thus tie code to its assigned privileges within an
environment, subverting this mechanism can be instrumental in an
attacker escalating privilege.
Any means of subverting the way that a virtual machine enforces code
signing classifies for this style of attack. This pattern does not include
circumstances through which a signing key has been stolen.
Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
1. A given code signing scheme may be fallible due to improper use
of cryptography
2. avoid reliance on flags or environment variables that are usercontrollable
IA
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69
Target Programs with Elevated Privileges (5)
This attack targets programs running with elevated privileges. The
attacker would try to leverage a bug in the running program and get
arbitrary code to execute with elevated privileges. For instance an
attacker would look for programs that write to the system directories or
registry keys (such as HKLM, which stores a number of critical
Windows environment variables).
Exploitation of Privilege/Trust
1. Apply the principle of least privilege.
2. Validate all untrusted data
3. Apply the latest patches.
4. Scan your services and disable the ones which are not needed and
are exposed unnecessarily.
5. Avoid revealing information about your system (e.g., version of
the program) to anonymous users.
6. Make sure that your program or service fail safely.
7. If possible use a sandbox model which limits the actions that
programs can take.
8. Check your program for buffer overflow and format String
vulnerabilities which can lead to execution of malicious code.
9. Monitor traffic and resource usage and pay attention if resource
exhaustion occurs.
10. Protect your log file from unauthorized modification and log
forging.
AC,SI,RA,PS,SC

70
Try Common(default) Usernames and Passwords (2)
An attacker may try certain common (default) usernames and
passwords to gain access into the system and perform unauthorized
actions. An attacker may try an intelligent brute force using known
vendor default credentials as well as a dictionary of common
usernames and passwords.
Probabilistic Techniques
1. Delete all default account credentials that may be put in by the
product vendor.
2. Implement a password throttling mechanism.
3. Put together a strong password policy and make sure that all user
created passwords comply with it.
4. Passwords need to be recycled to prevent aging, that is every once
in a while a new password must be chosen.
AC,IA
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71
Using Unicode encoding to Bypass Validation Logic (3)
An attacker may provide a Unicode string to a system component that
is not Unicode aware and use that to circumvent the filter or cause the
classifying mechanism to fail to properly understanding the request.
That may allow the attacker to slip malicious data past the content filter
and/or possibly cause the application to route the request incorrectly.
Resource Manipulation
1. Ensure that the system is Unicode aware and can properly process
Unicode data. Do not make an assumption that data will be in
ASCII.
2. Ensure that filtering or input validation is applied to canonical data
3. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all
valid input to the software system based on the requirements
specifications. Input that does not match against white list should
not be permitted to enter the system.
AC, SI, CM

72
URL encoding (8)
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An attacker can take
advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the
interpretation of the URL. An URL may contain special character that
need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special
characters are represented using a percentage character followed by
two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEXCODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented
with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percentencoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may
restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out
the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with
a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server
will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect
against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding
such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc. The attacker could
also subvert the meaning of the URL string request by encoding the
data being sent to the server through a GET request. For instance an
attacker may subvert the meaning of parameters used in a SQL request
and sent through the URL string (See Example section).
Resource Manipulation
1. Refer to the RFCS to safely decode URL
2. Regular expression can be used to match safe URL patterns. May
discard valid patterns if too restrictive.
3. Tools available to scan HTTP requests to the server
4. Security checks should occur after data is decoded and validated
for format. Bad chars result in validation failure.
5. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list of acceptable
input. Test it yourself.
6. Be aware of alternative encoding such as IP encoding
7. In web-forms, avoid using “Get” and use “Post” when possible
AC, CM, SA, SI, SC, CA, PL
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73
User-controlled Filename (4)
An attack of this type involves an attacker inserting malicious
characters (such as a XSS redirection) into a filename, directly or
indirectly that is then used by the target software to generate HTML
text or other potentially executable content. Many websites rely on
user-generated content and dynamically build resources like files,
filenames, and URL links directly from user supplied data. In this
attack pattern, the attacker uploads code that can execute in the client
browser and/or redirect the client browser to a site that the attacker
owns. All XSS attack payload variants can be used to pass and exploit
these vulnerabilities.
Resource Manipulation
1. Use browser technologies that do not allow client side script
2. Ensure all content delivered to client is sanitized
3. Validate input for all remote content
4. Validate output for all remote content
5. Disable scripts in browser
6. Scan dynamically generated content
7. Disable scripts in browser
AC, CM, MP, SI

74
Manipulating User State (6)
An attacker modifies state information maintained by the target
software in user-accessible locations. If successful, the target software
will use this tainted state information and execute in an unintended
manner.
State management is an important function within an application. User
state maintained by the application can include usernames, payment
information, browsing history as well as application-specific contents
such as items in a shopping cart.
Manipulating user state can be employed by an attacker to elevate
privilege, conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow
of the application to derive certain benefits.
Time and State Attacks
1. Do not rely solely on user-controllable locations, such as cookies
or URL parameters, to maintain user state
2. Do not store sensitive information, such as usernames or
authentication and authorization information, in user-controllable
locations.
3. At all times sensitive information that is part of the user state must
be appropriately protected to ensure confidentiality and integrity at
each request
CM, CP, IA, MP, SA, SC
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Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files (8)
An attacker modifies the contents of configuration files that
influence/control the operation of the target software. This attack
exploits the ever-growing number, size and complexity of
configuration files and the often lax access controls on these files.
This attack exploits a program's trust in configuration files that may
have weaker permissions. System configuration in distributed systems
such as J2EE servers have many administration points. For example,
permissions may be set on the administrative GUI, the configuration
file for the server as a whole, configuration files for specific domains
and applications, special jar and other class files used to load resources
at runtime, and even policy specific in .war and .ear files. A mistake in
permissions setting in either the file acl or the content is an opening an
attacker can use to elevate privilege.
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Exploitation of Privelage/Trust
1. Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
2. Design: Backup copies of all configuration files
3. Implementation: Integrity monitoring for configuration files
4. Implementation: Enforce audit logging on code and configuration
promotion procedures.
5. Implementation: Load configuration from separate process and
memory space, for example a separate physical device like a CD
AC, AU, CA, CM, CP, IR, SC, SI

76
Manipulating Input to File System Calls(4)
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target
software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain
access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target
software did not intend to be accessible.
Resource Manipulation
1. Design: Enforce principle of least privilege.
2. Design: Ensure all input is validated, and does not contain file
system commands
3. Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or
utilize chroot jails or other configuration techniques to constrain
privileges even if attacker gains some limited access to commands.
4. Design: For interactive user applications, consider if direct file
system interface is necessary, instead consider having the
application proxy communication.
5. Implementation: Perform testing such as pentesting and
vulnerability scanning to identify directories, programs, and
interfaces that grant direct access to executables.
AC, SI, CM, RA
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77
Manipulating User-Controlled Variables (4)
This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals,
and So Forth). An attacker can override environment variables
leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the
application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the
attacker can change variables controlling the business logic of the
application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly
set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.
Resource Manipulation
1. Do not allow override of global variables and do Not Trust Global
Variables. If the register_globals option is enabled, PHP will
create global variables for each GET, POST, and cookie variable
included in the HTTP request. This means that a malicious user
may be able to set variables unexpectedly. For instance make sure
that the server setting for PHP does not expose global variables.
2. A software system should be reluctant to trust variables that have
been initialized outside of its trust boundary. Ensure adequate
checking is performed when relying on input from outside a trust
boundary.
3. Separate the presentation layer and the business logic layer.
Variables at the business logic layer should not be exposed at the
presentation layer. This is to prevent computation of business logic
from user controlled input data.
4. Use encapsulation when declaring your variables. This is to lower
the exposure of your variables.
5. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all
valid input to the software system based on the requirements
specifications. Input that does not match against the white list
should be rejected by the program.
CM, SI, SC, AC
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78
Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding (5)
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An
attacker can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a
parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an
escape. By using that trick, the attacker tries to exploit alternate ways
to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens
avenues to attack.
Resource Manipulation
1. Verify that the user-supplied data does not use backslash character
to escape malicious characters.
2. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all
valid input to the software system based on the requirements
specifications. Input that does not match against the white list
should not be permitted to enter into the system.
3. Be aware of the threat of alternative method of data encoding.
4. Regular expressions can be used to filter out backslash. Make sure
you decode before filtering and validating the untrusted input data.
5. In the case of path traversals, use the principle of least privilege
when determining access rights to file systems. Do not allow users
to access directories/files that they should not access.
6. Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded
and validated as correct data format. Do not repeat decoding
process, if bad character are left after decoding process, treat the
data as suspicious, and fail the validation process.
7. Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if
those resources can have alternate names.
SI, MA, AC, CM, SC
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79
Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding (3)
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An attacker
would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of
the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host.
Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically
use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other
container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a
result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX
world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic
result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both
forms of the slash. This gives the attacker many opportunities to
discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal
of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to
one version, but not the other.
Resource Manipulation
1. Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded
and validated as correct data format. Do not repeat decoding
process, if bad character are left after decoding process, treat the
data as suspicious, and fail the validation process. Refer to the
RFCs to safelly decode URL.
2. When client input is required from web-based forms, avoid using
the “GET” method to submit data, as the method causes the form
data to be appended to the URL and is easily manipulated. Instead,
use the “POST method whenever possible.
3. There are tools to scan HTTP requests to the server for valid URL
such as URLScan from Microsoft
(http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools/urlscan.mspx)
4. Be aware of the threat of alternative method of data encoding and
obfuscation technique such as IP address endoding. (See related
guideline section)
5. Test your path decoding process against malicious input.
6. In the case of path traversals, use the principle of least privilege
when determining access rights to file systems. Do not allow users
to access directories/files that they should not access.
7. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all
valid input to the application based on the requirements
specifications. Input that does not match against the white list
should not be permitted to enter into the system.
SI, SC, AC
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Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic (1)
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to
bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode
potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not
expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making
input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation
Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal
UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of
the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it
permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use
the ``shortest possible'' encoding, but naive decoders may accept
encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629,
a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a
parser which performs security-critical validity checks against
the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet
sequences as characters.
Resource Manipulation
1. The Unicode Consortium recognized multiple representations to
be a problem and has revised the Unicode Standard to make
multiple representations of the same code point with UTF-8
illegal.
2. For security reasons, a UTF-8 decoder must not accept UTF-8
sequences that are longer than necessary to encode a character. If
you use a parser to decode the UTF-8 encoding, make sure that
parser filter the invalid UTF-8 characters (invalid forms or
overlong forms).
3. Look for overlong UTF-8 sequences starting with malicious
pattern. You can also use a UTF-8 decoder stress test to test your
UTF-8 parser (See Markus Kuhn's UTF-8 and Unicode FAQ in
reference section)
4. Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all
valid input to the software system based on the requirements
specifications. Input that does not match against the white list
should not be permitted to enter into the system. Test your
decoding process against malicious input.

Parent Mitigation

SI
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81
Web Logs Tampering (3)
Protection services in security are vulnerable so they are backstopped
by detection in the so-called protect-detect-respond model. A key
element in detection is log files, to identify a threat impact, for audit
purposes, or simply responding to a crash. Since most requests to web
servers are logged (at least header request response data) the attacker
literally has the ability to generate log data in every request
Web Logs Tampering attacks involve an attacker injecting, deleting or
otherwise tampering with the contents of web logs.
Additionally, writing malicious data to log files may target jobs, filters,
reports, and other agents that process the logs in an asynchronous
attack pattern.
Resource Location Attacks
1. Design: Use input validation before writing to web log
2. Design: Validate all log data before it is output
AC, AU, SI

82
Violating Implicit Assumptions Regarding XML Content (aka XMl
Denial of Service (XDoS)) (5)
XML Denial of Service (XDoS) can be applied to any technology that
utilizes XML data. This is, of course, most distributed systems
technology including Java, .Net, databases, and so on. XDoS is most
closely associated with web services, SOAP, and Rest, because remote
service requesters can post malicious XML payloads to the service
provider designed to exhaust the service provider's memory, CPU,
and/or disk space.
Resource Depletion
1. Design: Utilize a Security Pipeline Interface (SPI) to mediate
communications between service requester and service provider
The SPI should be designed to throttle up and down and handle a
variety of payloads.
2. Design: Utilize clustered and fail over techniques, leverage
network transports to provide availability such as HTTP load
balancers
3. Implementation: Check size of XML message before parsing
SC, IR, PE, RA, SC
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83
XPath Injection (2)
An attacker can craft special user-controllable input consisting of
XPath expressions to inject the XML database and bypass
authentication or glean information that he normally would not be able
to. XPath Injection enables an attacker to talk directly to the XML
database, thus bypassing the application completely. XPath Injection
results form the failure of an application to properly sanitize input used
as part of dynamic XPath expressions used to query an XML database.
Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane)
1. Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be
validated and filtered for illegal characters as well as content that
can be interpreted in the context of an XPath expression.
Characters such as a single-quote(') or operators such as or (|), and
(&) and such should be filtered if the application does not expect
them in the context in which they appear. If such content cannot be
filtered, it must at least be properly escaped to avoid them being
interpreted as part of XPath expressions.
2. Use of parameterized XPath queries - Parameterization causes the
input to be restricted to certain domains, such as strings or
integers, and any input outside such domains is considered invalid
and the query fails.
3. Use of custom error pages - Attackers can glean information about
the nature of queries from descriptive error messages. Input
validation must be coupled with customized error pages that
inform about an error without disclosing information about the
database or application.
SC, SI

84
XQuery Injection (3)
This attack utilizes XQuery to probe and attack server systems; in a
similar manner that SQL Injection allows an attacker to exploit SQL
calls to RDBMS, XQuery Injection uses improperly validated data that
is passed to XQuery commands to traverse and execute commands that
the XQuery routines have access to. XQuery injection can be used to
enumerate elements on the victim's environment, inject commands to
the local host, or execute queries to remote files and data sources.
Injection
1. Design: Perform input white list validation on all XML input
2. Implementation: Run xml parsing and query infrastructure with
minimal privileges so that an attacker is limited in their ability to
probe other system resources from xql.
SI, SA, AC
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85
Client Network Footprinting (using AJAX/XSS) (4)
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax
conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new
vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of
view. In many XSS attacks the attacker must get a "hole in one" and
successfully exploit the vulnerability on the victim side the first time,
once the client is redirected the attacker has many chances to engage in
follow on probes, but their is only one first chance. In a widely used
web application this is not a major problem because 1 in a 1,000 is
good enough in a widely used application.
A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the environment to
understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on
enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and
responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to
look for many vulnerabilities, well known ports, network locations and
so on.
Probabilistic Techniques
1. Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side
scripting
2. Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement
3. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
4. Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
5. Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in
browser
6. Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors
for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities
are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in
technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS
countermeasures mitigates this.
AC, SC, SI, RA
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Embedding Script (XSS) in HTTP Headers (4)
An attack of this type exploits web applications that generate web
content, such as links in a HTML page, based on unvalidated or
improperly validated data submitted by other actors. XSS in HTTP
Headers attacks target the HTTP headers which are hidden from most
users and may not be validated by web applications. As with all XSS
attacks, there are a number of possible targets:
1. Launch attack on web browser clients and client machine
2. Launch attacks on client machines environment, such as LAN or
Intranet
3. Launch attack on web server, including remote web servers
Web 2.0 technologies rely heavily on mashups and other plug in
technologies like multi media players which are effectively composed
of content generated by other systems and are vulnerable due to the
fact that an attacker may use the HTTP header information that these
technologies consume and display as an attack launch pad.
Beyond Web 2.0, increasingly system administration software uses
web front ends, from firewall administration to application servers, to
blogging software, many tools are administered through web browsers.
This gives the administrator the ability to administer in a highly
distributed environment, but this comes at the cost of exposing the
command and control software for the system to web attacks.
Additionally, because the rich functionality required these
administration applications, many rely on scripting languages. So an
attacker can insert HTTP links into logs, audit functionality, error logs,
and message queues, then, for example, a Javascript-enabled web
browser with administrator rights can be redirected to execute a wide
variety of attacks, including those listed here.
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Injection
1. Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side
scripting.
2. Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement
3. Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR
or other means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the
server side, the client's browser has no way of discerning where
the data is originating from.
4. Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is
sanitized against an acceptable content specification.
5. Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
6. Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
7. Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in
browser
8. Implementation: Session tokens for specific host
9. Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors
for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities
are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in
technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS
countermeasures mitigates this.
AC, SC, SI, RA

Parent Mitigation
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Forceful Browsing (3)
An attacker employs forceful browsing to access portions of a website
that are otherwise unreachable through direct URL entry.
Abuse of Functionality
1. Authenticate request to every resource. In addition, every page or
resource must ensure that the request it is handling has been made
in an authorized context.
2. Forceful browsing can also be made difficult to a large extent by
not hard-coding names of application pages or resources. This
way, the attacker cannot figure out, from the application alone, the
resources available from the present context.
AC, IA, SC
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OS Command Injection (3)
An attacker can leverage OS command injection in an application to
elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the
underlying operating system.
Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane)
1. Use language APIs rather than relying on passing data to the
operating system shell or command line. Doing so ensures that the
available protection mechanisms in the language are intact and
applicable.
2. Filter all incoming data to escape or remove characters or strings
that can be potentially misinterpreted as operating system or shell
commands
3. All application processes should be run with the minimal
privileges required. Also, processes must shed privileges as soon
as they no longer require them.

Parent Mitigation

SI, AC, CM

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description
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Pharming (8)
Pharming attacks occur when victims provide sensitive information to
websites that do not possess a valid certificate from well-known
certificate authorities.

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Spoofing
1. All sensitive information must be handled over a secure
connection.
2. Known vulnerabilities in DNS or router software or in operating
systems must be patched as soon as a fix has been released and
tested.
3. End users must ensure that they provide sensitive information only
to websites that they trust, over a secure connection with a valid
certificate issued by a well-known certificate authority.

Parent Mitigation

AC, CA, CM, CP, IA, RA,SI, SC
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Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation
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Reflection Attack in Authentication Protocol (4)
A single sign-on solution for a network uses a fixed preshared key with
its clients to initiate the signon process in order to avoid eavesdropping
on the initial exchanges.
Exploitation of Privilege or Trust
1. The server must initiate the handshake by issuing the challenge.
This ensures that the client has to respond before the exchange can
move any further.
2. The use of HMAC to hash the response from the server can also be
used to thwart reflection. The server responds by returning its own
challenge as well as hashing the client's challenge, its own
challenge and the preshared secret. Requiring the client to respond
with the HMAC of the two challenges ensures that only the
possessor of a valid preshared secret can successfully hash in the
two values.
3. Introducing a random nonce with each new connection ensures
that the attacker can not employ two connections to attack the
authentication protocol
AC, IA, SC, SI
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XSS in IMG Tags (1)
Image tags are an often overlooked, but convenient, means for a Cross
Site Scripting attack. The attacker can inject script contents into an
image (IMG) tag in order to steal information from a victim's browser
and execute malicious scripts.
Injection
1. In addition to the traditional input fields, all other user controllable
inputs, such as image tags within messages or the likes, must also
be subjected to input validation. Such validation should ensure that
content that can be potentially interpreted as script by the browser
is appropriately filtered.
2. All output displayed to clients must be properly escaped. Escaping
ensures that the browser interprets special scripting characters
literally and not as script to be executed
SI
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Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation
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Forced Integer Overflow (4)
This attack forces an integer variable to go out of range. The integer
variable is often used as an offset such as size of memory allocation or
similarly. The attacker would typically control the value of such
variable and try to get it out of range. For instance the integer in
question is incremented past the maximum possible value, it may wrap
to become a very small, or negative number, therefore providing a very
incorrect value which can lead to unexpected behavior. At worst the
attacker can execute arbitrary code.
Data Structure Attacks
1. Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds
checking.
2. Carefully review the service's implementation before making it
available to user. For instance you can use manual or automated
code review to uncover vulnerabilities such as integer overflow.
3. Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a
complete solution.
4. Always do bound checking before consuming user input data.
CA, RA, SC, SI
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Log Injection-Tampering-Forging(5)
This attack targets the log files of the target host. The attacker injects,
manipulates or forges malicious log entries in the log file, allowing him
to mislead a log audit, cover traces of attack, or perform other
malicious actions. The target host is not properly controlling log
access. As a result tainted data is resulting in the log files leading to a
failure in accoutability, non-repudiation and incident forensics
capability.
Audit Log Manipulation
1. Carefully control access to physical log files.
2. Do not allow tainted data to be written in the log file without prior
input validation. Whitelisting may be used to properly validate the
data.
3. Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.
4. Use static analysis tools to identify log forging vulnerabilities.
5. Avoid viewing logs with tools that may interpret control characters
in the file, such as command-line shells.
AC, IA, SC, AU, RA
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Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

94
Man in the Middle (3)
This type of attack targets the communication between two
components (typically client and server). The attacker places himself in
the communication channel between the two components. Whenever
one component attempts to communicate with the other (data flow,
authentication challenges, etc.), the data first goes to the attacker, who
has the opportunity to observe or alter it, and it is then passed on to the
other component as if it was never intercepted. This interposition is
transparent leaving the two compromised components unaware of the
potential corruption or leakeage of their communications. The potential
for Man-in-the-Middle attacks yields an implicit lack of trust in
communication or identify between two components.
Spoofing
1. Get your Public Key signed by a Certificate Authority
2. Encrypt your communication using cryptography (SSL,...)
3. Use Strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate both
ends of any communications channel.
4. Exchange public keys using a secure channel
AC, IA, SC

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description
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WSDL Scanning (3)
This attack targets the WSDL interface made available by a web
service. The attacker may scan the WSDL interface to reveal sensitive
information about invocation patterns, underlying technology
implementations and associated vulnerabilities. This type of probing is
carried out to perform more serious attacks (e.g. parameter tampering,
malicious content injection, command injection, etc.). WSDL files
provide detailed information about the services ports and bindings
available to consumers. For instance, the attacker can submit special
characters or malicious content to the Web service and can cause a
denial of service condition or illegal access to database records. In
addition, the attacker may try to guess other private methods by using
the information provided in the WSDL files.

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Abuse of Functionality
1. It is important to protect WSDL file or provide limited access to it.
2. Review the functions exposed by the WSDL interface (specially if
you have used a tool to generate it). Make sure that none of them
is vulnerable to injection.
3. Ensure the WSDL does not expose functions and APIs that were
not intended to be exposed.
4. Pay attention to the function naming convention (within the
WSDL interface). Easy to guess function name may be an entry
point for attack.
5. Validate the received messages against the WSDL Schema.
Incomplete solution
AC, SI, AU

Parent Mitigation
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Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation
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Block Access to Libraries (5)
An application typically makes calls to functions that are a part of
libraries external to the application. These libraries may be part of the
operating system or they may be third party libraries. It is possible that
the application does not handle situations properly where access to
these libraries has been blocked. Depending on the error handling
within the application, blocked access to libraries may leave the system
in an insecure state that could be leveraged by an attacker.
Resource Manipulation
1. Ensure that application handles situations where access to APIs in
external libraries is not available securely. If the application
cannot continue its execution safely it should fail in a consistent
and secure fashion.
CM, SA, SC, SI, RA
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Cryptanalysis (2)
Cryptanalysis is a process of finding weaknesses in cryptographic
algorithms and using these weaknesses to decipher the ciphertext
without knowing the secret key (instance deduction). Sometimes the
weakness is not in the cryptographic algorithm itself, but rather in how
it is applied that makes cryptanalysis successful. An attacker may have
other goals as well, such as:
1. Total Break - Finding the secret key
2. Gobal Deduction - Finding a functionally equivalent algorithm for
encryption and decryption that does not require knowledge of the
secret key.
3. Information Deduction - Gaining some information about
plaintexts or ciphertexts that was not previously known
4. Distinguishing Algorithm - The attacker has the ability to
distinguish the output of the encryption (ciphertext) from a random
permutation of bits
The goal of the attacker performing cryptanalysis will depend on the
specific needs of the attacker in a given attack context. In most cases,
if cryptanalysis is successful at all, an attacker will not be able to go
past being able to deduce some information about the plaintext (goal
3). However, that may be sufficient for an attacker, depending on the
context.
Probabilistic Techniques
1. Use proven cryptographic algorithms with recommended key
sizes.
2. Ensure that the algorithms are used properly. That means: 1. Not
rolling out your own crypto; Use proven algorithms and
implementations. 2. Choosing initialization vectors with
sufficiently random numbers 3. Generating key material using
good sources of randomness and avoiding known weak keys 4.
Using proven protocols and their implementations. 5. Picking the
most appropriate cryptographic algorithm for your usage context
and data
IA, SC
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Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

98
Phishing (4)
Phishing is a social engineering technique where an attacker
masquerades as a legitimate entity with which the victim might do
business in order to prompt the user to reveal some confidential
information (very frequently authentication credentials) that can later
be used by an attacker. Phishing is essentially a form of information
gathering or "fishing" for information.
Spoofing
1. Do not follow any links that you receive within your e-mails and
certainly do not input any login credentials on the page that they
take you too. Instead, call your Bank, Paypal, Ebay, etc., and
inquire about the problem. A safe practice would also be to type
the URL of your bank in the browser directly and only then log in.
Also, never reply to any e-mails that ask you to provide sensitive
information of any kind.

Parent Mitigation

AT, SA, SI, PL

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description
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XML Parser Attack (3)
Applications often need to transform data in and out of the XML
format by using an XML parser. It may be possible for an attacker to
inject data that may have an adverse effect on the XML parser when it
is being processed. These adverse effects may include the parser
crashing, consuming too much of a resource, executing too slowly,
executing code supplied by an attacker, allowing usage of unintenteded
system functionality, etc. An attacker's goal is to leverage parser
failure to his or her advantage. In some cases it may be possible to
jump from the data plane to the control plane via bad data being passed
to an XML parser [1].
Resource Depletion
1. Carefully validate and sanitize all user-controllable data prior to
passing it to the XML parser routine. Ensure that the resultant data
is safe to pass to the XML parser.
2. Perform validation on canonical data.
3. Pick a robust implementation of an XML parser.
4. Validate XML against a valid schema or DTD prior to parsing.
IR, SA, SI

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation
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Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

100
Overflow Buffers (2)
Buffer Overflow attacks target improper or missing bounds checking
on buffer operations, typically triggered by input injected by an
attacker. As a consequence, an attacker is able to write past the
boundaries of allocated buffer regions in memory, causing a program
crash or potentially redirection of execution as per the attacker's
choice.
Data Structure Attacks
1. Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds
checking.
2.

Use secure functions not vulnerable to buffer overflow.

3.

If you have to use dangerous functions, make sure that you do
boundary checking.

4.

Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard,
ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this
provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution.

5.

Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.

6.

Utilize static source code analysis tools to identify potential buffer
overflow weaknesses in the software.

Parent Mitigation

SC,SI

Attack Pattern ID
Attack Pattern Name (KOE)
Description
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(SSI) Server Side Include Injection (4)
Consider a website hosted on a server that permits Server Side Includes
(SSI), such as Apache with the "Options Includes" directive enabled.
Whenever an error occurs, the HTTP Headers along with the entire
request are logged, which can then be displayed on a page that allows
review of such errors. A malicious user can inject SSI directives in the
HTTP Headers of a request designed to create an error.
When these logs are eventually reviewed, the server parses the SSI
directives and executes them.
Injection (Injecting Control Plane content through the Data Plane)
1. Set the OPTIONS IncludesNOEXEX in the global access.conf file
or local .htaccess (apache) file to deny SSI execution in directories
that do not need them
2. All user controllable input must be appropriately sanitized before
use in the application. This includes omitting, or encoding, certain
characters or strings that have the potential of being interpreted as
part of an SSI directive
3. Server Side Includes must be enabled only if there is a strong
business reason to do so. Every Additional component enabled on
the web server increases the attack surface as well as
administrative overhead
SI, CM, RA, SA

Parent Threat
Solutions and Mitigations

Parent Mitigation
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Graphical Attack Trees

Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust

Attack Pattern ID: 1

Attack Pattern Name: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by
ACLs (2)

Description:
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is
mitigated by the authorization framework, whose job it is to map ACLs to
elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In
the case that the application deployer failed to specify an ACL for a particular
element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with
the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain
sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an
attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher
privilege level, can access management sections of the application or can run
queries for data that he is otherwise not supposed to.

Solutions and Mitigations:
In a J2EE setting, deployers can associate a role that is impossible for the
authenticator to grant users, such as "NoAccess", with all Servlets to which
access is guarded by a limited number of servlets visible to, and accessible by,
the user.. Having done so, any direct access to those protected Servlets will be
prohibited by the web container. In a more general setting, the deployer must
mark every resource besides the ones supposed to be exposed to the user as
accessible by a role impossible for the user to assume. The default security
setting must be to deny access and then grant access only to those resources
intended by business logic

Parent Mitigation: AC, IA
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality

Attack Pattern ID: 2

Attack Pattern Name: Inducing Account Lockout (2)

Description:
An attacker leverages the security functionality of the system aimed at
thwarting potential attacks to launch a denial of service attack against a
legitimate system user. Many systems, for instance, implement a
password throttling mechanism that locks an account after a certain
number of incorrect log in attempts. An attacker can leverage this
throttling mechanism to lock a legitimate user out of their own
account. The weakness that is being leveraged by an attacker is the very
security feature that has been put in place to counteract attacks.

Solutions and Mitigations:
Implement intelligent password throttling mechanisms such as those
which take IP address into account, in addition to the login name.
When implementing security features, consider how they can be
misused and made to turn on themselves.

Parent Mitigation: IA, PL
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 3

Attack Pattern Name: Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass
Input Filters (3)

Description:
An attacker intentionally introduces leading characters that enable getting the
input past the filters.

Solutions and Mitigations:
Perform white list rather than black list input validation.
Canonicalize all data prior to validation
Take an iterative approach to input validation (defense in depth).

Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, SL
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Parent Mitigation: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 4

Attack Pattern Name: Using Alternative IP Address Encodings (3)

Description:
This attack relies on the attacker using unexpected formats for representing IP
addresses. Networked applications may expect network location information in
a specific format, such as fully qualified domains names, URL, IP address, or
IP Address ranges. The issue that the attacker can exploit is that these design
assumptions may not be validated against a variety of different possible
encodings and network address location formats. Applications that use naming
for creating policy namespaces for managing access control may be susceptible
to queryin directly by IP addresses, which is ultimately a more generally
authoritative way of communicating on a network.

Solutions and Mitigations:
Design: Default deny access control policies
Design: Input validation routines should check and enforce both input data
types and content against a positive specification. In regards to IP addresses,
this should include the authorized manner for the application to represent IP
addresses and not accept user specified IP addresses and IP address formats
(such as ranges)
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.

Parent Mitigation: AC SC SI
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 5

Attack Pattern Name: Analog In-band Switching Signals (aka Blue Boxing) (2)

Description
This attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been around for
decades. The signal is sent by the attacker to impersonate a supervisor signal.
This has the effect of rerouting or usurping command of the line and call.
While the US infrastructure proper may not contain widespread vulnerabilities
to this type of attack, many companies are connected globally through call
centers and business process outsourcing. These international systems may be
operated in countries which have not upgraded telco infrastructure and so are
vulnerable to Blue boxing.
Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce strong
authentication for administrative functions. While the infrastructure is different
than standard current applications like web applications, there are historical
lessons to be learned to upgrade the access control for administrative functions.

Solutions and Mitigations
Implementation: Upgrade phone lines. Note this may be prohibitively
expensive
Use strong access control such as two factor access control for administrative
access to the switch

Parent Mitigation: AC, MA
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 6

Attack Pattern Name: Argument Injection (2)

Description
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an
attacker's commands to be directly or indirectly applied as arguments, for
example as shell commands. This may allow an attacker access to files,
network resources, media, and in short anything accessible through the shell.
The argument injection attack uses the exposed service or method as a launch
pad to invoke other programs. If the service does not validate or filter the input
data then the client program is granted access to execute commands using the
server's privileges. The OS commands can be appended to standard input for
shell programs, HTTP Requests, and XML messages. The ability to invoke
commands is not necessarily sufficient for the attacker to collect the output of
the attack. This may or may not be an issue depending on the attacker goal.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Do not program input values directly on command shell, instead treat
user input as guilty until proven innocent. Build a function that takes user input
and converts it to applications specific types and values, stripping or filtering
out all unauthorized commands and characters in the process.
Design: Limit program privileges, so if metacharcters or other methods
circumvent program input validation routines and shell access is attained then
it is not running under a privileged account. chroot jails create a sandbox for
the application to execute in, making it more difficult for an attacker to elevate
privilege even in the case that a compromise has occurred.
Implementation: Implement an audit log that is written to a separate host, in the
event of a compromise the audit log may be able to provide evidence and
details of the compromise.

Parent Mitigation: AT, PL
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 7

Attack Pattern Name: Blind SQL Injection (2)

Description:
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection.
Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the
suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL
Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages.
Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the attacker
constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL
expressions. The attacker can determine if the syntax and structure of the
injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not.
Applied iteratively, the attacker determines how and where the target is
vulnerable to SQL Injection.

Solutions and Mitigations:
Security by Obscurity is not a solution to preventing SQL Injection. Rather
than suppress error messages and exceptions, the application must handle them
gracefully, returning either a custom error page or redirecting the user to a
default page, without revealing any information about the database or the
application internals.
Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be validated and
filtered for illegal characters as well as SQL content. Keywords such as
UNION, SELECT or INSERT must be filtered in addition to characters such
as a single-quote(') or SQL-comments (--) based on the context in which they
appear.

Parent Mitigation: SI, CM
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 8

Attack Pattern Name: Buffer Overflow in an API Call (2)

Description
This attack targets libraries or shared code modules which are vulnerable to
buffer overflow attacks. An attacker who has access to an API may try to
embed malicious code in the API function call and exploit a buffer overflow
vulnerability in the function's implementation. All clients that make use of the
code library thus become vulnerable by association. This has a very broad
effect on security across a system, usually affecting more than one software
process.

Solutions and Mitigations
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Use secure functions not vulnerable to buffer overflow.
If you have to use dangerous functions, make sure that you do boundary
checking.
Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the
Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds
checking, it is not a complete solution.
Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.

Parent Mitigation: AT, SC
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks

Attack Pattern ID: 9

Attack Pattern Name: Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities (5)

Description:
This attack targets command-line utilities available in a number of shells. An
attacker can leverage a vulnerability found in a command-line utility to
escalate privilege to root.

Solutions and Mitigations:
Carefully review the service's implementation before making it available to
user. For instance you can use manual or automated code review to uncover
vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow.
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete
solution.
Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the
Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds
checking, it is not a complete solution.
Operational: Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.
Apply the latest patches to your user exposed services. This may not be a
complete solution, specially against zero day attack.
Do not unnecessarily expose services.

Parent Mitigation: RA, SI, CM, SA, AC
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 10

Attack Pattern Name: Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables (4)

Description:
This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through manipulation of
environment variables. Once the attacker finds that they can modify an
environment variable, they may try to overflow associated buffers. This attack
leverages implicit trust often placed in environment variables.

Solutions and Mitigations
Do not expose environment variable to the user.
Do not use untrusted data in your environment variables.
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking
You can use Sharefuzz to determine if you are exposing an environment
variable vulnerable to buffer overflow

Parent Mitigation: SI, AC, CM, RA
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID:11 (2)

Attack Pattern Name: Cause Web Server Misclassification

Description:
An attack of this type exploits a Web server's decision to take action based on
filename or file extension. Because different file types are handled by different
server processes, misclassification may force the Web server to take
unexpected action, or expected actions in an unexpected sequence. This may
cause the server to exhaust resources, supply debug or system data to the
attacker, or bind an attacker to a remote process.

Solutions and Mitigations:
Implementation: Server routines should be determined by content not
determined by filename or file extension.

Parent Mitigation: CM, IA
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality

Attack Pattern ID: 12

Attack Pattern Name: Choosing a Message/Channel Identifier on a Public/
Multicast Channel (2)

Description:
Attackers aware that more data is being fed into a multicast or public
information distribution means can 'select' information bound only for another
client, even if the distribution means itself forces users to authenticate in order
to connect initally.
Doing so allows the attacker to gain access to possibly privileged information,
possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by
impersonation.
If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output
mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could
change its identifier from a less privileged to more so privileged channel or
command.

Solutions and Mitigations
Associate some ACL (in the form of a token) with an authenticated
user which they provide middleware. The middleware uses this token as part of
its channel/message selection for that client, or part of a discerning
authorization decision for privileged channels/messages. The purpose is to
architect the system in a way that associates proper authentication/
authorization with each channel/message.
Rearchitect system input/output channels as appropriate to distribute
self-protecting data. That is, encrypt (or otherwise protect) channels/messages
so that only authorized readers can see them.

Parent Mitigation: IA, SC
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 13

Attack Pattern Name: Subverting Environment Variable Values (3)

Description
The attacker directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or
controlling the target software. The attacker‟s goal is to cause the target
software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the
attacker.

Solutions and Mitigations
Protect environment variables against unauthorized read and write access.
Protect the configuration files which contain environment variables against
illegitimate read and write access.
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list.
Apply the least privilege principles.

Parent Mitigation: AC, SM, SI
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attack

Attack Pattern ID: 14

Attack Pattern Name: Client-side Induction-induced Buffer Overflow (10)

Description
This type of attack exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in targeted client
software through injection of malicious content from a custom-built hostile
service.

Solutions and Mitigations
The client software should not install untrusted code from a non authenticated
server.
The client software should have the latest patches and should be audited for
vulnerabilities before being used to communicate with potentially hostile
servers.
Perform input validation for length of buffer inputs.
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete
solution.
Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the
Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides

Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, IA SA, SI, AU, CA, MA, RA, AT
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 15

Attack Pattern Name: Command Delimiters (4)

Description
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an
attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the
intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The
system that uses a filter or a blacklist input validation, as opposed to whitelist
validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations
of delimiters) not present in the filter or blacklist. As with other injection
attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to
tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL
queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Perform whitelist validation against a positive specification for
command length, type, and parameters.
Design: Limit program privileges, so if commands circumvent program input
validation or filter routines then commands do not running under a privileged
account
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Use type conversions such as JDBC prepared statements.

Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, SA, RA
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques

Attack Pattern ID: 16

Attack Pattern Name Dictionary-based Password Attack (10)

Description
An attacker tries each of the words in a dictionary as passwords to gain access
to the system via some user's account. If the password chosen by the user was
a word within the dictionary, this attack will be successful (in the absence of
other mitigations). This is a specific instance of the password brute forcing
attack pattern.

Solutions and Mitigations
Create a strong password policy and ensure that your system enforces this
policy.
Implement an intelligent password throttling mechanism. Care must be taken
to assure that these mechanisms do not excessively enable account lockout
attacks such as CAPEC-02.

Parent Mitigation: AC, AT, AU, CA, CM, IA, MP, PL, PS, SI
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust

Attack Pattern ID: 17

Attack Pattern Name: Accessing, Modifying or Executing Executable Files (3)

Description
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an attacker
to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or
in a possible worst case allows an attacker to upload a file and then execute it.
Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which
have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the
programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces
and the correct privileges for each interface.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or utilize chroot
jails or other configuration techniques to constrain privileges even if attacker
gains some limited access to commands.
Implementation: Perform testing such as pentesting and vulnerability scanning
to identify directories, programs, and interfaces that grant direct access to
executables.

Parent Mitigation: AC, AU,IA
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 18

Attack Pattern Name Embedding Scripts in Nonscript Elements (5)

Description
This attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where malicious scripts are
embedded in elements that are not expected to host scripts such as image tags
(<img>), comments in XML documents (< !-CDATA->), etc. These tags may
not be subject to the same input validation, output validation, and other content
filtering and checking routines, so this can create an opportunity for an attacker
to tunnel through the application's elements and launch a XSS attack through
other elements.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.
Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized
against an acceptable content specification.
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in browser
Implementation: Session tokens for specific host
Implementation: Service provider should not use the XMLHttpRequest method
to create a local proxy for content from other sites, because the client will not
be able to discern what content comes from which host.

Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, SC, IA, MP
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID 19

Attack Pattern Name: Embedding Scripts within Scripts (6)

Description
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on
by allowing remote hosts to execute scripts. The attacker leverages this
capability to execute scripts to execute his/her own script by embedding it
within other scripts that the target software is likely to execute. The attacker
must have the ability to inject script into script that is likely to be executed. If
this is done, then the attacker can potentially launch a variety of probes and
attacks against the web server's local environment, in many cases the so-called
DMZ, back end resources the web server can communicate with, and other
hosts.
Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.
Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement
Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR or other
means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the server side, the client's
browser has no way of discerning where the data is originating from.
Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized
against an acceptable content specification.
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in browser
Implementation: Session tokens for specific host
Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on
the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service
packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies, staying current on
patch release that deal with XSS countermeasures mitigates this.
Implementation: Privileges are constrained, if a script is loaded, ensure system
runs in chroot jail or other limited authority mode

Parent Mitigation: PL, SC, AC, RA, AC, SI
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Parent Threat: Probalistic Techniques

Attack Pattern ID: 20

Attack Pattern Name: Encryption Brute Forcing(4)

Description
An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used,
performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the
key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.

Solutions and Mitigations:
In theory a brute force attack performing an exhausitve keyspace search will
always succeed, so the goal is to have computational security. Moore's law
needs to be taken into account that suggests that computing resources double
every eighteen months.

Parent Mitigations: AC, IA, PS, SC
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Authentication

Attack Pattern ID: 21

Attack Pattern Name: Exploitation of Session ID‟s and Resource ID‟s and
other trusted credentials (3)

Description:
Attacks on session IDs and resource IDs take advantage of the fact that some
software accepts user input without verifying its authenticity.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: utilize strong federated identity such as SAML to encrypt and sign
identity tokens in transit.
Implementation: Use industry standards session key generation mechanisms
that utilize high amount of entropy to generate the session key. Many standard
web and application servers will perform this task on your behalf.

Parent Mitigations: AC, IA, SC
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust

Attack Pattern ID: 22

Attack Pattern Name: Exploiting Trust in Client {aka client invisible} (3)

Description
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities in client/server
communication channel authentication and data integrity.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Ensure that client process and/or message is authenticated so that
anonymous communications and/or messages are not accepted by the system.

Parent Mitigation: AC, IA, SC
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 23

Attack Pattern Name: File System Function Injection, Content Based (7)

Description
An attack of this type exploits the host's trust in executing remote content
including binary files. The files are poisoned with a malicious payload
(targeting the file systems accessible by the target software) by the attacker and
may be passed through standard channels such as via email, and standard web
content like PDF and multimedia files. The attacker exploits known
vulnerabilities or handling routines in the target processes.

Solutions and Mitigations
Enforce principle of least privilege
Validate all input for content including files. Execute programs with
constrained privileges, so parent process does not open up further
vulnerabilities.
Proxy communication to host, so that communications are terminated at the
proxy, sanitizing the requests before forwarding to server host.
Virus scanning on host

AC, CA, CM, CP, SI, SC, IR
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks

Attack Pattern ID: 24

Attack Pattern Name: Filter Failure Through Buffer Overflow (3)

Description
In this attack, the idea is to cause an active filter to fail by causing an oversized
transaction. An attacker may try to feed overly long input strings to the
program in an attempt to overwhelm the filter (by causing a buffer overflow)
and hoping that the filter does not fail securely (i.e. lets the user input into the
system unfiltered).

Solutions and MItigations
Make sure that ANY failure occurring in the filtering or input validation
routine is properly handled and that offending input is NOT allowed to go
through. Basically make sure that the vault is closed when failure occurs.
Pre-design: Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds
checking.
Pre-design through Build: Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as
StackGuard, ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this
provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution.
Operational: Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.
Design: Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete
solution.

Parent Mitigation: IR, SI, CM
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Parent Threat: Time and State Attacks

Attack Pattern ID: 25

Attack Pattern Name: Forced Deadlock (2)

Description
Attackers aware that more data is being fed into a multicast or public
information distribution means can 'select' information bound only for another
client, even if the distribution means itself forces users to authenticate in order
to connect initally.
Doing so allows the attacker to gain access to possibly privileged information,
possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by
impersonation.
If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output
mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could
change its identifier from a less privileged to more so privileged channel or
command.

Solutions and Mitigations
Use known algorithm to avoid deadlock condition (for instance non-blocking
synchronization algorithms).
For competing actions use well known libraries which implement
synchronization

Parent Mitigation: SC, SI
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Parent Threat: Time and State Attacks

Attack Pattern ID: 26

Attack Pattern Name: Leveraging Race Conditions (5)

Description
This attack targets a race condition occurring when multiple processes access
and manipulate the same resource concurrently and the outcome of the
execution depends on the particular order in which the access takes place. The
attacker can leverage a race condition by "running the race", modifying the
resource and modifying the normal execution flow. For instance a race
condition can occur while accessing a file, the attacker can trick the system by
replacing the original file with his version and cause the system to read the
malicious file.

Solutions and Mitigations
Use safe libraries to access resources such as files.
Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as chown(),
tempfile(), chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition.
Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.
Use static analysis tools to find race conditions.
Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of resources.

Parent Mitigation: AC,MP,SA,SI,CM
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Parent Threat: Time and State Attack

Attack Pattern ID: 27

Attack Pattern Name: Leveraging Race Conditions via Symbolic Links (4)

Description
This attack leverages the use of symbolic links (Symlinks) in order to write to
sensitive files. An attacker can create a Symlink link to a target file not
otherwise accessible.

Solutions and Mitigations
1. Use safe libraries when creating temporary files. For instance the standard
library function mkstemp can be used to safely create temporary files. For shell
scripts, the system utility mktemp does the same thing.
2.Access to the directories should be restricted as to prevent attackers from
manipulating the files. Denying access to a file can prevent an attacker from
replacing that file with a link to a sensitive file.
3.Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to files.
4.Ensure good compartmentalization in the system to provide protected areas
that can be trusted.

Parent Mitigation: AC, MP, SI
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques

Attack Pattern ID: 28

Attack Pattern Name: Fuzzing (4)

Description
Fuzzing is a software testing method that feeds randomly constructed input to
the system and looks for an indication that a failure in response to that input
has occured. Fuzzing treats the system as a blackbox and is totally free from
any preconceptions or assumptions about the system.

Solutions and Mitigations
1. Test to ensure that the software behaves as per specification and that there
are no unintended side effects. Ensure that no assumptions about the validity of
data are made.
2. Use fuzz testing during the software QA process to uncover any surprises,
uncover any assumptions or unexpected behavior.

Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, SA, RA
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Parent Threat: Time and State Attacks

Attack Pattern ID: 29

Attack Pattern Name: Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use
(TOCTOU) Race Conditions (8)

Description
This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time of check (state)
for a resource and the time of use of a resource. The typical example is the file
access. The attacker can leverage a file access race condition by "running the
race", meaning that he would modify the resource between the first time the
target program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file.
During that period of time, the attacker could do something such as replace the
file and cause an escalation of privilege.

Solutions and Mitigations
Use safe libraries to access resources such as files.
Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as chown(),
tempfile(), chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition.
Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.
Use static analysis tools to find race conditions.
Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of resources.

Parent Mitigation: AC, AU, CM, MP, RA, SA, SC, SI
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust

Attack Pattern ID: 30

Attack Pattern Name: Hijacking a Privileged Thread of Execution (3)

Description
Attackers can sometimes hijack a privileged thread from the underlying system
through synchronous (calling a privileged function that returns incorrectly) or
asynchronous (callbacks, signal handlers, and similar) means.

Solutions and Mitigations
1. Application Architects must be careful to design callback, signal, and
similar asynchronous constructs such that they shed excess privilege prior to
handing control to user-written (thus untrusted) code.
2. Application Architects must be careful to design privileged code blocks such
that upon return (successful, failed, or unpredicted) that privilege is shed prior
to leaving the block/scope.

Parent Mitigation: CM, AC, SA
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks

Attack Pattern ID: 31

Attack Pattern Name: Accessing / Intercepting / Modifying HTTP Cookies (3)

Description
This attack relies on the use of HTTP Cookies to store credentials, state
information and other critical data on client systems. The first form of this
attack involves accessing HTTP Cookies to mine for potentially sensitive data
contained therein. The second form of this attack involves intercepting this
data as it is transmitted from client to server. The third form is when the
cookie‟s content is modified by the attacker before it is sent back to the server.

Solutions and Mitigations
Use input validation for cookies
Generate and validate MAC for cookies
Use SSL/TLS to protect cookie in transit
Ensure the web server implements all relevant security patches, many
exploitable buffer overflows are fixed in patches issued for the software.

Parent Mitigation: SI, SC, CA
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 32

Attack Pattern Name: Embedding Scripts in HTTP Query Strings (4)

Description:
A variant of cross-site scripting called "reflected" cross-site scripting, the
HTTP Query Strings attack consists of passing a malicious script inside an
otherwise valid HTTP request query string. This is of significant concern for
sites that rely on dynamic, user-generated content such as bulletin boards,
news sites, blogs, and web enabled administration GUIs. The malicious script
may steal session data, browse history, probe files, or otherwise execute
attacks on the client side. Once the attacker has prepared the malicious HTTP
query it is sent to a victim user (perhaps by email, IM, or posted on an online
forum), who clicks on a normal looking link that contains a poison query
string. This technique can be made more effective through the use of services
like http://tinyurl.com/, which makes very small URLs that will redirect to
very large, complex ones. The victim will not know what he is really clicking
on.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.
Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement
Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR or other
means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the server side, the client's
browser has no way of discerning where the data is originating from.
Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized
against an acceptable content specification.
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content, including
remote and user-generated content
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in browser
Implementation: Session tokens for specific host
Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on
the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service
packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies
Implementation: Privileges are constrained, if a script is loaded, ensure system
runs in chroot jail or other limited authority mode

Parent Mitigation: SI, AC, CM, AU
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 33

Attack Pattern Name: HTTP Request Smuggling (3)

Description
HTTP Request Smuggling results from the discrepancies in parsing HTTP
requests between HTTP entities such as web caching proxies or application
firewalls. Entities such as web servers, web caching proxies, application
firewalls or simple proxies often parse HTTP requests in slightly different
ways. Under specific situations where there are two or more such entities in the
path of the HTTP request, a specially crafted request is seen by two attacked
entities as two different sets of requests. This allows certain requests to be
smuggled through to a second entity without the first one realizing it.

Solutions and Mitigations
HTTP Request Smuggling is usually targeted at web servers. Therefore, in
such cases, careful analysis of the entities must occur during system design
prior to deployment. If there are known differences in the way the entities
parse HTTP requests, the choice of entities needs consideration.
Employing an application firewall can help. However, there are instances of
the firewalls being susceptible to HTTP Request Smuggling as well.

Parent Mitigation: SA, SI, SC
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 34

Attack Pattern Name: HTTP Response Splitting (2)

Description
This attack uses a maliciously-crafted HTTP request in order to cause a
vulnerable web server to respond with an HTTP response stream that will be
interpreted by the client as two separate responses instead of one. This is
possible when user-controlled input is used unvalidated as part of the response
headers. The target software, the client, will interpret the injected header as
being a response to a second request, thereby causing the maliciously-crafted
contents be displayed and possibly cached.

Solutions and Mitigations
To avoid HTTP Response Splitting, the application must not rely on usercontrollable input to form part of its output response stream. Specifically,
response splitting occurs due to injection of CR-LF sequences and additional
headers. All data arriving from the user and being used as part of HTTP
response headers must be subjected to strict validation that performs simple
character-based as well as semantic filtering to strip it of malicious character
sequences and headers.

Parent Mitigation: SI, SC
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID 35

Attack Pattern Name: Leverage Executable Code in Nonexecutable Files (4)

Description
An attack of this type exploits a system's trust in configuration and resource
files, when the executable loads the resource (such as an image file or
configuration file) the attacker has modified the file to either execute malicious
code directly or manipulate the target process (e.g. application server) to
execute based on the malicious configuration parameters. Since systems are
increasingly interrelated mashing up resources from local and remote sources
the possibility of this attack occurring is high.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or utilize chroot
jails or other configuration techniques to constrain privileges even if attacker
gains some limited access to commands.
Implementation: Perform testing such as pentesting and vulnerability scanning
to identify directories, programs, and interfaces that grant direct access to
executables.
Implementation: Implement host integrity monitoring to detect any unwanted
altering of configuration files.
Implementation: Ensure that files that are not required to execute, such as
configuration files, are not over-privileged, i.e. not allowed to execute.

Parent Mitigation: AC, CA, CP, CM
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality

Attack Pattern ID 36

Attack Pattern Name: Using Unpublished Web Service APIs (5)

Description
An attacker searches for and invokes Web Services APIs that the target system
designers did not intend to be publicly available. If these APIs fail to
authenticate requests the attacker may be able to invoke services and/or gain
privileges they are not authorized for.

Solutions and Mitigations
Authenticating both services and their discovery, and protecting that
authentication mechanism simply fixes the bulk of this problem. Protecting the
authentication involves the standard means, including: 1) protecting the
channel over which authentication occurs, 2) preventing the theft, forgery, or
prediction of authentication credentials or the resultant tokens, or 3) subversion
of password reset and the like.

Parent Mitigation: AC, CA, CM, IA, SC
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust

Attack Pattern ID 37

Attack Pattern Name: Lifting Data Embedded in Client Distributions (4)

Description
An attacker can resort to stealing data embedded in client distributions or client
code in order to gain certain information. This information can reveal
confidential contents, such as account numbers, or can be used as an
intermediate step in a larger attack (such as by stealing keys/credentials).

Solutions and Mitigations
Never Use Unvalidated Input as Part of a Directive to any Internal Component
Treat the Entire Inherited Process Context as Unvalidated Input
Use Well-Known Cryptography Appropriately and Correctly

Parent Mitigation: AC, IA, SC, SI
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Parent Threat: Spoofing

Attack Pattern ID: 38

Attack Pattern Name: Leveraging/Manipulating Configuration File Search
Paths (8)

Description
This attack loads a malicious resource into a program's standard path used to
bootstrap and/or provide contextual information for a program like a path
variable or classpath. J2EE applications and other component based
applications that are built from mutliple binaries can have very long list of
dependencies to execute. If one of these libraries and/or references is
controllable by the attacker then application controls can be circumvented by
the attacker.
A standard UNIX path looks similar to this
/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
If the attacker modifies the path variable to point to a locale that includes
malicious resources then the user unwittingly can execute commands on the
attacker's behalf:
/evildir/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
This is a form of usurping control of the program and the attack can be done on
the classpath, database resources, or any other resources built from compound
parts. At runtime detection and blocking of this attack is nearly impossible,
because the configuration allows execution.

Solutions and Mitigations
Enforce principle of least privilege
Ensure that the program's compound parts, including all system dependencies,
classpath, path, and so on, are secured to the same or higher level assurance as
the program
Host integrity monitoring

Parent Mitigation: AC, AU, CA, CM, MP, RA, SC, SI
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques

Attack Pattern ID: 39

Attack Pattern Name: Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens (6)

Description
In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in
tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If
client
or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication
tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even
opaquely manipulating
that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines
the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from
tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation.

Solutions and Mitigations
One solution to this problem is to protect encrypted data with a CRC of some
sort. If knowing who last manipulated the data is important, then using a
cryptographic "message authentication code" (or hMAC) is prescribed.
However, this guidance is not a panecea. In particular, any value created by
(and therefore encrypted by) the client, which itself is a "malicous" value, all
the protective cryptography in the world can't make the value 'correct' again.
Put simply, if the client has control over the whole process of generating and
encoding the value--then simply protecting its integrity doesn't help.
Make sure to protect client side authentication tokens for confidentiality
(encryption) and integrity (signed hash)
Make sure that all session tokens use a good source of randomness
Perform validation on the server side to make sure that client side data tokens
are consistent with what is expected.

Parent Mitigation: AU, IA, SI, CM, SA, SC
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 40

Attack Pattern Name: Manipulating Writeable Terminal Devices (2)

Description
This attack exploits terminal devices that allow themselves to be written to by
other users. The attacker sends command strings to the target terminal device
hoping that the target user will hit enter and thereby execute the malicious
command with their privileges. The attacker can send the results (such as
copying /etc/passwd) to a known directory and collect once the attack has
succeeded

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Ensure that terminals are only writeable by named owner user and/or
administrator
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege

Parent Mitigation: IA AC
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 41

Attack Pattern Name: Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject
Malicious Payloads (4)
Description
This type of attack involves an attacker leveraging meta-characters in email
headers to inject improper behavior into email programs.
Email software has become increasingly sophisticated and feature-rich. In
addition, email applications are ubiquitous and connected directly to the Web
making them ideal targets to launch and propagate attacks. As the user demand
for new functionality in email applications grows, they become more like
browsers with complex rendering and plug in routines. As more email
functionality is included and abstracted from the user, this creates
opportunities for attackers. Virtually all email applications do not list email
header information by default, however the email header contains valuable
attacker vectors for the attacker to exploit particularly if the behavior of the
email client application is known. Meta-characters are hidden from the user,
but can containt scripts, enumerations, probes, and other attacks against the
user's system.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Perform validation on email header data
Implementation: Implement email filtering solutions on mail server or on
MTA, relay server.
Implementation: Mail servers that perform strict validation may catch these
attacks, because metacharacters are not allowed in many header variables such
as dns names

Parent Mitigation: AU, IA, SC, SI
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks

Attack Pattern ID: 42

Attack Pattern Name: MIME Conversion (4)

Description
An attacker exploits a weakness in the MIME conversion routine to cause a
buffer overflow and gain control over the mail server machine. The MIME
system is designed to allow various different information formats to be
interpreted and sent via e-mail. Attack points exist when data are converted to
MIME compatible format and back.

Solutions and Mitigations
Stay up to date with third party vendor patches
Disable the 7 to 8 bit conversion. This can be done by removing the F=9 flag
from all Mailer specifications in the sendmail.cf file.
Use the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh)
Use mail.local

Parent Mitigation: SI, RA, CM, AT
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 43

Attack Pattern Name: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers (1)

Description
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences
of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit
relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing
a “layer” of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can
disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with
layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent
processing steps.

Solutions and Mitigations
An iterative approach to input validation may be required to ensure that no
dangerous characters are present. It may be necessary to implement redundant
checking across different input validation layers. Ensure that invalid data is
rejected as soon as possible and do not continue to work with it.
Make sure to perform input validation on canonicalized data (i.e. data that is
data in its most standard form). This will help avoid tricky encodings getting
past the filters.
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all valid input to
the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does
not match against the white list should not be permitted to enter into the
system.

Parent Mitigation: SI
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks

Attack Pattern ID: 44

Attack Pattern Name: Overflow Binary Resource File (6)

Description
An attack of this type exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in the handling
of binary resources. Binary resources may includes music files like MP3,
image files like JPEG files, and any other binary file. These attacks may pass
unnoticed to the client machine through normal usage of files, such as a
browser loading a seemingly innocent JPEG file. This can allow the attacker
access to the execution stack and execute arbitrary code in the target process.
This attack pattern is a variant of standard buffer overflow attacks using an
unexpected vector (binary files) to wrap its attack and open up a new attack
vector. The attacker is required to either directly serve the binary content to the
victim, or place it in a locale like a MP3 sharing application, for the victim to
download. The attacker then is notified upon the download or otherwise
locates the vulnerability opened up by the buffer overflow.

Solutions and Mitigations
Perform appropriate bounds checking on all buffers.
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
Design: Static code analysis
Implementation: Execute program in less trusted process space environment,
do not allow lower integrity processes to write to higher integrity processes
Implementation: Keep software patched to ensure that known vulnerabilities
are not available for attackers to target on host.

Parent Mitigation: CA, MA, AC, RA, SC, SI
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks

Attack Patten ID: 45

Attack Pattern Name: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links (7)

Description
This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer
overflows. An attacker can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such
that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software
processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers
with insufficient bounds checking.

Solutions and Mitigations
Enforce principle of least privilege
Protect files, secure location (of files), encryption
Data sanitization
Abstraction, obfuscation, library checking

Parent Mitigations: AC, AU, CA, CM, MP, SI, SC
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks

Attack Pattern ID: 46

Attack Pattern Name: Overflow Variables and Tags (4)

Description
This type of attack leverages the use of tags or variables from a formatted
configuration data to cause buffer overflow. The attacker crafts a malicious
HTML page or configuration file that includes oversized strings, thus causing
an overflow.

Solutions and Mitigations
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete
solution.
Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the
Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds
checking, it is not a complete solution.
Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.
Do not trust input data from user. Validate all user input.

Parent Mitigation: SC,AC,SI,RA
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks

Attack Pattern ID: 47

Attack Pattern Name: Buffer Overflow via Parameter Expansion (5)

Description
In this attack, the target software is given input that the attacker knows will be
modified and expanded in size during processing. This attack relies on the
target software failing to anticipate that the expanded data may exceed some
internal limit, thereby creating a buffer overflow.

Solutions and Mitigations
Ensure that when parameter expansion happens in the code that the
assumptions used to determine the resulting size of the parameter are accurate
and that the new size of the parameter is visible to the whole system

Parent Mitigation: CP, CM, CA, PL, SC
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality

Attack Pattern ID: 48

Attack Pattern Name: Passing Local Filenames to Functions That Expect a
URL (4)

Description
This attack relies on client side code to access local files and resources instead
of URLs. When the client browser is expecting a URL string, but instead
receives a request for a local file, that execution is likely to occur in the
browser process space with the browser's authority to local files. The attacker
can send the results of this request to the local files out to a site that they
control. This attack may be used to steal sensitive authentication data (either
local or remote), or to gain system profile information to launch further
attacks.

Solutions and Mitigations
Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized
against an acceptable content specification.
Implementation: Ensure all configuration files and resource are either removed
or protected when promoting code into production.
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in browser

Parent Mitigation: SI, CM, SA, SC
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques

Attack Pattern ID: 49

Attack Pattern Name: Password Brute Forcing (4)

Description
In this attack, the attacker tries every possible value for a password until they
succeed. A brute force attack, if feasible computationally, will always be
successful because it will essentially go through all possible passwords given
the alphabet used (lower case letters, upper case letters, numbers, symbols,
etc.) and the maximum length of the password.
A system will be particularly vulnerable to this type of an attack if it does not
have a proper enforcement mechanism in place to ensure that passwords
selected by users are strong passwords that comply with an adequate password
policy.
In practice a pure brute force attack on passwords is rarely used, unless the
password is suspected to be weak. Other password cracking methods exist that
are far more effective (e.g. dictionary attacks, rainbow tables, etc.).

Solutions and Mitigations
Implement a password throttling mechanism. This mechanism should take into
account both the IP address and the log in name of the user.
Put together a strong password policy and make sure that all user created
passwords comply with it. Alternatively automatically generate strong
passwords for users.
Passwords need to be recycled to prevent aging, that is every once in a while a
new password must be chosen.

Parent Mitigation: IA, AC, CM, SC
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques

Attack Pattern ID: 50

Attack Pattern Name Dictionary-based Password Attack (10)

Description
An attacker may take advantage of the application feature to help users recover
their forgotten passwords in order to gain access into the system with the same
privileges as the original user. Generally password recovery schemes tend to
be weak and insecure. Most of them use only one security question . For
instance, mother's maiden name tends to be a fairly popular
one. Unfortunately in many cases this information is not very hard to find,
especially if the attacker knows the legitimate user.
These generic security questions are also re-used across many applications,
thus making them even more insecure. An attacker could for instance overhear
a coworker talking to a bank representative at the work place and supplying
their mother's maiden name for verification purposes. An attacker can then try
to log in into one of the victim's accounts, click on "forgot password" and there
is a good chance that the security question there will be to provide mother's
maiden name.
A weak password recovery scheme totally undermines the effectiveness of a
strong password scheme.

Solutions and Mitigations
Use multiple security questions (e.g. have three and make the user answer two
of them correctly). Let the user select their own security questions or provide
them with choices of questions that are not generic.
E-mail the temporary password to the registered e-mail address of the user
rather than letting the user reset the password online.
Ensure that your password recovery functionality is not vulnerable to an
injection style attack.

Parent Mitigation: IA, SA
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 51

Attack Pattern Name: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links (7)

Description:
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema
information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect
(think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service
provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata (to effect a
denial of service), and delete information about service provider interfaces.
WS-Addressing is used to virtualize services, provide return addresses and
other routing information, however, unless the WS-Addressing headers are
protected they are vulnerable to rewriting. The attacker that can rewrite WSaddressing information gains the ability to route service requesters to any
service providers, and the ability to route service provider response to any
service.
Content in a registry is deployed by the service provider. The registry in an
SOA or Web Services system can be accessed by the service requester via
UDDI or other protocol. The basic flow for the attacker consists of either
altering the data at rest in the registry or uploading malicious content by
spoofing a service provider. The service requester is then redirected to send its
requests and/or responses to services the attacker controls.

Solutions and Mitigations:
Enforce principle of least privilege
Harden registry server and file access permissions
Implement communications to and from the registry using secure protocols

Parent Mitigations: AC, AU, CA, CM, MP, SI, SC
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 52

Attack Pattern Name: Embedding NULL Bytes (1)

Description
An attacker embeds one or more null bytes in input to the target software. This
attack relies on the usage of a null-valued byte as a string terminator in many
environments. The goal is for certain components of the target software to stop
processing the input when it encounters the null byte(s).

Solutions and Mitigations
Properly handle the NULL characters supplied as part of user input prior to
doing anything with the data.

Parent Mitigation: SI
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 53

Attack Pattern Name: Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash (3)

Description:
If a string is passed through a filter of some kind, then a terminal NULL may
not be valid. Using alternate representation of NULL allows an attacker to
embed the NULL midstring while postfixing the proper data so that the filter is
avoided. One example is a filter that looks for a trailing slash character. If a
string insertion is possible, but the slash must exist, an alternate encoding of
NULL in midstring may be used.

Solutions and Mitigations:
Properly handle Null characters. Make sure canonicalization is properly
applied. Do not pass Null characters to the underlying APIs.
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all valid input to
the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does
not match against the white list should not be permitted to enter into the
system.

Parent Mitigation: SI, AC, CM
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Parent Threat: Data Leakage Attacks

Attack Pattern ID: 54

Attack Pattern Name: Probing an Application Through Targeting its Error
Reporting (2)

Description
An attacker, aware of an application's location (and possibly authorized to use
the application) can probe the application's structure and evaluate its
robustness by probing its error conditions (not unlike one would during a 'fuzz'
test, but more purposefully here) in order to support attacks such as blind SQL
injection, or for the more general task of mapping the application to mount
another subsequent attack.

Solutions and Mitigations
Application designers can construct a 'code book' for error messages. When
using a code book, application error messages aren't generated in string or
stack trace form, but are cataloged and replaced with a unique (often integerbased) value 'coding' for the error. Such a technique will require helpdesk and
hosting personnel to use a 'code book' or similar mapping to decode
application errors/logs in order to respond to them normally.
Application designers can wrap application functionality (preferably through
the underlying framework) in an output encoding scheme that obscures or
cleanses error messages to prevent such attacks. Such a technique is often used
in conjunction with the above 'code book' suggestion.

Parent Mitigation: SC, SI
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques

Attack Pattern ID: 55

Attack Pattern Name: Rainbow Table Password Cracking (3)

Description
An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of passwords are
stored. He then uses a rainbow table of precomputed hash chains to attempt to
look up the original password. Once the original password corresponding to
the hash is obtained, the attacker uses the original password to gain access to
the system.
A password rainbow table stores hash chains for various passwords. A
password chain is computed, starting from the original password, P, via a a
reduce(compression) function R and a hash function H. A recurrence relation
exists where Xi+1 = R(H(Xi)), X0 = P. Then the hash chain of length n for
the original password P can be formed: X1, X2, X3, ... , Xn-2, Xn-1, Xn,
H(Xn). P and H(Xn) are then stored together in the rainbow table.
Constructing the rainbow tables takes a very long time and is computationally
expensive. A separate table needs to be constrcuted for the various hash
algorithms (e.g. SHA1, MD5, etc.). However, once a rainbow table is
computed, it can be very effective in cracking the passwords that have been
hashed without the use of salt.

Solutions and Mitigations
Use salt when computing password hashes. That is, concatenate the salt
(random bits) with the original password prior to hashing it.

Parent Mitigation: SI, SC, IA
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust

Attack Pattern ID 56

Attack Pattern Name: Removing/short-circuiting 'guard logic' (2)

Description
Attackers can, in some cases, get around logic put in place to 'guard' sensitive
functionality or data.
The attack may involve gaining access to and calling protected functionality
(or accessing protected data) directly, may involve subverting some aspect of
the guard's implementation, or outright removal of the guard, if possible.

Solutions and Mitigations
Use Authentication Mechanisms, Where Appropriate, Correctly
Use Authorization Mechanisms Correctly

Parent Mitigation: AC, IA
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Parent Threat: Spoofing

Attack Pattern ID: 57

Attack Pattern Name: Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to
Register Man in the Middle (3)
Description
This attack utlizes a Rest(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications'
trust in the system resources and environment to place man in the middle once
SSL is terminated. Rest applications premise is that they leverage existing
infrastructure to deliver web services functionality.

Solutions and Mitigations
Implementation: Implement message level security such as HMAC in the
HTTP communication
Design: Utilize defense in depth, do not rely on a single security mechanism
like SSL
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege

SA, SI, AC
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust

Attack Pattern ID 58

Attack Pattern Name: Restful Privilege Elevation (3)

Description
Rest uses standard HTTP (Get, Put, Delete) style permissions methods, but
these are not necessarily correlated generally with back end programs. Strict
interpretation of HTTP get methods means that these HTTP Get services
should not be used to delete information on the server, but there is no access
control mechanism to back up this logic. This means that unless the services
are properly ACL'd and the application's service implementation are following
these guidelines then an HTTP request can easily execute a delete or update on
the server side.
The attacker identifies a HTTP Get URL such as http://victimsite/updateOrder,
which calls out to a program to update orders on a database or other resource.
The URL is not idempotent so the request can be submitted multiple times by
the attacker, additionally, the attacker may be able to exploit the URL
published as a Get method that actually performs updates (instead of merely
retrieving data). This may result in malicious or inadvertant altering of data on
the server.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege
Implementation: Ensure that HTTP Get methods only retrieve state and do not
alter state on the server side
Implementation: Ensure that HTTP methods have proper ACLs based on what
the funcitonality they expose

Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, SI
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Authentication

Attack Pattern ID: 59

Attack Pattern Name: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction (3)

Description
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The
attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform
spoofing and session hijacking.

Solutions and Mitigations
Use a strong source of randomness to generate a session ID.
Use adequate length session IDs.
Do not use information available to the user in order to generate session ID
(e.g., time)…
Encrypt the session ID if you expose it to the user. For instance session ID can
be stored in a cookie in encrypted format.

Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, SC
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Authentication

Attack Pattern ID: 60

Attack Pattern Name: Reusing Session ID‟s (6)

Description
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in
order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used
previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.

Solutions and Mitigations
Always invalidate a session ID after the user logout.
Setup a session time out for the session IDs.
Protect the communication between the client and server. For instance it is best
practice to use SSL to mitigate man in the middle attack.
Do not code send session ID with GET method, otherwise the session ID will
be copied to the URL. In general avoid writing session IDs in the URLs. URLs
can get logged in log files, which are vulnerable to an attacker.
Encrypt the session data associated with the session ID.
Use multifactor authentication.

Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, PS, SC, IA, SA
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Authentication

Attack Pattern ID: 61

Attack Pattern Name: Session Fixation (3)

Description
The attacker induces a client to establish a session with the target software
using a session identifier provided by the attacker. Once the user successfully
authenticates to the target software, the attacker uses the (now privileged)
session identifier in their own transactions

Solutions and Mitigations
Use a strict session management mechanism that only accepts locally
generated session identifiers of their own choice.
Regenerate and destroy session identifiers when there is a change in the level
of privilege:
Use session identifiers that are difficult to guess or brute-force:

Parent Mitigation: AC, IA, SC
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Authentication

Attack Pattern ID: 62

Attack Pattern Name: Cross Site Request Forgery (aka Session Riding) (6)

Description
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages,
email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on
the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application.
If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and
accepted by the targeted application with the users‟ privilege level.
This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in
user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture,
once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on
the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated
using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply
"riding" the existing session cookie.

Solutions and Mitigations
Use cryptographic tokens to associate a request with a specific action. The
token can be regenerated at every request so that if a request with an invalid
token is encountered, it can be reliably discarded. The token is considered
invalid if it arrived with a request other than the action it was supposed to be
associated with.
Although less reliable, the use of the optional HTTP Referer header can also be
used to determine whether an incoming request was actually one that the user
is authorized for, in the current context.
Additionally, the user can also be prompted to confirm an action every time an
action concerning potentially sensitive data is invoked. This way, even if the
attacker manages to get the user to click on a malicious link and request the
desired action, the user has a chance to recover by denying confirmation. This
solution is also implicitly tied to using a second factor of authentication before
performing such actions.
In general, every request must be checked for the appropriate authentication
token as well as authorization in the current session context.

AC, CA, CM, IA, SC, SI
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 63

Attack Pattern Name: Simple Script Injection (5)

Description
An attacker embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web
browsers. The goal of the attack is for the target software, the client-side
browser, to execute the script with the users‟ privilege level.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.
Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement
Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR or other
means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the server side, the client's
browser has no way of discerning where the data is originating from.
Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized
against an acceptable content specification.
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Session tokens for specific host
Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on
the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service
packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies, staying current on
patch release that deal with XSS countermeasures mitigates this.

Parent Mitigation: CM, SI, SC, MP, AC
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 64

Attack Pattern Name: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass
Validation Logic (3)

Description:
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the
slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple way of
encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. An URL may
contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be
interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character
followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character
(%HEX-CODE).

Solutions and Mitigations
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all valid input to
the software system based on the requirements specifications.
When client input is required from web-based forms, avoid using the “GET”
method to submit data
Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded and
validated as correct data format

Parent Mitigation: SI, AC, CM
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Parent Threat: Data Leakage Attacks

Attack Pattern ID: 65

Attack Pattern Name: Passively Sniff and Capture Application Code
Bound for Authorized Client (7)

Descriptions
Attackers can capture application code bound for the client and can use it, as-is
or through reverse-engineering, to glean sensitive information or exploit the
trust relationship between the client and server.
Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied
to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to
communicate with the server.

Solutions and Mitigations
Do not store secrets in client code
All potentially sensitive data, including code, transmitted to the client must be
encrypted

Parent Mitigations: AT, SA, SC, SI, CA, IA, PL
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 66

Attack Pattern Name: SQL Injection (3)

Description
This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on
user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software
constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement
performs actions other than those the application intended.

Solutions and Mitigations
Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be validated and
filtered for illegal characters as well as SQL content. Keywords such as
UNION, SELECT or INSERT must be filtered in addition to characters such
as a single-quote(') or SQL-comments (--) based on the context in which they
appear.
Use of parameterized queries or stored procedures - Parameterization causes
the input to be restricted to certain domains, such as strings or integers, and
any input outside such domains is considered invalid and the query fails. Note
that SQL Injection is possible even in the presence of stored procedures if the
eventual query is constructed dynamically.
Use of custom error pages - Attackers can glean information about the nature
of queries from descriptive error messages. Input validation must be coupled
with customized error pages that inform about an error without disclosing
information about the database or application.

Parent Mitigation: SI, AC, MP
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks

Attack Pattern ID: 67

Attack Pattern Name: String Format Overflow in syslog() (2)

Description
This attack targets the format string vulnerabilities in the syslog() function. An
attacker would typically inject malicious input in the format string parameter
of the syslog function. This is a common problem, and many public
vulnerabilities and associated exploits have been posted.

Solutions and Mitigations
The code should be reviewed for misuse of the Syslog function call. Manual or
automated code review can be used. The reviewer needs to ensure that all
format string functions are passed a static string which cannot be controlled by
the user and that the proper number of arguments are always sent to that
function as well. If at all possible, do not use the %n operator in format strings.
The following code shows a correct usage of Syslog(): ... syslog(LOG_ERR,
"%s", cmdBuf); ... The following code shows a vulnerable usage of Syslog():
... syslog(LOG_ERR, cmdBuf); // the buffer cmdBuff is taking user supplied
data. ...

Parent Mitigation: SI, AC
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust

Attack Pattern ID: 68

Attack Pattern Name: Subvert Code-signing Facilities (1)

Description
Because languages use code signing facilities to vouch for code's identity and
to thus tie code to its assigned privileges within an environment, subverting
this mechanism can be instrumental in an attacker escalating privilege.
Any means of subverting the way that a virtual machine enforces code signing
classifies for this style of attack. This pattern does not include circumstances
through which a signing key has been stolen.

Solutions and Mitigations
A given code signing scheme may be fallible due to improper use of
cryptography
Avoid reliance on flags or environment variables that are user-controllable

Parent Mitigation: IA
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust

Attack Pattern ID: 69

Attack Pattern Name: Target Programs With Elevated Privileges (5)

Description
This attack targets programs running with elevated privileges. The attacker
would try to leverage a bug in the running program and get arbitrary code to
execute with elevated privileges. For instance an attacker would look for
programs that write to the system directories or registry keys (such as HKLM,
which stores a number of critical Windows environment variables).

Solutions and Mitigations
Apply the principle of least privilege.
Validate all untrusted data.
Apply the latest patches.
Scan your services and disable the ones which are not needed and are exposed
unnecessarily.
Avoid revealing information about your system (e.g., version of the program)
to anonymous users.
Make sure that your program or service fail safely.

Parent Mitigation: AC,SI,RA,PS,SC
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques

Attack Pattern ID: 70

Attack Pattern Name: Try Common (Default) Usernames and Passwords (2)

Description
An attacker may try certain common (default) usernames and passwords to
gain access into the system and perform unauthorized actions. An attacker may
try an intelligent brute force using known vendor default credentials as well as
a dictionary of common usernames and passwords.

Solutions and Mitigations
Delete all default account credentials that may be put in by the product vendor.
Implement a password throttling mechanism.
Put together a strong password policy and make sure that all user created
passwords comply with it.
Passwords need to be recycled to prevent aging, that is every once in a while a
new password must be chosen.

Parent Mitigation: AC,IA

315

Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 71

Attack Pattern Name: Using Unicode to Bypass Validation Logic (3)

Description
An attacker may provide a Unicode string to a system component that is not
Unicode aware and use that to circumvent the filter or cause the classifying
mechanism to fail to properly understanding the request. That may allow the
attacker to slip malicious data past the content filter and/or possibly cause the
application to route the request incorrectly.

Solutions and Mitigations
Ensure that the system is Unicode aware and can properly process Unicode
data. Do not make an assumption that data will be in ASCII.
Ensure that filtering or input validation is applied to canonical data
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all valid input to
the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does
not match against white list should not be permitted to enter the system.

Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, CM
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 72

Attack Pattern Name: URL encoding (8)

Description
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An attacker can take advantage of
the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
An URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in
order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage
character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original
character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be
represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percentencoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict
the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests
it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special
characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a
forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL
can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicodeencoding, etc. The attacker could also subvert the meaning of the URL string
request by encoding the data being sent to the server through a GET request.
For instance an attacker may subvert the meaning of parameters used in a SQL
request and sent through the URL string (See Example section).

Solutions and Mitigations
Refer to the RFCS to safely decode URL
Regular expression can be used to match safe URL patterns. May discard valid
patterns if too restrictive.
Tools available to scan HTTP requests to the server
Security checks should occur after data is decoded and validated for format.
Bad chars result in validation failure.
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list of acceptable input. Test it
yourself.
Be aware of alternative encoding such as IP encoding
In web-forms, avoid using “Get” and use “Post” when possible

Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, SA, SI, SC, CA, PL
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 73

Attack Pattern Name: User-controlled filename (4)

Description
An attack of this type involves an attacker inserting malicious characters (such
as a XSS redirection) into a filename, directly or indirectly that is then used by
the target software to generate HTML text or other potentially executable
content. Many websites rely on user-generated content and dynamically build
resources like files, filenames, and URL links directly from user supplied data.
In this attack pattern, the attacker uploads code that can execute in the client
browser and/or redirect the client browser to a site that the attacker owns. All
XSS attack payload variants can be used to pass and exploit these
vulnerabilities.

Solutions and Mitigations
Use browser technologies that do not allow client side script
Ensure all content delivered to client is sanitized
Validate input for all remote content
Validate output for all remote content
Disable scripts in browser
Scan dynamically generated content

Parent Mitigation: AC, CM, MP, SI
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Parent Threat: Time and State Attacks
Attack Pattern ID: 74

Attack Pattern Name: Manipulating User State (6)

Description
An attacker modifies state information maintained by the target software in
user-accessible locations. If successful, the target software will use this tainted
state information and execute in an unintended manner.
State management is an important function within an application. User state
maintained by the application can include usernames, payment information,
browsing history as well as application-specific contents such as items in a
shopping cart.
Manipulating user state can be employed by an attacker to elevate privilege,
conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow of the application
to derive certain benefits.

Solutions and Mitigations
Do not rely solely on user-controllable locations, such as cookies or URL
parameters, to maintain user state
Do not store sensitive information, such as usernames or authentication and
authorization information, in user-controllable locations.
At all times sensitive information that is part of the user state must be
appropriately protected to ensure confidentiality and integrity at each request

Parent Mitigation: CM, CP, IA, MP, SA, SC
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege/Trust

Attack Pattern ID: 75

Attack Pattern Name: Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files (6)

Description
An attacker modifies the contents of configuration files that influence/control
the operation of the target software.

Solutions and Mitigations
Enforce principle of least privilege
Backup copies of all configuration files
Integrity monitoring for configuration files
Enforce audit logging on code and configuration promotion procedures.
Load configuration from separate process and memory space, for example a
separate physical device like a CD

AC, CM, CP, CA, SI, AU

320

Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 76

Attack Pattern Name: Manipulating Input to File System Calls(4)

Description
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software
passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps
modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be
accessible.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Enforce principle of least privilege.
Design: Ensure all input is validated, and does not contain file system
commands
Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or utilize chroot
jails or other configuration techniques to constrain privileges even if attacker
gains some limited access to commands.
Design: For interactive user applications, consider if direct file system
interface is necessary, instead consider having the application proxy
communication.
Implementation: Perform testing such as pentesting and vulnerability scanning
to identify directories, programs, and interfaces that grant direct access to
executables.

Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, CM, RA
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 77

Attack Pattern Name: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables (4)

Descriptions
This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So
Forth). An attacker can override environment variables leveraging usersupplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server
without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the attacker can change
variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in
languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow
the user to override variables.

Solutions and Mitigations
Do not allow override of global variables and do Not Trust Global Variables.
A software system should be reluctant to trust variables that have been
initialized outside of its trust boundary. Ensure adequate checking is performed
when relying on input from outside a trust boundary.
Separate the presentation layer and the business logic layer.
Use encapsulation when declaring your variables.
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all valid input to
the software system based on the requirements specifications

Parent Threat: CM, SI, SC, AC
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 78

Attack Pattern Name: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding (5)

Description
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An attacker
can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe
that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick,
the attacker tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which
leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.

Solutions and Mitigations
Verify that the user-supplied data does not use backslash character to escape
malicious characters.
Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines all valid input to
the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does
not match against the white list should not be permitted to enter into the
system.
Be aware of the threat of alternative method of data encoding.
Regular expressions can be used to filter out backslash. Make sure you decode
before filtering and validating the untrusted input data.
In the case of path traversals, use the principle of least privilege when
determining access rights to file systems. Do not allow users to access
directories/files that they should not access.
Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded and
validated as correct data format. Do not repeat decoding process, if bad
character are left after decoding process, treat the data as suspicious, and fail
the validation process.
Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if those
resources can have alternate names.

Parent Mitigation: SI, MA, AC, CM, SC
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 79

Attack Pattern Name: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding (3)

Description
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An attacker would try
to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes
characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven
systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to
indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For
murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a
backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash.
The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to
understand both forms of the slash. This gives the attacker many opportunities
to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this
pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version,
but not the other.

Solutions and Mitigations
Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded and
validated as correct data format. When client input is required from web-based
forms, avoid using the “GET” method to submit data, as the method causes the
form data to be appended to the URL and is easily manipulated. Instead, use
the “POST method whenever possible. There are tools to scan HTTP requests
to the server for valid URL such as URLScan from Microsoft (http://
www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools/urlscan.mspx) Be aware of the
threat of alternative method of data encoding and obfuscation technique such
as IP address endoding. (Do not allow users to access directories/files that they
should not access.Assume all input is malicious. Create a white list that defines
all valid input to the application based on the requirements specifications.
Input that does not match against the white list should not be permitted to enter
into the system.

Parent Mitigation: SI, SC, AC
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 80

Attack Pattern Name: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic (1)

Description
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass
validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially
harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective
at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character
encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long.
However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in
some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to
use the ``shortest possible'' encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings
that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly
subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs
security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input,
but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.

Solutions and Mitigations
The Unicode Consortium recognized multiple representations to be a problem
and has revised the Unicode Standard to make multiple representations of the
same code point with UTF-8 illegal. The UTF-8 Corrigendum lists the newly
restricted UTF-8 range (See references). The exact response required from an
UTF-8 decoder on invalid input is not uniformly defined by the standards. In
general, there are several ways a UTF-8 decoder might behave in the event of
an invalid byte sequence:

Parent Mitigation: SI
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 81

Attack Pattern Name: Web Logs Tampering (3)

Discription
Protection services in security are vulnerable so they are backstopped by
detection in the so-called protect-detect-respond model. A key element in
detection is log files, to identify a threat impact, for audit purposes, or simply
responding to a crash. While penetrating a system requires a set of skills, more
advanced attackers will cover their tracks by manipulating log files to either
erase entries or input false entries to throw the system administrators off their
trail. Since most requests to web servers are logged (at least header request
response data) the attacker literally has the ability to generate log data in every
request. Of course this is not the same as always being able to delete otherwise
tamper with log data.
Web Logs Tampering attacks involve an attacker injecting, deleting or
otherwise tampering with the contents of web logs.
Additionally, writing malicious data to log files may target jobs, filters,
reports, and other agents that process the logs in an asynchronous attack
pattern.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Use input validation before writing to web log
Design: Validate all log data before it is output

Parent Mitigation: AC, AU, SI
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Parent Threat: Resource Depletion

Attack Pattern ID: 82

Attack Pattern Name: XML Denial of Service (XDoS) (6)

Description:
XML Denial of Service (XDoS) can be applied to any technology that utilizes
XML data. This is, of course, most distributed systems technology including
Java, .Net, databases, and so on. XDoS is most closely associated with web
services, SOAP, and Rest, because remote service requesters can post
malicious XML payloads to the service provider designed to exhaust the
service provider's memory, CPU, and/or disk space. The main weakness in
XDoS is that the service provider generally must inspect, parse, and validate
the XML messages to determine routing, workflow, security considerations,
and so on. It is exactly these inspection, parsing, and validation routines that
XDoS targets. There are three primary attack vectors that XDoS can navigate
Target CPU through recursion: attacker creates a recursive payload and sends
to service provider
Target memory through jumbo payloads: service provider uses DOM to parse
XML. DOM creates in memory representation of XML document, but when
document is very large (for example, north of 1 Gb) service provider host may
exhaust memory trying to build memory objects.
XML Ping of death: attack service provider with numerous small files that clog
the system.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Utilize a Security Pipeline Interface (SPI) to mediate communications
between service requester and service provider The SPI should be designed to
throttle up and down and handle a variety of payloads.
Design: Utilize clustered and fail over techniques, leverage network transports
to provide availability such as HTTP load balancers
Implementation: Check size of XML message before parsing

Parent Mitigation: AC, SI, CM, CA, SC, CP
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 83

Attack Pattern Name: XPath Injection (2)

Description
An attacker can craft special user-controllable input consisting of XPath
expressions to inject the XML database and bypass authentication or glean
information that he normally would not be able to. XPath Injection enables an
attacker to talk directly to the XML database, thus bypassing the application
completely. XPath Injection results form the failure of an application to
properly sanitize input used as part of dynamic XPath expressions used to
query an XML database. In order to successfully inject XML and retrieve
information from a database, an attacker:

Solutions and Mitigations
Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be validated and
filtered for illegal characters as well as content that can be interpreted in the
context of an XPath expression. Characters such as a single-quote(') or
operators such as or (|), and (&) and such should be filtered if the application
does not expect them in the context in which they appear. If such content
cannot be filtered, it must at least be properly escaped to avoid them being
interpreted as part of XPath expressions.
Use of parameterized XPath queries - Parameterization causes the input to be
restricted to certain domains, such as strings or integers, and any input outside
such domains is considered invalid and the query fails.
Use of custom error pages - Attackers can glean information about the nature
of queries from descriptive error messages. Input validation must be coupled
with customized error pages that inform about an error without disclosing
information about the database or application.

Parent Mitigation: SC, SI
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 84

Attack Pattern Name: XQuery Injection (3)

Description
This attack utilizes XQuery to probe and attack server systems; in a similar
manner that SQL Injection allows an attacker to exploit SQL calls to RDBMS,
XQuery Injection uses improperly validated data that is passed to XQuery
commands to traverse and execute commands that the XQuery routines have
access to. XQuery injection can be used to enumerate elements on the victim's
environment, inject commands to the local host, or execute queries to remote
files and data sources.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Perform input white list validation on all XML input
Implementation: Run xml parsing and query infrastructure with minimal
privileges so that an attacker is limited in their ability to probe other system
resources from xql.

Parent Mitigation: SI, SA, AC
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Parent Mitigation: Probabilistic Techniques

Attack Pattern ID: 85
Attack Pattern Name: Client Network Footprinting (using Ajax/XSS) (4)

Description
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation
to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it
does optimize them from an attacker point of view. In many XSS attacks the
attacker must get a "hole in one" and successfully exploit the vulnerability on
the victim side the first time, once the client is redirected the attacker has many
chances to engage in follow on probes, but their is only one first chance. In a
widely used web application this is not a major problem because 1 in a 1,000 is
good enough in a widely used application.
A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the environment to
understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration,
the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are
typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities,
well known ports, network locations and so on.

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting
Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in browser
Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on
the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service
packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies, staying current on
patch release that deal with XSS countermeasures mitigates this.

Parent Mitigation: AC, SC, SI, RA
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 86

Attack Pattern Name: Embedding Script (XSS) in HTTP headers (4)

Description
An attack of this type exploits web applications that generate web content,
such as links in a HTML page, based on unvalidated or improperly validated
data submitted by other actors. XSS in HTTP Headers attacks target the HTTP
headers which are hidden from most users and may not be validated by web
applications. As with all XSS attacks, there are a number of possible targets:
1. Launch attack on web browser clients and client machine
2. Launch attacks on client machines environment, such as LAN or Intranet
3. Launch attack on web server, including remote web servers

Solutions and Mitigations
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.
Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement
Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR or other
means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the server side, the client's
browser has no way of discerning where the data is originating from.
Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized
against an acceptable content specification.
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as Javascript in browser
Implementation: Session tokens for specific host
Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on
the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service
packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies, staying current on
patch release that deal with XSS countermeasures mitigates this.

Parent Mitigation: AC, SC, SI, RA
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality

Attack Pattern ID: 87

Attack Pattern Name: Forceful Browsing (3)

Description
An attacker employs forceful browsing to access portions of a website that are
otherwise unreachable through direct URL entry.

Solutions and Mitigations
Authenticate request to every resource. In addition, every page or resource
must ensure that the request it is handling has been made in an authorized
context.
Forceful browsing can also be made difficult to a large extent by not hardcoding names of application pages or resources. This way, the attacker cannot
figure out, from the application alone, the resources available from the present
context.

Parent Mitigation: AC, IA, SC
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 88

Attack Pattern Name: OS Command Injection (3)

Description
An attacker can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate
privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying
operating system.

Solutions and Mitigations
Use language APIs rather than relying on passing data to the operating system
shell or command line. Doing so ensures that the available protection
mechanisms in the language are intact and applicable.
Filter all incoming data to escape or remove characters or strings that can be
potentially misinterpreted as operating system or shell commands
All application processes should be run with the minimal privileges required.
Also, processes must shed privileges as soon as they no longer require them.

Parent Mitigation: SI, AC, CM
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Parent Threat: Spoofing and Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 89

Attack Pattern Name: Pharming (8)

Description
Pharming attacks occur when victims provide sensitive information to websites
that do not possess a valid certificate from well-known certificate authorities.

Solutions and Mitigations
All sensitive information must be handled over a secure connection. Known
vulnerabilities in DNS or router software or in operating systems must be
patched as soon as a fix has been released and tested. End users must ensure
that they provide sensitive information only to websites that they trust, over a
secure connection with a valid certificate issued by a well-known certificate
authority.

Parent Mitigation: AC, CA, IA, SC, CM, CP, RA, SI
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Parent Threat: Exploitation of Privilege or Trust

Attack Pattern ID: 90

Attack Pattern Name: Reflection Attack in Authentication Protocol (4)

Description
A single sign-on solution for a network uses a fixed preshared key with its
clients to initiate the signon process in order to avoid eavesdropping on the
initial exchanges.

Solutions and Mitigations
The server must initiate the handshake by issuing the challenge. This ensures
that the client has to respond before the exchange can move any further
The use of HMAC to hash the response from the server can also be used to
thwart reflection. The server responds by returning its own challenge as well as
hashing the client's challenge, its own challenge and the preshared secret.
Requiring the client to respond with the HMAC of the two challenges ensures
that only the possessor of a valid preshared secret can successfully hash in the
two values.
Introducing a random nonce with each new connection ensures that the
attacker can not employ two connections to attack the authentication protocol.

Parent Mitigation: IA, SI, AC, SC
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 91

Attack Pattern Name: XSS in IMG Tags (1)

Description
Image tags are an often overlooked, but convenient, means for a Cross Site
Scripting attack. The attacker can inject script contents into an image (IMG)
tag in order to steal information from a victim's browser and execute malicious
scripts.

Solutions and Mitigations
In addition to the traditional input fields, all other user controllable inputs, such
as image tags within messages or the likes, must also be subjected to input
validation. Such validation should ensure that content that can be potentially
interpreted as script by the browser is appropriately filtered.All output
displayed to clients must be properly escaped. Escaping ensures that the
browser interprets special scripting characters literally and not as script to be
executed.

Parent Mitigation: SI
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks

Attack Pattern ID: 92

Attack Pattern Name: Forced Integer Overflow (4)

Description
This attack forces an integer variable to go out of range. The integer variable is
often used as an offset such as size of memory allocation or similarly. The
attacker would typically control the value of such variable and try to get it out
of range. For instance the integer in question is incremented past the maximum
possible value, it may wrap to become a very small, or negative number,
therefore providing a very incorrect value which can lead to unexpected
behavior. At worst the attacker can execute arbitrary code.

Solutions and Mitigations:
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Carefully review the service's implementation before making it available to
user. For instance you can use manual or automated code review to uncover
vulnerabilities such as integer overflow.
Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete
solution.
Always do bound checking before consuming user input data.

Parent Mitigation: CA, RA, SC, SI
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 93

Attack Pattern Name: Log Injection-Tampering-Forging (5)

Description
This attack targets the log files of the target host. The attacker injects,
manipulates or forges malicious log entries in the log file, allowing him to
mislead a log audit, cover traces of attack, or perform other malicious actions.
The target host is not properly controlling log access. As a result tainted data is
resulting in the log files leading to a failure in accoutability, non-repudiation
and incident forensics capability.

Solutions and Mitigations
Carefully control access to physical log files.
Do not allow tainted data to be written in the log file without prior input
validation. Whitelisting may be used to properly validate the data.
Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.
Use static analysis tools to identify log forging vulnerabilities.
Avoid viewing logs with tools that may interpret control characters in the file,
such as command-line shells.

Parent Mitigation: AC, IA, SC, AU, RA
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Parent Threat: Spoofing

Attack Pattern ID: 94

Attack Pattern Name: Man in the Middle (3)

Description
This type of attack targets the communication between two components
(typically client and server). The attacker places himself in the communication
channel between the two components. Whenever one component attempts to
communicate with the other (data flow, authentication challenges, etc.), the
data first goes to the attacker, who has the opportunity to observe or alter it,
and it is then passed on to the other component as if it was never intercepted.
This interposition is transparent leaving the two compromised components
unaware of the potential corruption or leakeage of their communications. The
potential for Man-in-the-Middle attacks yields an implicit lack of trust in
communication or identify between two components.

Solutions and Mitigations
Get your Public Key signed by a Certificate Authority
Encrypt your communication using cryptography (SSL,...)
Use Strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate both ends of any
communications channel.
Exchange public keys using a secure channel

Parent Mitigation: AC, IA, SC
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Parent Threat: Abuse of Functionality

Attack Pattern ID: 95

Attack Pattern Name: WSDL Scanning (1)

Description:
This attack targets the WSDL interface made available by a web service. The
attacker may scan the WSDL interface to reveal sensitive information about
invocation patterns, underlying technology implementations and associated
vulnerabilities. This type of probing is carried out to perform more serious
attacks (e.g. parameter tampering, malicious content injection, command
injection, etc.). WSDL files provide detailed information about the services
ports and bindings available to consumers. For instance, the attacker can
submit special characters or malicious content to the Web service and can
cause a denial of service condition or illegal access to database records. In
addition, the attacker may try to guess other private methods by using the
information provided in the WSDL files.

Solutions and Mitigations
It is important to protect WSDL file or provide limited access to it.Review the
functions exposed by the WSDL interface (specially if you have used a tool to
generate it). Make sure that none of them is vulnerable to injection.
Ensure the WSDL does not expose functions and APIs that were not intended
to be exposed.
Pay attention to the function naming convention (within the WSDL interface).
Easy to guess function name may be an entry point for attack.
Validate the received messages against the WSDL Schema. Incomplete
solution

Parent Mitigation: SI
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Parent Threat: Resource Manipulation

Attack Pattern ID: 96

Attack Pattern Name: Block Access to Libraries (5)

Description
An application typically makes calls to functions that are a part of libraries
external to the application. These libraries may be part of the operating system
or they may be third party libraries. It is possible that the application does not
handle situations properly where access to these libraries has been
blocked. Depending on the error handling within the application, blocked
access to libraries may leave the system in an insecure state that could be
leveraged by an attacker.

Solutions and Mitigations
Ensure that application handles situations where access to APIs in external
libraries is not available securely. If the application cannot continue its
execution safely it should fail in a consistent and secure fashion.

CM, SA, SC, SI, RA
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Parent Threat: Probabilistic Techniques

Attack Pattern ID: 97

Attack Pattern Name: Cryptanalysis (2)

Description
Cryptanalysis is a process of finding weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms
and using these weaknesses to decipher the ciphertext without knowing the
secret key (instance deduction). Sometimes the weakness is not in the
cryptographic algorithm itself, but rather in how it is applied that makes
cryptanalysis successful. An attacker may have other goals as well, such as:
1. Total Break - Finding the secret key
2. Gobal Deduction - Finding a functionally equivalent algorithm for
encryption and decryption that does not require knowledge of the secret key.
3. Information Deduction - Gaining some information about plaintexts or
ciphertexts that was not previously known
4. Distinguishing Algorithm - The attacker has the ability to distinguish the
output of the encryption (ciphertext) from a random permutation of bits
The goal of the attacker performing cryptanalysis will depend on the specific
needs of the attacker in a given attack context. In most cases, if cryptanalysis
is successful at all, an attacker will not be able to go past being able to deduce
some information about the plaintext (goal 3). However, that may be sufficient
for an attacker, depending on the context.

Solutions and Mitigations
Ensure that application handles situations where access to APIs in external
libraries is not available securely. If the application cannot continue its
execution safely it should fail in a consistent and secure fashion.

Parent Mitigation: CM, SA, SC, SI, RA
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Parent Threat: Spoofing

Attack Pattern ID: 98

Attack Pattern Name: Phishing

Description
Phishing is a social engineering technique where an attacker masquerades as a
legitimate entity with which the victim might do business in order to prompt
the user to reveal some confidential information (very frequently
authentication credentials) that can later be used by an attacker. Phishing is
essentially a form of information gathering or "fishing" for information.

Solutions and Mitigations
Do not follow any links that you receive within your e-mails and certainly do
not input any login credentials on the page that they take you too. Instead, call
your Bank, Paypal, Ebay, etc., and inquire about the problem. A safe practice
would also be to type the URL of your bank in the browser directly and only
then log in. Also, never reply to any e-mails that ask you to provide sensitive
information of any kind.

Parent Mitigation: AT, SA, SI, PL
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Parent Threat: Resource Depletion

Attack Pattern ID: 99

Attack Pattern Name: XML Parser Attack (3)

Description
Applications often need to transform data in and out of the XML format by
using an XML parser. It may be possible for an attacker to inject data that may
have an adverse effect on the XML parser when it is being processed. These
adverse effects may include the parser crashing, consuming too much of a
resource, executing too slowly, executing code supplied by an attacker,
allowing usage of unintenteded system functionality, etc. An attacker's goal is
to leverage parser failure to his or her advantage. In some cases it may be
possible to jump from the data plane to the control plane via bad data being
passed to an XML parser [1].

Solutions and Mitigation
Carefully validate and sanitize all user-controllable data prior to passing it to
the XML parser routine. Ensure that the resultant data is safe to pass to the
XML parser.
Perform validation on canonical data.
Pick a robust implementation of an XML parser.
Validate XML against a valid schema or DTD prior to parsing

Parent Mitigation: IR, SA, SI
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Parent Threat: Data Structure Attacks

Attack Pattern ID: 100

Attack Pattern Name: Overflow Buffers (2)

Description
Buffer Overflow attacks target improper or missing bounds checking on buffer
operations, typically triggered by input injected by an attacker. As a
consequence, an attacker is able to write past the boundaries of allocated buffer
regions in memory, causing a program crash or potentially redirection of
execution as per the attacker's choice.
Solutions and Mitigations
Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Use secure functions not vulnerable to buffer overflow.
If you have to use dangerous functions, make sure that you do boundary
checking.
Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the
Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds
checking, it is not a complete solution.
Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.
Utilize static source code analysis tools to identify potential buffer overflow
weaknesses in the software.

Parent Mitigation: SI,SC
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Parent Threat: Injection

Attack Pattern ID: 101

Attack Pattern Name: Server Side Includes (4)

Description
An attacker can use Server Side Include (SSI) Injection to send code to a web
application that then gets executed by the web server. Doing so enables the
attacker to achieve similar results to Cross Site Scripting, viz., arbitrary code
execution and information disclosure, albeit on a more limited scale, since the
SSI directives are nowhere near as powerful as a full-fledged scripting
language. Nonetheless, the attacker can conveniently gain access to sensitive
files, such as password files, and execute shell commands.

Solutions and Mitigations
Set the OPTIONS IncludesNOEXEC in the global access.conf file or local
.htaccess (Apache) file to deny SSI execution in directories that do not need
them
All user controllable input must be appropriately sanitized before use in the
application. This includes omitting, or encoding, certain characters or strings
that have the potential of being interpreted as part of an SSI directive
Server Side Includes must be enabled only if there is a strong business reason
to do so. Every additional component enabled on the web server increases the
attack surface as well as administrative overhead

Parent Mitigation: CM, SI, SC, AC
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PMP Summary Table

PM
AC
AT
AU
CA
CM
CP
IA
MA
PE
PL
RA
SA
SC
SI

PMP
81.220
9.19
14.28
20.30
43.130
8.17
31.72
9.13
2.2
7.11
21.42
20.67
55.160
74.235

